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Abstract
An Historical Analysis of the Market-Entry of Non-Bank
Competitors into the Retail Banking Markets in the USA and
Germany between 1980 and 1990, and of the Investments made
by Banks in Information Technology: - A Search for a
Hypothesis about Causation
Jorg Schulz
Information Technology, Commercial Banks, Banking, Retail
Banking, Financial Services, USA, Germany
Throughout the 1980s, information technology gained
increasing importance within commercial banks. There have
also been turbulent competitive developments in the retail
banking market caused by non-banks making inroads into
traditional banking business.
This research examines whether there is a direct
correlation significant changes in the market environment
of commercial banks and significant changes in the banks'
information technology strategy.
The research develops an understanding of this complex
relationship in two distinct retail banking markets, the
USA and Germany, and in two steps. The first is a thorough
literature analysis of the factors influencing the model,
the market-entries of selected non-bank competitors, and
banks' general strategic response. The second is a
qualitative research on the banks' strategic response, in
particular in terms of information technology. The change
of the IT strategy is measured by the investments made by
banks in information technology.
The research finds that commercial banks responded with a
time lag of 1 to 1.5 years to market-entries of a
substantial competitive and strategic scale. They spent
more than twenty percent of their information technology
budget devoted to information technology investments in the
retail banking function of their institution, to respond to
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1. Introduction
1.1 Introduction to the Topic
Throughout the late 1970s and the 1980s, the development
of information systems (IS) and related information
technology (IT) gained increasing importance within
commercial banks. IT developments such as electronic
banking facilities, automated teller machines (ATM), expert
systems, highly proficient customer databases, and
communication links to a whole array of business partners,
are by now standard facilities in a modern, successful
commercial bank. This context raised first of all the
guestion of what was responsible for this activity. Was it
merely IT-related innovations and cyclic technological
breakthroughs that triggered changes in commercial banks'
IT strategies, or was a significant change in the banks'
market environment, as it periodically happens in many
dynamic industries, responsible for a change in the IT
strategy ? It is the central question of this investigation
to find out whether significant changes in the market
environment of commercial banks directly correlate with
significant changes in the banks' IT strategy.
This question shall be analyzed by looking at an
important market segment of a commercial bank, the retail
1
banking market and its competitive developments. This
market segment showed particularly turbulent competitive
developments throughout the 1980s, through non- and near-
banks making inroads into traditional banking business. The
result of these movements is reflected by decreasing growth
of deposits made by the nonbank sector of the economy, in
several years throughout the 1980s (the relevance of these
years will be shown during the dissertation), as well as by
decreasing credit taken by nonbanks. Appendices 8 to 13
give an indication of the competitive developments between
commercial banks and nonbanks during the last decade in the
US and Germany.
To investigate the central question of whether a direct
correlation exists between a change in the banks' market
environment and their IT strategies, and to provide greater
evidence for the outcome, two different banking systems
were deliberately chosen: the US separation banking system,
which by law consists of two distinct parts, commercial and
investment banking, and the German universal banking
system. The retail banking markets in both countries are
analyzed in light of the market-entry of various types of
nonbank institutions, and commercial banks' reaction to it.
Detailed analyses of the market-entries, their competitive
implications on commercial banks, and banks' strategic
response are provided in chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7.
2
The hypothesised direct correlation between a
significant change in the market environment of a
commercial bank due to the market-entry of nonbank
competitors into the retail banking market, and banks'
reaction in terms of their IT strategy is influenced by
several factors. One of them is the regulatory environment
for banks and nonbanks in the retail banking markets under
consideration. Another is the change in private households'
purchasing behaviour of financial products and services
which was observable throughout the 1980s. These factors
are complemented by the way commercial banks perceive the
role and significance of IT and information systems within
their organisations. Part 1 of this dissertation contains
brief analyses of these influencing factors, and
establishes their significance for the research objective.
Before describing in depth the thrust of this research
it is important to state that in a turbulent and complex
market environment, such as the retail banking market, not
only non- and near-bank competition, but also other aspects
such as primarily interbank competition and the market-
entry of foreign banks have significant impacts on domestic
commercial banks. It might be even the case that interbank
competition - with regard to large commercial banks - is
perceived as a stronger competitive force than nonbank
market-entry because of the general tendency among large
contenders of an industry to quickly respond to competitive
3
moves by their rivals. However, it was the objective of
this research to look at changes in commercial banks' IT
strategy caused by a change in the market environment
solely from the perspective of nonbank competition.
Interbank competition and the market-entry of foreign banks
has been deliberately left aside in order to be able to
isolate and explore in detail the perceived correlation
between nonbank competition and the IT strategy of a
commercial bank. Such a research strategy is a necessary
approach to keep the research focused. The other two
aspects also clearly have their justification in this wide
research area but will not be analyzed any further in this
thesis.
1.2 The Research Thrust
The relevance of this topic is determined by the role of
the financial services industry as an intermediary between
all sectors of a national economy. That role necessitates
that the provision of banking products and services is
controlled and supervised by a dedicated banking
legislation to ensure a stable and functionable banking
system, depositor protection, and a safe and sound money
&
supply in the economy. As a conseguence, market entry
restrictions for non- and near-banks concerning various
banking products and services have been implemented in the
past. However, the last decade has witnessed substantial
4
inroads made by those non- and near-banks into traditional
banking services. In 1983, Volcker, the then-chairman of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
identified several factors responsible for that development
in the US:1
the innovation of financial services that
represent close substitutes to typical, protected
banking services.
a more liberal interpretation and various changes
in banking regulations due to market pressures.
- the competitive disadvantage of commercial banks
caused by the structure of the US banking system.
significant changes in consumer' purchasing
behaviour of financial products and services.
the strategic application of information
technology for a more cost-effective and faster
provision of financial services.
Volcker, P.A., 'Statement before the Congress', April
26, 1983, in: Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol.69, pp.356-
364.
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Based on the statements made by Volcker, one can
identify three broad factors, that determine competition in
the retail banking services industry, (1) the significance
of IT, (2) consumer purchasing behaviour, and (3) the
structure and regulations of the banking system. Hence,
before discussing in detail the competitive situation in
the retail banking services industry in light of the
market-entry of nonbanks, and commercial banks' strategic
reaction, particularly in terms of their IT strategy, it is
necessary to briefly demonstrate the significance of the
influencing factors mentioned above for both banking
markets under investigation.
Following that line, the strategic importance of
information technology for a modern commercial bank will be
first established. This is important in light of the fact
that particularly since the early 1970s, strategic
considerations have covered virtually all functions within
an enterprise. The context of business strategies and
strategy formulation was also a very widely researched
academic area throughout the past two decades. Essentially,
it is this development that made a hypothesis like the one
in this dissertation, which inter alia analyses changes in
the IT strategy of a bank, possible. Section 2.1.2
discusses this aspect in detail.
In the context of the market-entry of nonbank
6
competitors, the structure and legislation of both banking
systems is also of crucial importance. This is the case
for two reasons. Firstly, banking legislation clearly
separates banking and non-banking business, and therefore
defines the competitive potential of non- and near-banks.
Secondly, the structure of a national banking system could
clearly be responsible for differences in the development
of typical characteristics of non- and near-bank
competition in both countries. Although these differences
are assumed to exist, which was a main criterion in the
first place for choosing these two diverging banking
systems, and although they do not form the main focus of
attention regarding the correlation to be investigated,
they definitely impinge on the potential market-entry and
hence need to be discussed. In light of that situation, a
brief analysis of the banking system in Germany and the US
with special focus on nonbank regulations is presented in
section 2.2.
Finally, a brief discussion of the changes in consumer
purchasing behaviour of financial services that intensified
such trends as disintermediation, securitisation, and
conglomeratisation, and facilitated the rise of non- and
near-banks will be presented. Appendix 13 indicates the
rise of these non- and near banks by illustrating the
development of their relative importance in relation to all
financial institutions. These discussions form part 1 of
7
this dissertation, called the foundation of the investi¬
gation.
Part 2 of the dissertation consists of a structured
analysis of competitive changes in the retail banking
services market triggered by four different types of
nonbanks, insurance companies, thrift institutions, retail
organisations, and credit card organisations, and
commercial banks' strategic reactions in both countries.
This analysis was conducted by:
(a) focusing on individual services of selected non-
and near-banks, and establishing their
competitive relevance as a substitute service.
If that service was triggered by a change in
regulations, special emphasis was put on that
aspect.
(b) analyzing the competitive implications of these
changes in the market environment on German and
American commercial banks. The focus thereby lay
on nonbanks' market entry and penetration
strategies.
(c) analyzing the various strategic answers and
related IT activities of both German and American
commercial banks to respond to these changes in
8
their market environment.
On the following pages a detailed description of the
research including approach, design, and methodology used,
is presented. This description begins with a brief research
overview.
1.3 Research Overview
The research was evolutionary and carried out in
essentially two stages. Both stages are exploratory in
approach although the methodology differs. Figure 1
provides a road map for the research.
9




There are two stages in the research. These build on each
other to provide the results as presented in part 2 of this
dissertation. They use different methodologies to provide
insights into the fascinating area of banking markets, and
information systems and technology. Both areas are
turbulent and complex, which means permanent change and
adjustments for the companies operating in such a business
climate. Understanding such complex and volatile issues
therefore required a research approach that combined both
a solid literature review to create a proper foundation for
the investigation, and a qualitative and inductive approach
to explore the central question of this dissertation.
After having laid down the framework of the research (as
presented in chapter 2) by discussing the influencing
factors based on the relevant literature, chapter three
introduces the nonbank competitors that were selected in
both retail banking markets to examine our hypothesis. It
also highlights the selection criteria applied.
It is the author's firm conviction that the only method
for developing an understanding of the perceived direct
correlation between a significant change in the banks'
market environment due to the market-entry of nonbanks, and
a significant change of the banks IT strategy was the
method of structured analysis supplemented by semi-
structured interviews. It was the objective of stage 1 to
12
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build up an event-schema2 for the decade of the 1980s that
shows the market-entry of selected nonbank competitors, and
commercial banks' strategic reaction for both the German
and US retail banking markets. This was primarily achieved
through an extensive literature review.
In stage 2, bank managers of predominantly two
functions, namely general business strategy and IT, could
then be confronted with these event schemes and asked to
describe and pinpoint the reaction of their institution in
terms of competitive movements and IT strategy. These
findings were then used to validate the understandings from
stage 1, and supplemented by additional discussions with
industry specialists, consultants, and executives of IT
vendors, in order to generate grounded, substantive theory.3
Chapter 8 highlights the most interesting and unexpected
results of the research. It also offers pointers for
further academic work in this fascinating area.
Pettigrew, A., 'On studying organisational cultures',
in: Qualitative Methodology, ed. by van Maanen, J, ,
Beverly Hills, 1979.
Glaser, B. G. / Strauss, A. L., 'Discovery of
Substantive Theory: A Basic Strategy Underlying
Qualitative Research', in: Qualitative Methodology:
Firsthand Involvement With The Social World, ed. by
Filstead, W. J. Chicago, 1970, pp.288-301.
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1.4 The Research Approach
The research approach, using qualitative analysis as
well as extensive literature reviews including a whole
array of journals, periodicals, press clippings, and a
review of the previous research work in this area, was felt
to be the only method to tackle this complex research
issue.
Due to the complex nature of the research issue and the
fact that similar investigations in the retail banking
industry have not been conducted, an explanatory approach
to study our research issue was necessary. In addition, the
nature of the variables proved to be very qualitative. A
quantitative methodology, such as regression analysis, to
finally test the grounded theory statistically (in our case
the perceived correlation) was therefore felt to be
superfluous. The secretive nature of the banking industry
in the provision of hard figures was also a restraining
factor.
In order to provide greater evidence for the perceived
correlation under investigation the author found that
applying a comparative analysis to explore this research
issue in two different banking markets would be a suitable
approach.
14
These and other methodological issues of the research
are further discussed in section 1.5.
1.5 The Research Design
This research arose out of an earlier study into IT,
information systems, and the banking market4, and from the
researcher's personal work experience with an IT
manufacturer whose clients, inter alia, were large
commercial banks.
Before discussing in-depth the research design, it is
important to restate the starting point of this research.
In talking to bankers, a statement frequently made by them
was "...you know we have been operating in an increasingly
volatile market environment for the past ten to fifteen
years. Our systems expense budgets in both retail and
wholesale banking are growing significantly...".5
In addition, as we will see in section 2.1 of this
dissertation, IT must be regarded as a critical success
factor for a modern commercial bank, which reguires
continuous investment and the formulation of strategies. As
Schulz, J., Enterprise-wide Modelling as an Approach
of Banks to Cope with Recent Changes in the Regulatory
Environment. Competition, and Customer Behaviour under
the Perspective of 1992. unpublished MBA dissertation,
University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, 1990.
Rahlves, H.D., Director of Organisation at Deutsche
Bank AG, 1991.
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a consequence of these discussions with bankers and IT
vendors, the thought arose that it might be expected that
the aggregate spending on IT (please see Appendix 16), the
development of information systems, and their application
follows a certain trend line which is associated with
changes in that market environment. This potential
correlation triggered the research efforts presented in
this dissertation.
It was felt that the general approach to meet the
research objective - does a significant change in the
market environment of a commercial bank, due to the market-
entry of nonbank competitors, directly correlate with a
significant change in the banks' IT strategy ? - was
inductive, and was best served by a thorough literature
review, and the complementary use of qualitative
methodology. This combined approach allows a synergistic
view of the evidence, and provides supplementary and mutual
verification of the research problem.
The literature review of stage 1 of the research process
allowed the research to gain familiarity with the
phenomenon to be investigated, to identify influencing
factors, and to systematically create a foundation for the
thesis. Stage 2 on the other hand, established the final
pattern and inter-relationship between the variables of
this investigation. Mintzberg confirms this approach:
16
"For while systematic data creates the foundation of our
theories, it is the anecdotal data that enables us to do
the building".6
Apart from identifying influencing factors, stage 1 was
designed to develop an event schema of the market-entry
dates, and related activities of selected nonbank
competitors and commercial banks' strategic reactions to
it. In order to pinpoint the date of the commercial banking
industry's strategic response to the market-entry of
nonbank competitors in both the US and Germany, the first
response of one of the large enterprises of the commercial
banking industry is identified as the response date. This
approach covers two important issues. Firstly, it
neutralises the possibility that in many instances a tiny
little enterprise of an industry can legitimately claim to
have been first to respond to changes in the market
environment without having significant market power and
importance to establish a substantial difference. Secondly,
it takes into consideration the natural imitation effect
and follower strategy among large contenders of an
industry. The banks that were included in the research
sample are presented in section 1.5.1.
Only those types of nonbank competitors were chosen for
investigation that were observable as substantial
Mintzberg, H., 'An emerging strategy of direct
research', in: Administrative Science Quarterly.
vol.24, Dec. 1979, pp.582-89.
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competitors in both retail banking markets. Chapter 3
provides an overview of these competitors.
A time horizon of one decade was felt to be sufficient
for this research. Hence the interval 198 0 to 199 0 was
chosen.
1.5.1 Multicompany Research
The author felt that a research objective like ours can
only be met by focusing on the 'big players' of the
commercial banking industry. This is true for three
reasons: the availability of information, the size of the
IT budget, and the comparability of German and US
commercial banks. Bearing in mind the strongly secretive
nature of the banking industry compared to other
industries, the availability of information stemming from
bank internal and external sources increases with the size
of the bank. In addition, attempting to analyze a perceived
correlation such as the one in this research requires
substantial IT budgets and the intention of a company to
remain state-of-the-art in terms of technology used.
Furthermore, the comparison between the US and German
banking markets required commercial banks that provide
similar product and service ranges. Only large, global-
orientated commercial banks meet this requirement. Finally,
18
the author's personal contacts dating back to his work
experience with commercial banks influenced the structure
of the research sample. Hence, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner
Bank, Commerzbank, and Fiducia were chosen in the German
market, and Citicorp and Chase Manhattan for the US retail
banking market. The product and service ranges of banks of
this size are very alike. This is not the case if, for
example, the US and German savings banks industry is
compared.
Single company research, despite its richness of detail,
was rejected as a feasible approach because of its
disadvantage to generalize from.
In practical terms, an understanding of such a complex
research issue requires multicompany research. It also
reguires much effort and time to be put into each company
to achieve the research guality needed. A larger sample
could not have been researched in the time scale available,
and bearing in mind the relative secretive nature of the
commercial banking industry. Additionally, the banks chosen
are among the leaders in both markets.
There are of course some trade-offs to be made. It is
difficult to generalise from a small sample. There is also
the danger of researcher bias, and the fact that the same
variables and relations might be slightly different in each
19
organisation of the same industry. However, the decision on
how the research is designed depends on the research goals,
strategies, and largely the industry context. The aim of
our research is to create a fairly broad model. Given the
nature of the variables, the nature of the industry, the
criteria mentioned above, and the size and market position
of the companies chosen, this approach is inevitable and
the most valuable. Important insights can be gained that
can be tested in different ways at other times.
1.5.2 The Qualitative Research - Stage 2
The research method of stage 2 is gualitative and
inductive in nature. It is based on the principles of
developing grounded theory7, which proceeds in a bottom up
direction in that hypotheses and theory are generated from
ground up with raw data as a starting point. This approach
o
is regarded as extremely practical , useful in theory
formulation, and enables the prediction and exploration of
behaviour. As a result of a research process that creates
theory from data, constructs, concepts, models, and
hypotheses generally emerge during this process. However,
the initial model itself may come from sources other than
Glaser, B. / Strauss, A., The discovery of grounded
theory. Chicago, 1967.
Sekaran, U. , Research Methods for Business, 2nd edn.,
New York, 1992, Ch.7.
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the data. In our case the perceived correlation came from
an observation of the environment and was narrowed down and
refined through stage 1 of this research (the creation of
an event-schema).
1.5.2.1 The Research Process and Interview Method
Contact with the banks arose from personal contact with
various key staff, stemming from the author's previous work
experience in this business area. Additionally, by
contacting management consultants and industry specialists
within IBM, valuable contacts could be made that would have
been extremely difficult to achieve otherwise.
Due to the nature of the variables and the already
existing event-schema at this point in time, primarily two
key functions within the banks had to be interviewed, the
strategy/marketing function which was able to provide
information on the organisation's competitive behaviour
towards the threatening market-entry of nonbanks, and the
IT/IS function responsible for the development and
implementation of IT strategies and the required
investments.
It was the aim of this study to interview the relevant
key managers in all banks - that is senior managers and
functional executives - to achieve the highest possible
21
degree of standardisation. Hence, the respondents did not
vary widely in function, age, and responsibility.
Interviewing stopped when key personnel had been
interviewed and when no further information was
discovered. In the case of a denial of a personal visit,
telephone interviews with these managers were held in order
to meet the objective of the research process. For the sake
of clarification of some details, and due to the complex
research topic, a snowballing technigue9 was occasionally
used to identify further specialists and departmental
managers. Among those were also for example executives and
higher management of the banks' subsidiaries such as the
Deutsche Bank Bauspar AG (the bank's captive thrift
institution) or Deutsche Bank Lebensversicherung AG (the
bank's captive life insurance subsidiary).
The interviews were semi-structured and lasted
between one and three hours. They were recorded by constant
note taking. Most of the interview partners were not
willing to be tape recorded. After having agreed on
constant note taking, the respondents expressed their
opinions very openly and gave as much time as was required.
Guided by the event-schema specific, precise questions
Spekman, R.E. / Stern, L.W., 'Environmental uncertainty
and buying group structure: an empirical
investigation', in: Journal of Marketing, vol.43,
Spring 1979, pp.54-64.
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were asked. The objective was to cover the issues pre¬
determined by the literature review, and gradually widen
10 • •
the scope of the questions. The central questions include
discussions of the following:
1. Nonbank competitor activities
effect on the organisation
- market penetration strategies
the future of nonbank competition
characteristics of nonbank competition
2. The bank's strategic response
timing and conditions
business strategy to respond
- change within the organisation
3. The development of IT
- role of IT within the organisation
future of IT within the banking industry
impact of IT on relationships with business
partners
IT strategies and their formulation
4. Change of the IT strategy
timing and conditions
- required IT activities and cost
IT budget developments
Interviews took place between November 1991 and April 1992.
In restating the perceived correlation, that a
significant change in the market environment, due to the
market-entry of nonbank competitors, is directly correlated
with a significant change in a commercial bank's IT
strategy, one factor - the attribute significant - requires
A summary of the questions is provided in Appendix 1.
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further explanation. In line with our research approach,
bank managers within the IT/IS function11 were asked to
describe and quantify the reaction of their institution in
terms of a change in the IT strategy. In order to 'test'
the significance of a change in the banks' IT strategy, the
IT budget allocated to the retail banking function (this
dissertation only analyses the retail banking market) was
applied as a yardstick. This was done in order to introduce
a quantifiable parameter, and because of the author's
experience in this area, supplemented by research in other
industries in which the IT budget was identified as a
frequently used instrument of IT strategies.12 At first
sight, it also appears reasonable to look at the banks
annual accounts, especially their depreciation charges,
which might give guidance on the growth of spending on
information technology. However, this approach is not
helpful with regard to our research problem because of the
incomparability of accounting standards in the US and
Germany concerning depreciation methods, and the fact that
depreciation charges are only published as part of
commercial banks operating expenses, which also includes
for instance depreciation of buildings, property, and
The function is called IS/IT function because some
banks simply call it IT, whereas others call it IS.
However, both mean the same function.
Hogarth-Scott, S., The Impact of Information Technology
on Retailer-Manufacturer Relationships . Ph.D
Dissertation, University of Bradford, 1991, p.98.
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general business equipment. Appendix 16 indicates large
German commercial banks' operating expenses of the banking
business throughout the previous decade.
Discussions with various bank managers in these
functions, industry consultants, and executives of IT
vendors, led to the assumption - in the sense of an
operational definition for the purpose of this dissertation
- that a change of at least twenty percent of the IT budget
devoted to IT expenditure and investments in the retail
banking function of a commercial bank to react to the
market-entry of nonbank competitors must be regarded as
significant.
Furthermore, in order to be able to test the correlation
with the market-entry of a nonbank competitor, this change
in the IT budget was only investigated in the year of the
banks' strategic response to the market-entry.
In order to determine the change in the IT budget, IT
managers were asked to isolate the aggregated cost of IT
activities such as the purchase of IT equipment, systems
design activities, project cost etc., which were directly
attributable to the strategic response of their
organisation to the market-entry of a specific type of
nonbank competitor. They were then asked to rank this
aggregated cost block against the total IT budget devoted
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to the retail banking function.
The interviews were transcribed, followed by a thorough
content analysis to cluster and summarise the notes taken.
This was done to discover patterns within the data
concerning the correlation of the variables that led to a
better interpretation of the data, a more holistic view of
the entire research issue, and also culminated in the
development of diagrams at the end of chapters 4 to 7 which
try to graphically illustrate the correlation.
Other sources of information include the use of
extensive company documentation which was provided by both
the relevant banks and nonbank competitors. These were
supplemented by consultant reports, and industry and sales
analyses provided by IT vendors (predominantly IBM) . They
represented additional sources to validate the results. The
documents that were used are quoted in the relevant
sections.
The results obtained through the individual research
stages were also discussed with independent industry
consultants, such as McKinsey, to add another, more
holistic angle to the findings.
With regard to validity and reliability of the
findings, the research as a whole should be considered.
26
Both stages were necessary to fulfil the research
objectives. Stage 1 would not have met the research
objective on its own. It was a reguired preliminary step
from which stage 2 benefitted. Both stages also have
different value and form part of the total research
approach, both methodologically and conceptually. The
interviews held at stage 2 were as free of researcher bias
as possible, and the literature was as objectively assessed
as possible. As a consequence of these reasons, questions
of validity and reliability must be applied to the whole
research and the main findings, and not to each stage
separately.
1.6 The Significance of the Study
Thus far, an extensive literature base exists in the
area of industry analysis and the strategic value of
information technology. This study pulls these disparate
areas together by means of correlation. This provides new
insights. In attempting to prove that there is a direct
correlation between a change in the market environment and
a change in the banks' IT strategy, an area which has not
been tackled before, extremely helpful insights for both
bank executives and IT vendors are presented, regarding the
allocation of fastly increasing budgets and the related
spending behaviour.
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In trying to clarify that a correlation between these
variables exists, this study builds a new framework for





2. Foundations of the Investigation
Several reasons for nonbank institutions to encroach
upon traditional retail banking business in the 1980s are
observable. These can be identified as (a) the constantly
growing profitability ratios13 in the commercial banking
industry of the 1970s, (b) stiffer competition and poorer
1L.
growth outlook in the incumbent industries , (c) positive
profitability outlooks in the consumer banking market
segment, due to changes in consumer demand patterns of
financial services, and intensified utilisation of
information technology (IT) in the area of routine banking
services with its production cost reduction effects.
However, this at first sight highly lucrative market
segment is protected by banking regulations. In both
Gregorash, G. / Maloney, E., 'Banking 1988: The eye of
the storm', in: Economic Perspectives. FED of Chicago,
July/Aug. 1989, pp.2-12.
Moody's Industry Outlook for the retail market
predicted only moderate growth in the retailing
industry for the second half of the 1980s and the
beginning of the 1990s.
Pavel, C. / Rosenblum, H. , 'Banks and nonbanks: The
horse race continuous', in: Economic Perspectives.
May/June 1985, pp.3-17, here p.6.
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banking systems, the US and the German banking system, the
market-entry of nonbanks into the retail banking market is
restricted by legal entry barriers to ensure a safe and
sound status quo of the national banking system. Hence, the
national banking legislation is responsible for the degree
of competition between banks and nonbanks, and the market
potential permitted to nonbank competitors. This clearly
influences the market-entry side of our correlation and is
therefore discussed in more detail in sections 2.2 and 2.3.
Comparable competitive developments between commercial
banks and nonbanks in both countries preempt a comparable
market environment. If such a condition does not exist - as
in the case of the regulatory environment - national
characteristics of the banking system remain an important
influencing factor in the competitive relation between
banks and nonbanks. This environmental force might then
have an impact on the perception of commercial banks in how
to strategically respond to the market-entry of a nonbank
competitor.
A second important environmental factor that impinges on
the perceived correlation - again the market-entry side -
is the demand pattern of financial services. Without a
strong demand side that is responsive to attractive
financial products resembling substitutes to traditional
banking products, there is no point in a nonbank competitor
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even attempting a market-entry. Differences in the
development of this demand pattern in both banking markets
may also be responsible for different competitive
developments between banks and nonbanks. Hence, similar to
an analysis covering the legislative environment an
analysis of the changing purchasing behaviour of financial
services in the US and Germany is required in order to
understand later on (in stage 2 of the research) potential
differences in commercial banks' strategic response. This
analysis is presented in section 2.4.
Finally, commercial banks' perception of the strategic
significance of information systems and their underlying
technology also has an impact on our perceived correlation
between a significant change in the market environment due
to the market-entry of nonbank competitors, and a
significant change in the banks' IT strategy. If a company
does not regard IT as a critical factor contributing to the
success of the enterprise, it is unlikely that its IT
strategy would significantly change in response to a
changing market environment. Hence, it is necessary to
establish that IT is of strategic importance for a modern
commercial bank. This is done in section 2.1.
In addition, the fact that since the 1970s research into
business strategy and strategy formulation has covered
virtually all functions within an enterprise, represents
an academic angle that made a hypothesis like the one in
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this dissertation possible, which at least in parts also
deals with a strategy element.
However, if large commercial banks in both countries,
despite existing differences in the legislative
environment, divergent developments in the demand pattern
of financial services, and their perception of the
strategic significance of IT, do react with a significant
change of their IT strategy to the market-entry of a
nonbank competitor, a direct correlation between that
market-entry and a commercial bank's IT strategy might
exist.
As a consequence of these considerations, it is crucial
to briefly discuss both banking systems, changes in the
consumer demand pattern of financial services, significant
changes in the regulatory framework, and the perception of
the strategic relevance of IT for a modern commercial bank,
as influencing factors to the hypothesis and its underlying
variables under investigation.
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2.1 Significance of IT for Commercial Banks
2.1.1 Definitions
Since the early 1980s, the time when retail banking
developed into a business area of constantly increasing
relevance to a commercial bank, this phrase has been used,
exploited, and interpreted in many ways. Unfortunately,
there exists no standard definition of retail banking and
its related market in the general banking literature. In
part because most banks include a slightly different set of
activities under that heading. There are, however, certain
characteristics that determine a typical retail banking
business. Many authors, under the constraint of that
imprecise category of activity, chose the approach of
defining retail banking by pointing out its
characteristics. The following definition is a typical
example of that approach:
'Retail banking will mean a financial service or group
of services offered through an institution to personal
customers. Although primarily branch based, the
category will include any method of delivering
financial services to the personal customer'.15
Other authors merely talk about consumer banking without
even specifying in detail its characteristics.
Retail banking activities tend to include all activities
Howcroft, J.B. / Lavis J., Retail Banking, New York,
1986, p.6.
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that are not wholesale based, directed toward the private
sector, and generally performed through a branch network.
Typical retail banking business encompasses funds transfer,
all kinds of credit and deposit services, and financial
consulting. Banks themselves talk about the consumer
banking function, and define that business by typical
product lines offered. In Citibank's case for instance, the
consumer business focuses on 'the broad middle market and
serves the needs of customers through branches, cards, and
mortgage financing'.16
For the purpose of this investigation, retail banking
business, and hence the retail banking market for
commercial banks, is defined in the sense of an operational
definition as the set of banking utilities offered to
private households. This set ranges from funds transfer
utilities, all kinds of short and long-term consumer credit
and deposit facilities, to financial services consulting.
The effort of a bank is generally market-driven but the
engine to deliver new products or to enable smooth
processing is information technology. It must therefore be
regarded as an important factor for a modern commercial
bank (see section 2.1.1). Hence it is necessary to have a
crisp definition of IT, and concerning our hypothesis under
Citicorp, Strategies for the Nineties. New York, 1990.
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investigation, a definition of the expression IT strategy
in banking.
Information technology (IT) in this dissertation can be
defined as the mix of eguipment, methods, tools, and
principles which are employed for the availability and
utilisation of information within an enterprise to enable
sound decision-making processes, and to subseguently meet
corporate objectives. Based on this framework, IT
encompasses the entire set of hardware, software, and
orgware implemented to plan, organize, execute, and control
the information function (defined as the recognition,
storage, transformation, and transfer of data17) . This is
slightly different from the definition of an information
1 ft
system (IS) which covers a much wider area including IT.
Smith provides a detailed description of typical
information systems and technology currently employed in
Wittmann, W. , 'Information', in: Handworterbuch der
Organisation. ed. by Grochla, E. , 2nd edn., Stuttgart,
1980, Sp.894-904.
For other definitions of IS please see
Amler, A.W., Analyze und Gestaltung strategischer
Informationssvsteme der Unternehmung: Ansatze zu einer
Neuorientierung der Methodenkritik, Gottingen, 1983,
pp.63; also Berthel, J., Betriebliche
Informationssvsteme. Stuttgart, 1975, pp.13; also
Ippisch, W. , ' Strategische Uberlegungen zum Stellenwert
neuer Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien in
der bankbetrieblichen Leistungsproduktion', in:
Bankautomation und Bankmarketing, Schriftenreihe des
osterreichischen Forschungsinsti tuts fur das
Sparkassenwesen. 02/1986, p.21.
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commercial banks operating in retail banking.19
A strategy functions as a methodology for operating a
bank within a volatile market environment (in the case of
this investigation the retail banking market), and for
providing action plans to adjust to changes in this market
environment. Hence, IT strategy in this dissertation means
the aggregation of all IT activities, including internal
application design processes, the purchase or rental of IT
equipment from external organisations, as well as
communication activities and related tools to adjust to a
changing market environment. In light of the hypothesis
under investigation, that a direct correlation exists
between a change in the banks' market environment through
the market-entry of nonbank institutions, and the banks' IT
strategy, the aggregated cost of those IT activities that
are clearly attributable to the strategic response of a
commercial bank to such a market-entry, are taken as a
measure to test the significance of a change in the banks'
IT strategy. The level of significance is thereby assumed
to be twenty percent or more of the budget devoted to IT
expenditure and investments in the retail banking function
of a commercial bank in the year of the banks' strategic
response.
for an in-depth description of the retail banking
technology see Smith, C., Retail banking technology:
a practical guide to the information systems used in
consumer banking. London, 1987.
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If asked to describe their IT strategy in retail banking,
many bankers immediately talk about electronic banking.
This is understandable because electronic banking is
generally employed to enhance the customer interface of a
commercial bank. Bearing in mind what has been said already
about typical characteristics of retail banking, for
instance that it is directed toward the private sector, and
the branch orientation of the delivery system, this way of
thinking makes sense. Accordingly, a number of authors
simply define electronic banking as a heading that includes
all IT supported businesses between the customers and their
• • • • • 20 • • • . .
financial institution. But similar to the definition of
retail banking, electronic banking is not precisely
defined. The variety of definitions in the literature is
large. A typical example is the following:
'Electronic banking systems are electronic systems
that transfer money and record data related to these
transfers. In effect, they entail the use of computers
and communication lines to transfer funds without
paper' .21
From the bank's perspective, typical definitions follow the
line:
'Under the general heading of Electronic Banking, the
latest electronic and telecommunication facilities are
please see Meyer-Spasche, G., Zahlungsverkehr mit dem
PC, Haar, 1992, pp.15-17; also Benn, J., 'Electronic
Banking', in: Innovationsmanaqement in Banken
Herausforderung der 9Per Jahre. ed. by Schuster, L. ,
St.Gallen, 1985, p.76; also Straub, E. , Electronic
Banking, Die elektronische Schnittstelle zwischen
Banken und Kunden, Bern, 1990, p.36.
Lipis, A.H. / Marschall, T.R. / Linker, J.H.,
Electronic Banking, New York, 1985, p.7.
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grouped which are used to offer existing services via
new marketing channels, to create new ones and to
place them at the disposal of its customers tailored
to meet specific reguirements' .22
According to our definition of IT, electronic banking
represents a subset of IT and hence can be subsumed.
However, in order to clarify its position within the set of
information technologies used in a bank, it is useful to
look at its orientation. Does it include more wholesale or
retail banking orientated technology and information
systems ?
In analyzing the above definitions several key
characteristics of electronic banking are identifiable:
self-service character (ie automated teller machines)
automation of the customer interface (ie self-service
terminals)
internal and external funds transfer (ie EFTPOS
utilities)
telecommunications (ie home or telebanking facilities)
These characteristics show that electronic banking seems to
be more widely used in the retail banking area. The
services in parentheses indicate typical retail banking
services that can be subsumed under these characteristics.
Nevertheless, electronic banking also encompasses a whole
range of IT activities in the wholesale and investment
banking segment (ie Swift networks, external funds
Schweizer Bankgesellschaft, Technobank. 1986, p.l.
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transfer, stock exchange communication etc.).
It is not the aim of this study to further discuss
electronic banking. It was included because many bankers
used this expression at some point in time during the
interviews, and for the sake of completion. It certainly
has its justification in the wide area of information
technology employed within banks. With regard to the
research objective of this dissertation, however, it is
only of minor importance. The elements of electronic
banking that are retail banking oriented (as for instance
some of the characteristics mentioned above), in recalling
that this dissertation concentrates on the retail banking
market only, are included in our definition of IT.
2.1.2 The Strategic Relevance of IT
As many interviews, surveys, and consultants' reports
about the banking industry have shown, a large number of
bank CEOs and CIOs, even today, cannot quantify their
return on systems investment and the contribution of IT to
see Chorafas, D.N., Strategic Planning for Electronic
Banking. London, 1987, Ch.l.
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their company's success. On the other hand, many of the
existing banking products and services of a modern
commercial bank, such as money market accounts, ATM-
networks, and self-service centres emerged around an IT and
IS infrastructure. Given the role and importance IT
embodies for a commercial bank, that is an enormous
contradiction. In a large number of banks - not the
successful banks - IT still remains an unleveraged,
inappropriately measured asset, which is not fully
exploited.25
Bankers must realize that information technology has
altered traditional business models in the world of
banking. Traditional models contained essentially three
factors of production, capital, human, and natural
resources. The use of computer systems, application
systems, and communications for the development,
production, and delivery of products, particularly in the
financial services industry, has changed that model by
introducing a new element - IT. For a modern commercial
bank, the new business model looks like the following
diagram:
First Manhattan Consulting Group, Aligning FSI's
Strategy With Key Trends and Their Impact on Systems
Investments at Financial Institutions. Financial




* natural resources have been subsumed under capital
Figure 2: Business Model of a Modern Commercial Bank
The pivotal role IT plays for a modern bank is also
illustrated by the following example. Internal simulations
within major banks have revealed that a breakdown of the
main computer system with a downtime factor of four days,
would bring a large commercial bank close to insolvency.
The use and availability of information is crucial for a
bank, or as Chorafas and Steinmann have noted:
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• • • 26" The modern bank is information in motion".
Information systems and their underlying technology
incorporate an ambivalent significance for a bank. They are
not only an enabling tool that accelerates product
development cycles, enhances service capabilities, provides
opportunities to gain market share, and improves the
efficiency of internal operations, they also pose
constraints on a bank because of their potential
application by competitors and dependency on vendors of IT.
Both advantages and constraints affect the whole
enterprise, and can only be answered from the firm's
perspective by an appropriate change in corporate strategy.
As a consequence, IT must be regarded as a core element of
corporate strategy.
In more detail, IT provides the following key advantages
and constraints to a commercial bank:
(a) advantages:
- IT can differentiate products & services and the
company itself within the sector
IT can overcome product obsolence and generate new
Chorafas, D.N. / Steinmann, H., Implementing Networks
in Banking and Financial Services, London, 1988, p.4.
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products
IT can create new markets or business segments
IT can enhance the customer - institution relation in
a given market and thereby building in switching cost
- IT presses for decentralisation of power
- IT can increase productivity of operations, modify the
cost function, and subseguently build barriers to
entry.27
Like all coins, there is always a flip side that has to be
taken into consideration by bank managers dealing with IT.
The technological revolution of the past decade has
resulted in increasing differentiation of systems which are
freguently incompatible with each other. This problem
becomes even trickier because of cooperations and the
integration of acguired institutions and their respective
IT and IS infrastructure into the parent's systems.
Investment in IT may be necessary to launch new products,
This list is leaned on de Carmoy' s findings about
technological constraints in global banking strategy.
De Carmoy, H., Global Banking Strategy. Oxford, 1990,
pp.10-11; also Diebold, J., 'Informationstechnik:
Aufbruch in ein neues Zeitalter wirtschaftlichen
Wettbewerbs', in: Zeitschrift fur Organisation,
02/1987, pp.87-92, here p.87.
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but it cannot guarantee increased sales. Furthermore, the
introduction of new information technology creates
additional fixed cost, and also depreciates the previously
existing capital which still had production capability.
Thus, information systems and technology should be managed
and used strategically to balance advantages and
constraints, and to identify success potential that ensures
a long-term, and positive trend in business growth and
profitability.
The importance of IS and IT for individual companies
varies significantly, depending on the industry the company
is based in. Strategic thinking and top management devotion
to IT strategies is determined by that perception. In 1984,
McFarlan developed his famous grid exploring the position
of information systems in various types of companies.28 In
so doing, he identified four general roles of IS, a
distinctly supporting role, a factory role, a turnaround
role, and a strategic role. He ranked major US commercial
banks in the strategic quadrant because they were
critically dependent on the smooth functioning of the daily
IT activities.29
McFarlan, W. , 'Information Technology', in: Harvard
Business Review. May/June 1984, pp.98-103, here p.101.
For a detailed analysis of company's characteristics
and the impact of IT in the other quadrants of the grid
please see McFarlan, W. / McKenny, J. / Pyburn, P.,
'The information archipelago - plotting a course', in:
Harvard Business Review. Jan/Feb. 1983, pp.145-156.
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However, McFarlan based his analysis on data drawn in the
late 1970s and the early 1980s. With regard to the
financial services revolution and the emergence of
retailers, financial conglomerates, insurance companies,
and other non- and near-banks as direct competitors for
banks, whose success was largely dependent on the
application of IT (ie Sears' customer databases that
allowed a quick placement of typical banking products)
requires adjustments of the matrix. Significant technical
changes in IT performance, combined with the evolution of
a new competitive environment, have repositioned many
companies in the matrix. Figure 3 shows the strategic
importance of IS for banks, and also for their direct
competitors in tjie retail banking market.
Strategic Impact of Application








Figure 3: The Role of IS within Commercial Banks Relative
to other Types of Companies
Source: McFarlan, W., 'Information Technology', in:
















This matrix is a helpful tool for bank managers who have
not realized the strategic importance of IT and IS for
their organisations, to visualize their position and to
recognize the position of direct competitors and their
perception of the role of IS. The grid could also be used
as a starting point for reconsidering IT strategies
currently employed.
The strategic importance of IT to a major bank has also
been stressed more recently by Chorafas and Steinmann, who
identified an evolutionary relationship between IS and the
product strategy. Both are strongly commingled, and neither
remained stagnant over time. These authors found four
generations of product strategy and their underlying,
enabling information technology. Most banks, according to
them, are now in the third generation, which is
characterized by a network orientation as opposed to the
stage of batch processing and private online systems (first
generation), and the stage of cooperative online systems
and electronic funds transfer (second generation).30 The
authors predict that the 1990s can only be mastered by the
development of a fourth generation product strategy.
Intelligent networks, that is computers and communication
systems enriched with artificial intelligence (AI) ,
electronic banking, and integrated computer networks
Chorafas, D.N. / Steinmann H., ibid, pp.2-5.
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connecting with the environment, will be the backbone of
the new product strategy.
The strategic importance of IT for a commercial bank can
be substantiated by an earlier study (Porter and Millar,
1985)31 which established the reguirement that IT be a
crucial component of any business strategy for an
enterprise operating in a volatile market environment.
Moreover, the authors found that IT can also substantially
participate in the creation of a competitive advantage over
rivalling companies.
In a study about the profitability of financial products
and services and the underlying technology infrastructure,
it was found that a bank operating in a highly competitive
and dynamic marketplace (such as the retail banking market)
can only survive by getting the products to the market
first. To do so, fourth generation IT is reguired. Banks
that neglect devotion to IT will ultimately lag behind and
finally be driven out of the market.32
These findings relate to the relatively new concept of
commercializing technology. A concept that evolved in the
Porter, M.E. / Millar, V.E., 'How information gives you
competitive advantage' in: Harvard Business Review.
July/Aug. 1985, pp.149-60.
Chorafas, D.N. / Steinmann, H, ibid, 'Product
profitability and information systems', p.9.
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manufacturing industry, and is in the process of being
transferred to the service industry. According to the
concept, excellent companies view commercialisation as a
core strategic discipline, in light of changes in the
business environment, rapid technological innovations, and
high IT cost. Commercialisation begins when a company
identifies a way to use technological advances to meet a
market need. It incorporates a significantly larger share
of IT in their products than competitors and is ultimately
able to shorten product development cycles and to compete
in many product and geographic markets.33 That is also
happening in the retail banking industry. A good example is
the uprise of financial conglomerates and superregional
banks in the US banking market. Banks such as BancOne,
Mellon Bank, or CoreStates recognized the strategic value
of IT. A main similarity among them was that they did not
differentiate between their business and technology.34 Or as
John McCoy, Chairman of BancOne has put it:
'Technology is driving strategy, it is not a cost
centre. During the last 20 years technology has
enabled BancOne to develop superior products and
services' .35
Nevens, M.T. / Summe, G.L. / Uttal, B.,
'Commercializing Technology: What the best companies
do', in: Harvard Business Review. May/June 1990, pp.
154-163.
compare Singhton, J.P., 'Technology gets Top Priority
at Security Pacific', in: The Bankers Magazine.
May/June 1991, pp.4-10.
n.a., John McCoy, 'Managing Technology', in: Bank
Management. Febr. 1990, p.14.
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To indicate the strategic importance of technology for the
organisation as in the above example, banks should also
include IT and IS in their mission statements and corporate
objectives. The following is an excerpt of Citicorp's
mission statement:
'Citicorp's commitment to pursuing advancements in
technology has been in existence for a long time. Even
though the corporation does not consider itself a high
technology company as in the case of IBM, it maintains
that technology will pervade the financial services
industry.
Inherent in this commitment is the establishment of
the Corporate Technology Committee which is chartered
with identifying and taking advantage of opportunities
in telecommunication and data processing markets while
maintaining a decentralized, line-driven management
philosophy.
Furthermore, Citicorp recognizes that its customers
will be looking for information based services on a
global scale, and in order to respond, technology will
become a major force. '36
This example illustrates that IT affects the entire
organisation, and is also reflected in the corporate
culture, management philosophy, and organisational
structure. Citibank, for instance, acquired its own
technology subsidiary, Quotron, to develop added-value
software applications for a variety of business segments.37
Other successful banks did the same, or teamed up with
leading software houses.
Citicorp, Mission Statement.
Citicorp, Citicorp's Strategy for the Nineties. New
York, 1990.
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Not only mission statement and corporate objectives
should incorporate IT, but the organisational structure of
a modern commercial bank must also reflect the strategic
importance of IT. Again, if one analyzes organisational
charts of large and successful US commercial banks, the CIO
(Chief Information Officer) is mostly a member of the Board
of Directors. In a simplified structure, the following
diagram illustrates the organisational chart of a typical
US commercial bank.
Figure 4: Organisational Diagram of a Typical Large US
Commercial Bank
It is the concept of wh.at is generally known as ' Eye-to-
the-fifth-power' that characterizes the strategic
importance of IT to those banks. This expression was
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created in order to emphasize the increasing significance
of the fifth function (compare the above diagram), the
IS/IT function, for a modern commercial bank. Having a
strongly developed and up-to-date IS/IT function is a
crucial requirement nowadays.
German commercial banks, in turn, subsume IS/IT under an
administrative function which could be labelled Related
Banking Services. They are also broken down by geography,
instead of by type of customer (Deutsche Bank as recently
as 1991 has begun to change this structure). This form of
organisation impedes a rigorous profitability analysis per
customer and product line. Figure 5 shows the
organisational,chart of a typical West-German commercial
bank:
Figure 5: Organisational Diagram of Typical German
Commercial Banks
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There exist a number of other reasons why IT should be
placed very high in the organisation. The two most
important will be briefly mentioned. One is the roll-out
effect, and the other could be called cost control. The
entire banking organisation should actively participate in
the development and application of IT, in order to be able
to use the future systems and procedures. If IT is situated
too low in the organisation, the roll-out of new applica¬
tions and the acceptance can be severely constrained. The
organisation, in applying IT in its various forms of
appearance in a bank can, secondly, optimize the
utilisation of critical resources, redefine business
processes leading to cost reductions, and enhance the
market responsiveness of the entire organisation. A
necessary prerequisite for that is the general recognition
of all elements within a banking organisation that IT is
crucial, and has to be supported by the whole organisa-
• 38 • • •tion. This objective can only be achieved through
sufficient power of the IT function.
The most visible factor in analyzing the significance of
also see the findings of an MIT study on the management
of the 1990s. Venkatraman and Henderson developed a
strategic alignment model (SAM) that integrates all
functions, processes, organisational infrastructures,
and the business and IT strategy as a necessary premise
for a successful company.
Venkatram, N. / Henderson, J.S., 'IT Alignment with
Business Strategy', in: An ICL briefing for Management
on the Findings of the Management of the 1990s Research
Program. London, 1990, pp.22-24.
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IT to a commercial bank is the development of IS and IT
expenditure. The execution of a strategy or the change of
an IT strategy requires substantial investments in IT.
An analysis of the spending behaviour therefore is a good
indicator of the significance to a bank. In analyzing IS
expenditures in the interval 1980—88 of four major US
commercial banks, Citicorp, Chemical, Wells Fargo, and Bank
of Boston, it was found that on average these banks
increased their spending on IT by 4-5 times.
Growth of System Expenses
1980-1988 (in $ Mill)
Million $
■1 1980 Bl 1988
Steiner, T D / Teixeira, D B, ibid, p.14
Figure 6: Development of Systems Expenses
Citicorp, for instance, increased its spending from $366
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million to $ 1.530 million. The share of IT investment in
the retail banking business thereby climbed up to roughly
39 • • •
60 percent. This overall tendency indicates (a) the
general importance IT has reached within large US
commercial banks, and (b) the shift towards retail banking,
and hence also the problem of dealing with a turbulent
market environment, such as nonbanks entering the market.
The fact that IT reguires growing capital investment -
at least in the commercial banking industry - is also
indicated by the findings of a cross-industry survey
concerning IS budgets (see table 1):
Table 1: Cross-Industry Survey of US Companies' IS Budgets
Industry IS Budget Sales
% of sales Mil $ Mil $
Banks & Fin. Serv. 4 . 5 3904.4 86,968.2
Electronics 3 . 7 4839.8 131,274.4
Food & Nutrition 1.6 1657.1 104,334.3
Health & Pharma 0.6 270.6 48,789.5
Automobile 2 . 7 7432 . 4 273,394.5
Insurance 1.7 1678 . 5 100,115.5
Metal 1.1 495 . 0 45,083.3
Petrochemical 1.3 3312.3 261,875.1
Refinement 1.6 1572.8 99,029.9
Retailing 0.2 327.7 167,211.4
Transportation 1.3 712 . 7 54.994.5
Civil Service 1.0 1189.0 121,687.4
Source: Industry by Industry IS Survey, in: Datamation,
1/1987, pp.46-52
Steiner, T.D. / Teixeira, D.B., Technology in Banking,
Creating Value and Destroying Profits. Homewood,
Illinois, 1990, p.65.
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The essence of the considerations about the strategic value
of information systems and their underlying technology, as
laid down in this section, is that commercial banks are
aware of the strategic significance of IT for their
organisations. This is reflected by increasing information
system expense budgets throughout the previous decade.
Hence, the option that a bank would not change its IT
strategy in response to a significant change in its market
environment, due to the fact that it does not regard IT as
a significant success factor, can be eliminated.
2.1.3 Implications of Technological Innovations
Apart from the more broad consideration of the previous
section, that established the relevance of an IT strategy
to a modern commercial bank which functions as an umbrella
permanently impinging on the IT variable of the hypothesis
under investigation, this section introduces another
important influencing factor that has to be briefly
discussed, in order to lay a proper foundation for this
investigation.
The IT strategy of a commercial bank is also influenced
by technological innovations, advancements, and break¬
throughs. The critical question to be asked at this point,
is whether an interdependent relationship between a bank's
IT activities and investments and these technological
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innovations is the predominant motive for a change in a
banks' IT strategy. If this is the case, a commercial bank
would only insignificantly react in terms of IT activities
and related IT expenditure to a change in its market
environment, such as the market-entry of nonbanks. IT
investment activities would be tantamount to a mere
cyclical change management to keep up with state-of-the-art
technology.
Furthermore, with regard to the measurement process of
the IT variable in our perceived correlation, that is a
surge in IT investment, such a surge which follows for
example a major product announcement of a leading IT vendor
and a surge which follows a nonbank competitor incursion
would be rather difficult to distinguish.
However, in light this situation it appears appropriate
to first look at the substantial literature on the analysis
of technological change and the diffusion of technology
that developed over the past two decades, whether it can
make a contribution to our particular research phenomenon
in retail banking.
One of the most commonly noted empirical regularities in
the field of diffusion of technology is the observation
that the life path of technology evinces an S-shaped
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pattern.40 That means, it takes some time - after the
introduction of a technological innovation - until that
innovation starts being absorbed by the relevant industry.
In general, the absorption rate accelerates in the
following years until it reaches a saturation point and
finally starts decreasing. In addition, technological
change involves a learning process under uncertain
conditions primarily in the first years after an innovation
has been introduced to the market. Around these notions a
whole array of articles, books, and case studies emerged on
diffusion of technology. With regard to commercial banking
and the diffusion of IT primarily two studies made valuable
contributions. In 1991, Diederen, Kemp, Muysken, et alii
analyzed the diffusion of process technology in Dutch
/ -i
banking. In particular, the sort of technological change
considered was innovations influencing the intermediary
function of commercial banks in the payment system of the
Netherlands. The authors created a diffusion model covering
four technigues for handling accounts, back-office
terminals, OCR (optical character reader) equipment, front-
office terminals, and cash dispensers. In all cases, in
which the saturation point in the S-curve had not been
Sahal, D., 'The Multidimensional Diffusion of
Technology', in: Technological Substitution, ed. by
Linstone, H.A / Sahal, D., Portland, 1976, pp.223-44
Diederen, P. / Kemp, R. / Muysken, J., e.a., 'Diffusion
of Process Technology in Dutch Banking', in: Diffusion
of Technologies and Social Behavior, ed. by
Nakicenovic, N. / Griibler, A., Laxenburg, 1991, ch.21
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reached at the beginning of the time frame chosen for the
investigation (1978-87), the absorption rate graphs showed
/ p
a time lag of at least two years. It was also found that
the diffusion process of this information technology was
best explained by competitive force and competitive
pressure as the only variables. The authors concluded that
technological change reguires learning due to the fact that
"the availability of a more profitable technology does not
imply that it will be used immediately: different
techniques will be employed each moment to produce a
certain product. This is a consequence of phenomena, such
as the limited capacity of individuals and organisations to
process multi-type information, the balancing of current
expenditure against uncertain future benefits, and the
dependence of firm decisions on perceived reference
groups" .43
The more classic study on the diffusion of IT was
conducted by Stoneman in 1976.44 He analyzed the diffusion
of computers and certain computer applications in a set of
selected firms of individual industries by investigating
their decision-making procedures with respect to IT
absorption. One of the major results of his survey was that
in many cases no evaluation for the installation of new IT
kit took place. Another important observation was the
outcome that among the reasons given for installing
computers are some that refer to the inoperability of the
ibid, pp.542-43.
ibid, p.544
Stoneman, P., Technological Diffusion and the Computer
Revolution. Cambridge University Press, 1976.
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previous equipment, such as replacement of worn out
equipment, savings in office space, savings in manpower,
and difficulty in recruiting staff.45 Roughly one-third of
the computers in the sample were primarily installed
because the previous technology was no longer sufficiently
operable. The author concluded, which was also restated in
a more recent study, that
"the timing of the technique choice decision is determined
for the firm by the interaction of its goal formulation and
goal achievement characteristics".46
Thus, the key result of these studies is that there
exists a certain time lag in the absorption of new IT, that
the absorption is influenced by the business objectives and
strategy of the company involved in the decision-making
process, that about one-third of the IT expenditure is
spent 'just to keep the company going', and finally that a
clear reasoning of the prime trigger of IT expenditure
could not be identified.
Hence, it appears necessary to analyze the launch dates
of important IT product and services offered specifically
to the retail banking industry in the past years by a
leading IT vendor (in this case IBM) and commercial banks'
reaction to it to gain further insights into this
ibid, ch.6 survey results.
Stoneman, P., The Economic Analysis of Technological
Change, Oxford University Press, New York, 1983, p.141.
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phenomenon. This allows us to work out the response time
between a product launch and the take-up, which means IT
expenditure, by the commercial banking industry. The
following table shows the market launch and installation
figures, over a period of twenty-one years, of two
important IT solutions in the area of retail banking:
firstly, the market introduction of the IBM 3 600 front
office automation solution, consisting of the 3601
processor and the 3604 terminal system, and secondly, the
IBM 3614/24 cash dispenser and ATM (automated teller
machine) .47
3601 3604 3614
1970 5 75 —
1971 27 98 -
1972 36 145 -
1973 45 223 -
1974 101 582 -
1975 232 1394 -
1976 362 2356 0
1977 610 4167 5
1978 790 6321 35
1979 1036 8771 75
1980 1341 12208 165
1981 1429 15454 213
1982 1368 18982 397
1983 1215 18475 667
1984 1098 17682 952
1985 980 17094 1193
1986 734 15631 1259
1987 378 13096 1278
1988 136 11678 1293
1989 116 10275 1256
1990 94 8400 1138
1991 52 7115 1084
Table 2: IBM-own Installation Figu
■launch
■launch
The following figures are extracted from IBM Germany's
internal installation records.
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As this table illustrates, the IBM 3601 processor and
terminal system (IBM 3604) was introduced in 1970. A
necessary prerequisite for the smooth functioning of the
system was the installation of IBM's SNA (System Network
Architecture) which required additional software purchases.
However, it took 5 years until the banking industry
accepted this system, which is reflected by the
installation figures of 1975.
A similar time lag occurred regarding the market launch
of ATMs. The above installation figures of IBM's 3614/24
demonstrate that it took the German banking industry at
least 4 years (1975-79) to respond on a larger scale to
this innovation.
The extremely low installation figures, almost negligible
from IBM's perspective, of the first four years after the
market launch indicate the banks' attitude to test the new
technology before investing heavily in it. Hence, the
purchase of new technology for the purpose of gaining
familiarity with it, did certainly not lead to a
significant increase in IT investment.
These examples can be supplemented by two additional
major product launches relevant to the retail banking
industry. In the German market, IBM in 1989 introduced the
POS (point-of-sale) banking solution called EC-Cash, which
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is based on the magnetic stripe technology of the EC
(eurocheque) card. By then, all required hard- and software
components such as card readers, microcode to control the
system, security devices within the network, and the
network itself were available. However, even today (the end
of 1992) none of the commercial banks has invested into
this promising technological innovation.
Similarly, relational database technology was launched
into the market in 1979/80 (ie IBMs DB2 technology).
Commercial banks responded to this innovation, according to
IBM's own sales records, 6 years later in 1985/86.48 Hence,
a response lag of more than 4 years was also observable in
this case.
These findings suggest that the commercial banking
industry seems to have been extremely cautious concerning
capital investment into new information technology. This
confirms the results of the two studies mentioned above. A
time lag of at least 4 years is observable.
However, the above findings automatically raise another
question. Is the observed time lag of four years really
abnormally long ? Or, is this response time a standard time
horizon required by large commercial banks to absorb new
Also compare Fiducia's DB2 activities presented in
section 4.4.1.
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technology ? Providing a sufficient answer to these
questions can only be done by analyzing other major product
launches targeted at the retail banking industry that were
of comparable magnitude to those mentioned above. The
following table provides valuable information on the market
launch of IBM's 4700 branch automation system series and

























Table 3: IBM-own Installation records 4700 series
As these records indicate, the branch automation components
4701 and 4704 were both launched to the market in 1982. The
take-up process by the banking industry started in 1983 and
strongly gained momentum in 1984. Similar to the
development in table 2, these figures indicate a S-shaped
pattern. In contrast to the market introduction of the
technology mentioned in the previous table, the response
lag was approximately two years. Hence, a substantial take-
up time differential seems to exist. Similarly, the retail
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banking industry responded to the launch of the 4721 self-
service component. This front-end banking system was
introduced in 1986, and was strongly absorbed by commercial
banks roughly two years thereafter. These innovations were
of comparable magnitude to the banking industry as those
launched in 197 0 and 197 5. However, it took the banking
industry approximately two until two-and-a-half years to
absorb the above technology.
Another major technological innovation, the market launch
. ..#t 49
of automated chegue truncation facilities m 1985 , also
seems to support this phenomenon. The following table


















German Savings and Giro Association, Annual
Report, various issues, ch.6
Table 4: Growth of Cheque Truncation in Germany
Automated cheque truncation facilities were launched to the
market in 1985. They consist basically of three components,
a storage element, an optical character reader, and
n.a., BIK Report, No.3, November 1992, pp.1-12, here
p. 1
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controlling software. As the above table indicates, banks
in 1987 more than doubled the truncation of cheques within
the payment system which was only achievable through
substantial investment in cheque truncation technology. In
the first half of 1988, roughly two-and-a-half years after
the market launch, the market of optical character readers
almost reached a saturation point.50
As a consequence of these findings one can conclude
that the speed at which the technology laid down in table
2 was implemented seemed to be abnormally long. It can be
further concluded - if both tables are analyzed as a
totality - that there is a certain absorption lag for new
technology introduced to the retail banking industry. This
lag appears to be at least 2-2.5 years. With regard to our
hypothesis, that a direct correlation exists between a
significant change in the market environment for commercial
banks due to the market-entry of nonbank competitors, and
a significant change in the banks' IT strategy (which is
measured by their IT spending), one could reckon that a
surge in the IT budget should be recognisable much faster.
It has to be shown throughout the dissertation whether such
a quick response exists or not.
In further analyzing IBM's sales records, certain
IBM Germany, unpublished Market Analysis Banking
Industry, 1990
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regular sales of CPUs (Central Processing Unit), storage
devices, and peripheral devices are observable - primarily
in large account segments such as commercial banks - in
line with standard depreciation periods, or because of
reguirements to cope with constantly growing data and
transaction volumes. In such a case, a clear
interdependence between IBM's market launch of for instance
a new mainframe version, or an upgrade model (roughly every
second consecutive year), and banks' IT investments is
identifiable. But investment in this kind of IT equipment
on a cyclical basis, despite the fact that it eats up
substantial amounts of IT budgets, is a mere business
requirement to cope with daily operations. It is an
'enabler' to keep the company going. Due to the fact that
these kinds of IT investments occur on a regular basis,
they can be perceived as a 'constant'. Funds are regularly
planned, allocated, and spent. In a recent study about the
business value of computers Strassmann made a similar
observation. He stated that "mainframe computers and their
relevant upgrades are justified and planned as production
and process control tools. They were not included in direct
information technology cost."51
Although a certain interdependence between technological
innovations (ie new hardware upgrades or software versions)
Strassmann, P.A., The Business Value of Computers, New
Canaan, Connecticut, 1990, p.25.
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and the IT strategy of a commercial bank cannot be entirely
rejected, the key finding of this section, that a time lag
of at least 2-2.5 years seems to exist between the market
launch of innovative information technology and commercial
banks' investments in IT, suggests that this
interdependence - with regard to the retail banking
industry - appears to be rather weak.
What remains to be analyzed in part 2 of this
dissertation is whether a substantial change in the
competitive market environment can be identified as the
ultimate trigger of substantial IT activities within a
commercial bank.
2.2 The Regulatory Framework for Banks and Nonbanks
in the US and Germany
2.2.1 Commercial Banks and the Banking System
2.2.1.1 The US Banking System
"There is no hope for us in the American system; its
very essence and principles are faulty"
(Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street, 1873)
This famous observation on banking in the US,
particularly the regulation of banks, made by Bagehot is
still valid. The American banking system is one of the most
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fragmented and complex; it stands in sharp contrast to many
of the banking systems of Western Europe and the Pacific
Rim. A set of banking laws passed by both states and
federal regulators during two centuries of bank supervision
and control has led to a network of partly overlapping, and
therefore confusing regulations. This system inherently
depends on the American perspective of a society based on
the principles of individualism and federalism.
Commercial banking in the US is shaped by two basic
principles. Firstly, the concepts of dual banking and
separation banking directly applicable to banks, and
secondly, regulations specifically aimed at corporations
owning banks and their affiliates.
The concept of dual banking, a development of the so-
called 'free banking era' of the early 19th century52, was
officially established through the passage of the National
Banking Act of 18 6 4 . 53 Under this act, a bank may be
chartered either as a national (that is federally licensed)
bank, or by one of the state banking authorities, under the
compare Savage, D.T., 'American Banking: The Early
Years', in: Banking in America and the EEC. 1980, pp.1;
also, Mackenzie, K. , The Banking Systems of Great
Britain. France. Germany, and the United States of
America, London, 1960, pp.203.
Kroos, H.E. / Samuelson, P.A., Documentary History of




relevant state banking law, as a state licensed bank. The
National Banking Act established a new department of the US
Treasury, the OCC (Office at the Comptroller of the
Currency), an office specifically charged with the
supervision of national banks and the administration of
this act.54 The Comptroller has no authority over state
chartered banks. Thus, the US banking system clearly
differentiates between two types of banks, a system that is
unique in the financial world.55
The concept of separation banking, institutionalised
through the Glass-Steagall Act of 193356, provided for the
separation of commercial and investment banking. This act
explicitly bars a bank engaged in the securities business
from receiving deposits.57 It was a legislative response to
the large number of bank failures during the great
depression of the 1930s. The Glass-Steagall Act was
responsible for the structure of banking in the US, which
is characterised by a variety of different types of banks
engaged in clear-cut business activities, resulting in a
Puckler, G. , Das Bank- und Borsenwesen in den USA.
Frankfurt, 1986, pp.12.
For a more in-depth synopsis of the US banking system:
Clair, R. / Tucker, P., 'Interstate Banking and the
Federal Reserve: A historical perspective', in:
Economic Review. Nov. 1989, pp.2.
The Banking Act of 1933, June 16th, 1933.
The Banking Act of 1933, sect.21.
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high degree of specialisation.
A considerable portion of US banking law, including some
of the most onerous requirements for non-US banks, involves
not the governance of banks themselves, but their holding
companies and holding company affiliates. Since all large
banks, whether national or state-chartered, are organised
• • 58 •
in a holding company structure , banking authorities -
especially the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (FRS) - exercise a great influence. This influence
is given through the administration and application of the
BHCA (Bank Holding Company Act) of 1956 and its
amendments.59
The BHCA, inter alia, defines a commercial bank as ...
'any institution organized under the laws of the United
States, the District of Columbia, any territory of the US,
. . . which (a) accept deposits that the depositor has a
legal right to withdraw on demand, and (b) engages in the
business of making commercial loans'...60. Thus, under
current US banking law, only the simultaneous engagement in
both the deposit and commercial lending business
Chubb, J. / Kelly, E.J. / Quarles, R.K., 'United
States, Report on Banking in the US', in: International
Financial Law Review. Supplement. Nov. 1989, pp.66-75,
here p.67.
The BHCA of 1956, 12 U.S.C., §1841
Section 2(c) of the BHCA.
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constitutes a bank.
Banking supervision and control in the US is highly-
fragmented and complex. Throughout American banking
history, no single government authority has ever been
entrusted with regulatory power over all types of banks. As
a result, 50 state bank departments and three federal
regulators pursue very similar, and partly overlapping
regulatory policies concerning depository institutions:
(a) to avoid the risk of systematic bank failures and the
insured depository system
(b) to promote competitive and efficient capital markets
(c) to promote partiality in the granting of credit
(d) to prevent an extension of the safety net to
nonbanking activities
(e) to protect fair and sound dealing among credit
institutions61
As already mentioned, there are different types of banks
stemming from the dual banking concept:
national banks (federally chartered; most money centre
banks)
- state banks (state charter; not a member of the FRS
and the FDIC)
Greenspan, A., 'Innovation and Regulation of Banks in
the 1990s', in: Federal Reserve Bulletin. Dec. 1988,
p.783 .
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state member banks (state charter; member of the FRS)
nonmember insured banks (state charter; member of the
FDIC but not the FRS)
The supervisory responsibilities of commercial banks depend
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Abbrev: OCC = Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
FDIC —Federal Deposit Insurance Company
FRS = Federal Reserve System
Table 5: Supervision Responsibilities for US Commercial
Banks
72
The above table identifies the Board of Governors (BoG)
of the FRS, the FDIC and the OCC as federal regulators. The
supervisory function of the FRS is restricted to member
banks. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913, that established
the FED system in the US62, requires mandatory membership
for all national banks, whereas membership for state banks
was left optional.63 As already mentioned earlier, federally
licensed banks submit to supervision with the OCC. The last
supervisory body, the FDIC, was founded in 193364 to ensure
'depositor protection and to stabilise the banking system'.
Virtually all commercial banks regardless of the type of
charter are members of the FDIC. The following diagram
illustrates the network of regulations and supervisory
authorities in the US.
Federal Reserve Act, Dec. 1913, sect.2,10.
Federal Reserve Act, sect.11; also Guenther, H. ,
Banking in North America. London, 1987, p.67.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act of 1933.
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THE TANGLED NETWORK OF BANKING REGULATION
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Bank holding companies controlled by
50 states
Source: Hearings on financial structure and regulation before the subcommittee on Financial
Institutions of the senate committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. 93d Cong, 1st Segs 619.
Figure 7: The Tangled Network of Banking Regulations in the
US
To date, roughly 13,400 commercial banks operate in the
marketplace. They are categorised into three groups
according to their balance sheet totals. A commercial bank
belongs to the group of money centre banks if its balance
is greater than $10 billion, and is located in one of the
money centres in the US (for instance New York, California,
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Texas). Banks with a balance between $10 billion and $1
billion are called regional banks. Those with less than $1
million are identified as local commercial banks.
With regard to the business activities of commercial
banks, those were traditionally restricted to 'accepting
funds for safekeeping, issuing notes, granting credits and
making payments to a third party on behalf of a customer'.65
However, over time commercial banks started diversifying
- within the regulatory limits - into real estate, consumer
finance, brokerage finance, and trust business. Their
refinancing is generally performed via sight deposits,
savings deposits, certificates of deposits, bank accepts,
and debentures.66
2.2.1.2 The German Banking System
In contrast to the separation banking system in the US,
the separation of functions (as a matter of banking law) is
not found in Germany. The prevailing type of bank, whether
incorporated under private (private commercial banks) or
Ludke, J., The American Financial System. Boston, 1969,
p.157.
Cooper, K. / Fraser, D.R., Banking Deregulation and
the New Competition in Financial Services. Cambridge
Mass., 1984, p.13.
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public (savings banks) law, are universal banks. They are
permitted to offer the full range of commercial and
investment banking products, as well as securities
investment67, underwriting, or cross-industry shareholdings.
The universal banks consist of three main categories:
private commercial banks
- savings banks with their regional clearing
institutions and a central institution
- cooperative banks, which are organised similarly to
• 68
the savings bank sector
Originally, savings banks were engaged solely in the taking
of savings deposits, and real estate lending, whereas
cooperative banks focused primarily on providing medium and
short-term lending - traditionally only to their members -
to the farming and rural community. Since the early 1980s,
however, they have been providing more or less the same
all-around financial services as private commercial banks.
According to the Savings Bank Act (Sparkassengesetz),
savings banks are not allowed to invest in eguity
securities for their own account.
For an in depth analysis of the German universal
banking sector compare
Obst, G. / Hintner, 0., Geld-. Bank- und Borsenwesen.
38th edn., ed. by Kloten, N. / von Stein, J.H.,
Stuttgart, 1991, pp.183;
Jahrig, A. / Schuck, H. , Kreditaeschaft. 5th edn.,
Wiesbaden, 1989, pp.21.
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In addition to the universal banks, several groups of
specialist banking institutions exist which provide
particular banking services only. The most important are
the mortgage banks (Hypothekenbanken), instalment finance
banks (Teilzahlungs-Banken) , postal savings banks
(Postsparkassenamter), thrift banks (Bausparkassen), and
investment companies.69 Those institutions generally compete
only in their specialist area with the universal banks,
except for the thrift banks and postal savings banks, which
have made substantial inroads into traditional commercial
banking business (see part 2 of this dissertation).
The group of commercial banks, and particularly the
large clearers, which is in the centre of the investigation
comprises of four categories: large branch banks (Deutsche
Bank, Commerzbank, Dresdner Bank), regional banks, branches
of foreign banks, and private bankers.70 These three large
branch banks offer their full range of services on a
nationwide basis. They also have a strong position in
brokerage services, underwriting, trade finance and the
like. However, with regard to the retail banking market
within the universal banking sector, their market share is
only about 10 percent.
Schneider, H. / Hellwig, H.J. / Kingsman, D.J., The
German Banking System. 4th edn., Frankfurt, 1986, p.14.







Source: Bundesbank, Monthly Report, August 1990, pp.32-
34
Figure 8: Market Share Distribution in the German Retail
Banking Market
The regional banks include all other banks organized as
stock corporations. Most of them operate in a specific
region of Germany, but there also exist a few super-
regional banks which are characterized by both a strong
home base in a certain part of Germany (ie. Bavaria) and a
thin national branch network. Branches of foreign banks are
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primarily located in the main financial centres, such as
Diisseldorf or Frankfurt. But because of the thrust of the
dissertation, which lies on the German banks only, they
will not be dealt with on the following pages.
The final group of universal banks are the private
bankers. They are organised as general or limited
• 71 • • •
partnerships, and often operate in a highly specialised
business area, mostly related to the investment banking
business. In terms of market share in commercial banking,
this group of banks ranges around one percent72. Therefore,
in terms of market power in the retail banking market, they
are negligible.
In Germany, commercial banks are subject to supervision
and regulation according to the Kreditwesengesetz (Banking
Act) . This act does not include a concise definition of
what constitutes a bank. Instead, §1 of the Banking Act
(KWG) specifies a set of banking businesses, which, if
carried out on a sufficiently large scope, require a
commercially organised institution. These institutions are
called banking institutions. The banking businesses laid
down under §1 KWG include the following:
1. deposit business















However, this list of banking business activities does not
include other financial transactions such as factoring,
brokerage, or forfeiting, which are frequently conducted by
at least the large German branch banks. In so doing, these
transactions would not require a banking licence or
supervision, because they are not part of the activities
that constitute 'banking business'. Section 1 of §1 KWG,
because of that situation, incorporates a clause that
empowers the Federal Minister of Finance to define by
regulation certain financial activities as banking
business.
The Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen (Banking
Supervisory Office), based in Berlin, officially supervises
all banking institutions. Its functions are twofold, namely
(1) to supervise the operation of banks and (2) to prevent
abuses and malpractice in the banking system in order to
ensure depositor protection74. The Banking Supervisory
Office is also the licensing agency for all banks, and has
§1 Kreditwesengesetz as of July 11th, 1985.
§6 (1),(2) of the Kreditwesengesetz.
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as such defined rights of information, investigation and
intervention. Pursuant to §3 2 and §3 3 of KWG, a banking
license may be granted to everybody unless one of the
necessary reguirements enumerated in the KWG cannot be
fulfilled. These requirements are (a) the adequate capital
necessary for the operation is not available within Germany
(currently DM 6 mill.)75, (b) the bank does not appoint at
least two managers, (c) the managers are not reliable, (d)
the managers are not professionally qualified to run the
bank, and (e) the application for the licence is not
accompanied by a business plan.76
The Kreditwesengesetz requires that the supervision is
conducted by two bodies, the Bundesbank (Federal Bank) and
the Banking Supervisory Office77, working in close
cooperation.
The commercial banks are subject to submit certain
reports on a monthly basis directly to the Bundesbank.
Examples are issues regarding equity capital, liquidity,
§ 10 KWG





§35, §36 of KWG; also for a
Obst, G./ Hintner, 0, ibid,
/ Hellwig, H.J. / Kingsman,
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provisions for bad loans and the like. Others are directly
filed with the Supervisory Office. Both agencies generally
undertake investigative steps in a joined action. However
§44 of KWG specifies certain exclusive rights for the
. • • 79
Supervisory Office to conduct examinations.
2.2.2 Distinction between Banks and Monbanks in both
Countries
The intensity of the explaining variable in both
countries, non- and nearbank entry activity level into
typical retail banking business, is determined by national
banking regulations. To be more specific, the legal
definition of what constitutes a bank, products and
services not permitted for nonbanks to be offered, and the
resulting implications on the market-entry potential of
those non-and nearbank competitors have to be discussed in
this context. In light of that fact, the regulatory
framework for banks and nonbanks will be analyzed in both
countries. This will enable us to identify differences in
the competitive situation, and to assess potentially
different starting positions for US and German nonbank
competitors.
§14,24,26 KWG and §18 Bundesbankgesetz (Federal Bank
Act) .
§44 KWG; for a more detailed description: Jahrig, A./




2.2.2.1 Regulatory Distinction in the German Market
§1 of KWG, as discussed in section 2.2.1.2, defines the
legal requirements of a bank, and enumerates nine types of
banking activities that specify a bank. Performing at least
one of those activities qualifies for a banking licence and
hence supervision. Specifically exempted from that
on
regulation and supervision - pursuant to §2 of KWG - , are
the Bundesbank, the Federal Post Office, privately and
publicly incorporated social insurance companies, and
social security authorities (with regard to its savings
banks and giro operations). As a consequence of that clear-
cut definition, the nonbank sector is clearly
differentiated from the banking sector.
Regardless of the banking activities laid down under §1
of KWG, some of the exempted institutions listed under §2
of KWG do offer specific banking products. But due to the
fact that they are either supervised elsewhere (ie. social
insurance companies), or the banking business does only
represent a negligible part of their typical portfolio of
businesses, they are qualified as specialist banks. Thus,
they also belong to the banking sector -in a wider sense -





With regard to the relevant market for banking products
and services, again, §1 of KWG explicitly defines that.
However, a market cannot be solely isolated by legal
definitions. It is the consumer that ultimately determines
what kind of product he/she reguires to satisfy a need.
Based on that assumption, a market also consists of all
products and substitute products that can be demanded by
• 81
consumers to satisfy their needs. As a result, the
relevant market for banking products and services
encompasses the legally specified services, as well as all
services that represent a close substitute to them.
As a matter of fact, the German Banking Act does not
restrict market-entry geographically, unlike the US
counterpart. Large German commercial banks are allowed to
open branches or representative offices on a nationwide
basis, assuming that they fulfil the reguired endowment
op
capital and personnel objectives. The one and only
exception within the universal banking sector are the
savings banks. Most of them are incorporated under public
law and owned by municipalities and districts. The Federal
Supervisory Office remains the prime supervisory body,
although a supplementary supervision function is performed
Bain, J.S., Industrial Organisation. 2nd edn., New
York, 1968, pp.6.
§10 of KWG, to date, requires DM 6 mio to establish a
new bank. After 1992 that amount will be ECU 5 mio,
or roughly DM 10 mio.
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by the federal state ministry (Landerministerium) of the
• • • 83 •
state the savings bank is based in. The establishment of
Q /
savings banks, in general , is a matter of state law. So
they are only permitted to operate and expand within their
respective territory (ie. region or district). Similar
regulations exist for all commercial banks in the US, a
situation that will be discussed in the following section.
2.2.2.2 Regulatory Distinctions in the US
According to the definition of a bank (see section
2.2.1.1) as an organisation that is involved in gathering
deposits and granting commercial credit, which represents
a strict and exclusive right only attributable to
commercial banks, the US banking legislation - to date -
also institutionalises the characteristic features that
constitute a bank. The only difference to the German system
is that the KWG lists nine business activities, whereas the
Glass-Steagall Act reguires that only the simultaneous
engagement in the two basic functions mentioned above
qualifies for a bank.
Apart from that distinction which was enacted in 1933,
Buschgen, H.E., Bankbetriebslehre. 2nd edn. , Wiesbaden,
1989, p.142.
There also exist several privately owned and founded
savings banks which are treated differently from
publicly owned savings banks.
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and is primarily based on business activities, the banking
sector has been officially extended through two, more
recently enacted banking regulations, namely the DIDMCA
(Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980) and the Garn-St. Germain Depositary
Institutions Act of 1982. These acts basically allowed
thrift institutions to get involved in the two basic
functions that constitute a commercial bank by allowing
them to offer NOW accounts (Negotiable Order of
Withdrawal), a form of sight deposits, safekeeping of
securities, wire transfers, cash transaction, borrowing at
the discount-window, and short-term corporate finance
instruments. 85In addition, these institutions were made
subject to similar regulations as commercial banks', such
as the holding of minimum reserves, or reporting procedures
equivalent to commercial banks, that eventually made them
part of the banking sector as so-called depository
institutions.86
However, particularly in light of the S & L crisis, these
restrictions have been liberalised by the Federal Home Loan
Board (equivalent of BoG of the FRS and OCC for thrift
DIDMCA of 1980, Title 2; also Evanoff, D.D., 'Financial
Industry Deregulation in the 1980s', in: Economic
Perspectives. FED of Chicago, Sept./Oct. 1985, pp.3.
n.a., 'The Garn-St. Germain Act', in: Economic
Perspectives. FED at Chicago, Apr. 1983, pp.5; also
Novestick, M. , 'Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982', in:
Savings & LoanNews. Nov. 1982, pp.37.
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institutions) to rescue failing thrifts and to stabilise
87
the financial system , or have been deregulated by even
more recent acts such as the FIRREA (Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act) in 198988.
In spite of the other aspects of the above regulations,
the quintessential point is that the commercial banking
sector in the US - throughout the 1980s - in light of the
definition of a bank, consisted of only two groups -
commercial banks, and in a wider and partial sense,
thrifts. Thus, it is similarly clear to differentiate
between banks and nonbanks under the US banking legislation
as it is in Germany.
With respect to the relevant market for banking services
in the US, the separation banking system developed
commercial banks into performing certain banking functions.
These are traditionally the corporate loans, sight and time
deposits, money transfer, and correspondent banking
services. In addition to them, thrift institutions are
traditionally involved in the mortgage, real estate, and
Cargill and Garcia identify both acts as merely an ad
hoc response - what they call an myopic approach - to
stabilise the financial system in the US.
Cargill, T. / Garcia, G. , Financial Reform in the
1980s. Stanford, 1985, pp.66.
The FIRREA of 1989 installed the RTS (Resolution Trust
Corporation) and endowed it with far-reaching powers
to handle emergency acquisitions of failing and failed
thrifts.
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savings business to private households. The relevant market
is consequently determined by the combination of these
products and services in line with their substitute and
perceived substitute products, as discussed already. Hence,
in spite of fundamentally different banking systems in both
countries, the market for typical banking products and
services can be pinpointed in an almost identical way.
A chief difference, however, between the German
universal banking system and the US separation banking
system, lies in the market-entry possibilities of banks
into all market segments of the financial services market.
German banks are legally permitted to fight off nonbank
competitors in all areas of financial services, whereas US
commercial banks are partly prohibited from so doing. The
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and its amendments, in
• 89 • • • •
tandem with the Glass-Steagall Act , explicitly limit the
scope of service activities US banks are allowed to perform
to deposit, credit, trust and related services:
The Glass-Steagall Act is essentially only a subset of
the Banking Act of 1933, namely sections 16,20,21,32,
that provided for the separation of banking and
commerce.
Kroos, H.E. / Samuelson, P.A. 'The Banking Act, June
16th 1933', sect. 16,20,21,32, in: Documentary History
of Banking and Currency in the United States, vol. 2,
Chelsea, 1969, pp.2725; also Burns, A.F., The ongoing




. . . all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to
carry on the business of banking...'90 the activities of
which the branch . . . has determined. . . to be so closely
related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to
be a proper incident thereto'9 .
Furthermore section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits
member banks from affiliating with <nonbank> organisations
'principally engaged'92 in securities activities defined as
•any corporation, association, business trust, or other
similar organisation ...<dealing with>... the floatation,
underwriting, public sale, or distribution wholesale or
retail or through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds,
debentures, notes or other securities...'93.
These relatively vague and general specifications of
permissible and non-permissible nonbank activities of bank
holding companies have been classified under the 1970
amendment to the BHCA, section 4(c)8. The following table
illustrates a summary of these activities:
12 US-Code §27.
12 US-Code §1843(c)(8).
Many large commercial banks freguently attempted to
side-step this clause. Citibank, for instance, applied
to the FED to establish a subsidiary that would
underwrite commercial papers, mortgage-backed
securities, municipal revenue bonds, and securities
backed by consumer receivables, but not be engaged
principally in these activities.
Andrews, S., 'Does Glass-Steagall matter anymore', in:
Institutional Investor. May 1987, p.272.
The Banking Act of 1933, sect.20.
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Table 6: Nonbanking Activities of Section 4(c)(8) of the
BHCA
making loans for own account of others through dealing
in bankers' acceptances, mortgage banking, finance-
company operations, credit card operations, and
factoring
acting as an industrial loan company or industrial
bank referred to as a Morris plan bank
- servicing loans for others
conducting fiduciary activities
acting as investment or financial adviser to real-
estate investment trusts and to investment companies
under the Investment Company Act of 1940
- leasing personal and real property with full payout
making equity and debt investments in corporations to
promote community welfare
providing bookkeeping and data processing services
operating insurance agencies or acting as an insurance
broker, principally in connection with the extension
of credit
underwriting credit life, accident, health insurance
directly related to credit extension
- underwriting certain federal, state, and municipal
securities (types 1 and 2)
check verification activities94
However, the Federal Reserve Board was also empowered to
decide individually whether a specific nonbank activity
could be permitted or not. The key criterion was the
perception whether the performance of that activity
'
. . . by an affiliate of a holding company can reasonably
be expected to produce benefits to the public, such as
greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in
efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as
undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair
competition95, conflicts of interests, or unsound banking
This list is only a summary of the entire set of
nonbanking activities enumerated under section 4(c)(8)
of the BHCA.
Many authors stress the FED's fear of anticompetitive
effects as one of the paramount objectives in the
passage of the amendments to the BHCA of 1956. An
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practices . . . ,96„
As a consequence of these limitations, only eighteen of the
fifty largest BHCs, in terms of total assets, held a
significant percentage of their total assets in nonbank
activities. The ratio of the top 50 BHCs in 1988 was 10.2
percent97.
In analyzing the restricted activities, two highly
relevant market segments, in terms of nonbank competition,
that are neither directly accessible for commercial banks,
nor via affiliates, can be identified. These are investment
banking, and the insurance business. Throughout the 1970s
and 1980s the strict separation of commercial and
investment banking activities was gradually abolished. To
date, however, commercial banks are still prohibited from
underwriting securities issues. Significant steps forward
were the permission to take over or establish discount
98 • • •
brokerage houses which opened the security business, and
example is: Kim, S. / Miller, S., Competitive Structure
of the International Banking Industry. Lexington, 1983,
p. 65.
McAfee, J., 'Citicorp, New York, New York - Order
Approving Acquisition of Savings and Loan
Associations', in: Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol.68,
1982, pp.656-671, here p.661.
Liang, J.N. / Savage, D.T., 'The Nonbank Activities of
Bank Holding Companies', in: Federal Reserve Bulletin.
May 1990, pp.280-292, here p.284.
Dunn, H.D., 'What a Discount Broker Can Do for you',
in: Banking World. 29 August 1983, p.61.
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to create accounts for private customers very similar to
, , , , , go , , ,
investment banking facilities. In addition, commercial
banks were also allowed to conduct financial counselling
and brokerage services in the commercial paper market.
With regard to the insurance business, commercial
banking and the insurance sector were officially separated
in 19 8 2 .100 According to Regulation Y, only minor insurance
services, such as acting as an agent or broker in
communities with underrepresented insurance coverage, or
insuring the members of the holding company, are permitted.
Lucrative market segments, such as life insurance or the
insurance fund business, which directly compete with
banking facilities, are to date still blocked. Hence, the
diversification potential for commercial bankers in that
area is very limited. Only insignificant cooperations
• *101
between insurers and banks have sofar occurred in the US.
The competitive position of commercial banks in terms of
market entry, as opposed to nonbanks, is also influenced by
geographical barriers. Comparable to the branching
restrictions of the German savings bank industry, the
Moschel, W., Das Trennsvstem in der US-amerikanischen
Bankwirtschaft. Baden-Baden, 1978, pp.54.
Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982, Title 6.
MacDonald, R., 'Bankers and Insurers: Logical Allies',
in: The Bankers Magazine, vol.168, iss.l, 1985, p.13.
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McFadden Act of 1927102, and the Douglas Amendment (1966) 103
to the BHCA of 1956, limited interstate banking
possibilities for commercial banks for more than 50 years.
Throughout the 1980s, that restriction was gradually
abolished, initiated by changes in state banking laws. A
more in-depth discussion of the interstate-banking
liberalisation will be provided in section 2.3.
2.2.2.3 Impact on the Market-Entry Potential of Nonbanks
Structure, scope, and intensity of nonbank competition
in various segments of the retail banking market are
predominantly determined by the banking legislation. In a
segment that is only accessible for commercial banks
through explicit banking regulations, nonbank competition
will automatically be limited to substitute products or
nonbanks owning fully chartered banking affiliates. In
addition, the market-entry potential of nonbanks is de
The McFadden Banking Act, Febr. 25th, 1927; also
Cargill / Garcia who concluded that 'the McFadden Act
played an important role in establishing the structure
of banking by explicitly prohibiting interstate
branching and reaffirming the concept of dual banking',
Cargill, T. / Garcia, G., ibid, p.33.
The Douglas Amendment provided that a BHC operating in
one state may not acguire a bank in a second state
unless that state expressly authorized the acquisition
by statute.
Moulton, J., 'Nonbank Banks: Catalyst for Interstate
Banking', in: Business Review. FED of Philadelphia,
Nov./Dec. 1985, p.5.
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facto also constrained if the banks were able to build up
a dominant market share - prior to the abolition of legal
protection - in a certain market segment. The cost of
market-entry would be extraordinarily high because of that
competitive disadvantage, so that the entry probability is
very low. On the other hand, specific banking regulations,
such as the interstate banking prohibition for US
commercial banks, represent a competitive advantage for
nonbanks and increase their market-entry potential. In any
way, the scope and structure of nonbank competition in both
countries is largely influenced by national banking
regulations. The market-entry potential of nonbanks, and
their resulting business activities throughout the 1980s in
the US and Germany, can therefore be attributed - to a
large extent - to differences inherent in the banking
systems of both countries.
Under the German Banking Act (§1, §32 KWG), the
permissible business activities of nonbanks are specified
as those not listed under §1 and §32 of the act. Hence, the
market-entry potential for nonbanks in Germany is strictly
limited to activities not mentioned in the act; or market-
entry reguires the acguisition or foundation of a fully
licensed banking affiliate.
According to the definition of a bank in the US, only
the simultaneous engagement in the granting of commercial
94
loans and the gathering of deposits is exclusively reserved
for commercial banks. As a consequence, nonbanks that
divest themselves from one of these requirements are
legally permitted to enter a wider range of market segments
than their German counterparts. In addition, in entering
those segments they are not supervised by US banking
supervisory authorities, and are also permitted to open
branches on a nationwide basis. As a difference to the
German market-entry possibilities of nonbanks, the
principle of separation banking in the US prohibits the
affiliation of fully licensed banks for the nonbank sector
of the economy.
These facts lead to the conclusion that the rise of
nonbank competitors in the US banking market was mainly
triggered by two factors: (1) the relatively unrestricted
market-entry, and (2) competitive disadvantages of
commercial banks, in terms of geographical expansion
possibilities and business line restrictions. In Germany,
however, equivalent conditions and legal pre-requisites to
those in the US, do not exist. The German banking
legislation, in contrast, (1) strictly constrains nonbank
competition in a set of 'vital' banking activities, but
also (2) allows commercial banks to fight off substitute
products, and nonbank competition through the establishment
of nonbank subsidiaries, or the extension of existing
product ranges into the area of substitute products.
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2.3 Significant Legal Changes Affecting Banks in the
USA and Germany throughout the 1980s
After having discussed the strategic relevance of IT for
a modern commercial bank operating in the retail banking
market, and the regulatory framework governing banks and
nonbanks in the US and Germany that determines their
market-entry potential, it is necessary to introduce
another influencing aspect to our model, which is closely
related to the regulatory framework.
The 1980s have witnessed significant legal changes - at
least in the US (the German universal banking system made
product line and geographic restrictions virtually
obsolete) - in the banking legislation that affect the
retail banking function of commercial banks. These changes
are characterised by an ongoing process of deregulation and
liberalisation. The timing, nature, and implications of
these changes will be presented in the following two
sections.
Discussing this issue adds to our main research in that
the detailed analyses of the individual market-entries, as
laid down in chapters 4 to 7, start with an analysis of the
substitution potential of nonbanks' financial services. It
is important to find out whether deregulations have
triggered the market launch of a particular financial
96
product offered by nonbank competitors. A changing
regulatory environment is certainly (a) an important
influencing environmental factor for our hypothesis that
reguires a brief discussion, in that it might be the
ultimate trigger responsible for a particular market-entry
event. Bearing in mind that the aim of stage 1 is to build
up an event-schema, the dates of the passage of, for
example, a new banking law would represent an important
stimulus for a nonbank competitor. In light of the guality
of the market environment variable (a significant market-
entry of nonbank competitors), it could well be that (b) a
deregulative step, in a particular year, has created a
competitive advantage for a specific type of nonbank
competitor. In addition, such a step could have placed
commercial banks in the position of not being able or
willing to respond to the entry. This would have
substantial impact on our research model. In any way, a
short analysis of the main legal changes affecting banks in
both countries will provide clarifying insights into these
considerations.
2.3.1 Product-line related Deregulation
The US banking market with its long-lasting regulations
to prevent a second banking crisis, excessive competition,
and a high level of market concentration, developed into a
97
system of strongly protected market segments during the
1960s and 1970s. The main product-line related restrictions
were interest rate ceilings and restrictions in the demand-
deposit business.
In 1980 the passage of the DIDMCA104 (Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act) changed
that situation. This act eliminated the famous Regulation
105 • • • • •
Q over a six years phasing-out period which lasted until
01.01.1987. The phasing-out of Regulation Q led to stronger
competition in the deposit account business due to the
permission of commercial banks to pay market rates. But it
also increased banks' cost of financing. As a result, net
margins started being sgueezed, caused by rising deposit
rates, to remain competitive and fixed cost on an almost
constant level.
In addition to the phasing-out of Regulation Q, the
DIDMCA expanded the right of depository institutions to
offer - in a limited range - interest-bearing sight deposit
accounts106. A product-line that had been virtually non-
For a detailed description of the titles of the DIDMCA,
compare Frazer, D.R. / Kolari, J.W., The Future of
Small Banks in a Deregulated Environment, Cambridge,
Mass., 1985, pp.47-53.
The Regulation Q was introduced in 19 3 3 through the
Banking Act as a ceiling on time deposits with an
initial interest rate ceiling of 2.5 percent.
DIDMCA of 1980, Title 2.
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existent since the enforcement of the Glass-Steagall Act.
The DIDMCA, furthermore, broadened the refinancing base
of commercial banks in allowing NOW-accounts (Negotiable
Order of Withdrawal) to be offered by all depository
institutions. On the other hand, it abolished the quasi-
monopoly position of commercial banks to offer transaction
accounts by granting thrift institutions, and non-member
banks of the FRS similar product-line rights. Finally, the
107 •
DIDMCA relaxed state usury laws in the area of mortgage,
farming, and business loans.108
On the deposit side, the product range of commercial
banks was even further expanded through the passage of the
• 109 • • •
Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982. Designed primarily as a
relief and revitalisation of the US thrift industry, it
included some important product line improvements for
commercial banks. The act introduced the money market
Usury ceilings were originally aimed at making credit
available to small and inexperienced borrowers. By law
a maximum rate of interest was stipulated that credit
institutions were allowed to charge. A typical example
was a ceiling on credit card charges for rate payment,
also Phans, D. , / Hinton, J., 'The Distributional
Effects of Usury Laws: Some Empirical Evidence', in:
Atlantic Economic Journal. Sept. 1981, pp.81.
DIDMCA, Title 5.
Novestick, M., ibid, pp.37-42.
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deposit account (MMDA), a direct equivalent of the MMMF
(Mutual Money Market Funds), with a minimum deposit of
$2500 since 14.12.82, $1000 since 05.01.85, and without a
minimum deposit since 01.01.86.
This regulatory step was crucial for commercial banks to
counterbalance the growing market share of financial
conglomerates such as Merryll Lynch in the deposit account
business. In tandem with the introduction of the MMDA, a
larger transaction account, the super-NOW account, was
permitted from January 1983 onwards.
Both acts, the DIDMCA and the Garn-St. Germain Act,
eliminated considerable supervisory differences between
banks and thrifts which, led to increasing similarities in
the product range of both groups. However, in terms of
minimum reserve requirements and taxation, some differences
still remain in existence.
A paramount barrier that still severely limits the
product range of commercial banks is the separation of
investment and commercial banking institutionalised through
The MMMF-accounts attracted a constantly rising
proportion of savings away from typical bank accounts
which were unable to pay money market rates. By the
autumn of 1982 MMMFs held $230 billion of the nations's
funds.
FED of Chicago, 'The Garn-St. Germain Act', Apr. 1983,
in: Economic Perspectives, p.5.
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the Glass-Steagall Act. The second half of the 1980s is
characterised by numerous attempts to circumvent the Glass-
Steagall Act. Since the end of 1982 banks are permitted to
issue federal, state, and municipal bonds, conduct fund
management and retail discount brokerage111 'solely upon the
order, and for the account of the customer'112.
In 1988, commercial banks were again successful in
undermining the Glass-Steagall Act. They were granted the
permission to issue commercial papers and to deal in
municipal revenue bonds.113
That gradual liberalisation of the product range
restrictions, however, had only minor significance for
large commercial banks. The really profitable businesses,
such as underwriting and the issue of shares and mortgage-
backed securities, or financial counselling still remain
out-of-reach due to the Glass-Steagall Act.
Hayes, S.L., 'Commercial Banking: Inroads in Investment
Banking', in: Issues in Bank Regulation, vol.8, Autumn
1984, pp.21-30, here p.23.
12 US Code §24 (7) .
Gondring, H.P., ibid, p.166.
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2.3.2 Geography-related Deregulation
Another element of the US banking legislation that
impeded the competitive positioning of commercial banks as
opposed to nonbanks was the regional market expansion
restriction, similar to the regional restrictions in the
German Sparkassen (savings banks) industry. The main
impediment of that kind was the so-called interstate
banking prohibition, that is the restriction for a
commercial bank to bank and expand across state lines. In
an attempt to stabilise the economy and to avoid adverse
concentration effects in the banking industry, the McFadden
11L.
Act of 1927 ruled that national and state member banks of
the FED were only permitted to operate branches in their
115 ... . .
home state. The possibility to expand on a nationwide
basis, via multi bank holding companies or one-bank holding
companies including a nonbank subsidiary, was also closed
through various amendments to the BHCA of 1956116. Thus, to
date, BHCs can only acguire banks in other states, if that
state expressly authorizes these acquisitions by statute.
The McFadden Banking Act, 25 Febr. 1927.
Not all states allowed free branching within their
boundaries. Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Kansas,
Montana, and North Dakota in 1988 still did not permit
free intrastate branching.
Oppenheimer, M / Rietmaier, A, 1Bankenreform in den
USA', July 1988, in: Recht der internationalen
Wirtschaft. p.529.
The Douglas Amendment of 1966 (sect.3,C) and the 1970
amendment to the BHCA.
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With regard to nonbank acquisitions, a purchase is only
permitted if the business activities of that nonbank are
'closely related to banking or managing or controlling
banks'.
At the beginning that was a very disappointing situation
for commercial banks in the US. However, the 1980s showed
various deregulations on both a federal and state level,
that opened up opportunities to circumvent these
constraints. On a federal level, the passing of the DIDMCA,
Garn-St. Germain Act , and FIRREA of 1989117 led to
constantly growing powers of BHCs to take over failed or
failing thrift institutions on a nationwide basis.
In utilising the more liberal interpretation of banking
laws regarding geographic expansion - mainly a more relaxed
perception of what business activities are closely related
to banking - commercial banks gradually expanded on a
• • , I 1 Q
nationwide basis through the application of 'loophole-
The FIRREA of 1989 installed the RTS (resolution trust
corporation) , an institution responsible for the quick
handling of emergency acquisitions of failed thrifts.
Counting only the 'main vehicles', the affiliation of
nonbank banks, grandfathered subsidiaries, LPOs, Edge
Act Corp., acquisitions of failing thrifts, and
correspondent banking services, US banking
organisations controlled more than 7000 interstate
locations even before most of the stats had passed the
first interstate banking regulations.
Syron, R.F., 'The New England Experiment in Interstate
Banking', in: New England Economic Review. Mar/Apr.
1984, p.6.
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vehicles' such as nonbank affiliates , Loan Production
Offices (LPO)120, or Edge Act Corporations121.
On the state level, individual states, because of
different experiences with regard to branching, retail
banking, bank holding company control, and the history of
US banking as a unit-banking country, reacted differently
A commercial bank could purchase another bank, then
separate its deposit-taking and lending business (the
bank criterion) into two legally distinct institutions,
both of which represented nonbank banks. Thus, in the
end the acquiror legally ran two nonbank bank
affiliates but economically just one bank. Until 1982
when the Board of Governors of the FRS changed its
policy about the nonbank bank criterion this device was
heavily used. As Savage and Liang in 1990 found in an
analysis covering the nonbank activities of BHCs, in
1988 the top 25 banking organisations held on average
$5.94 billion of net nonbank assets which represented
12.4 percent of total BHC assets.
Liang, N.J. / Savage, D.T., 'The Nonbank Activities of
Bank Holding Companies', in: Federal Reserve Bulletin.
May 1990, pp.280-292.
Loan Production offices are commonplace
representatives, which means banking staff engaged in
soliciting and originating loans and other customer
relationships in an office that is not regarded as a
brick-and-mortar branch according to the McFadden Act.
It was a means of showing market presence and to follow
a customer across state lines. In 1988, more than 400
LPOs were operating across the US.
Horvitz, P.M., 'Alternative Avenues to Interstate
Banking', in: Dynamics of Banking, ed. by Havrlesky,
T.M. , Arlington Heights, Illinois, 1986, pp.238-
248; also Gondring, H.P., ibid, p.113.
Edge Act Corporations are organisational devices
primarily employed by large commercial banks in money
centres, which provide deposit as well as Lending
Services outside a bank's home state related to
international trade.
Cooper, K. / Frazer, D.R., ibid, p. 204; also 'The Edge
Act of 1919', in: Kroos, H.E. / Samuelson, P.A., ibid,
pp.2514; also Kim, S / Miller, S, ibid, pp.22-23.
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to increasing pressures triggered by developments in
technology, the economy, and various lobbying groups to
liberalize their branching laws. In 1975, Maine passed a
law that allowed out-of-state BHCs to invest capital. This
so-called 'Maine-experiment'122 marked the beginning of a
series of regulations, such as the FCDA (Financial Centre
Development Act) of 1981 in Delaware123, to ensure a steady
1
capital inflow into the state to master economic problems.
From 1982 onwards, when Massachussets passed the first
regional reciprocal interstate banking law, which allowed
the mutual acguisition of commercial banks among New
125
England states , the states started to undermine, and hence
Saulbury, V.L, 'Interstate Banking - An Update', in:
FDIC, Regulatory Review. July 1986, pp.1-17, here p.l.
Erdevig, E. , 'New Directions for Economic Development -
the Banking Industry', FED of Chicago, in: Economic
Perspectives. Sept./Oct. 1988, p.24.
Citicorp, for instance, moved its entire credit card
operations to Sioux Falls (South Dakota) because of a
similar state law.
also Savage, D.T, 'Interstate Banking Developments',
in: Federal Reserve Bulletin. Febr. 1987, p.80.
For a general description of the reasons to pass
interstate banking laws compare
Rose, P.S, 'The Interstate Banking Revolution',
Westport Conn., 1989, pp.64-67.
If laws were enacted on a reciprocal basis but were
specifically crafted to include only contiguous states
or states located in the same region, they are called
regional laws. This type of interstate banking law
resulted in the formation of regional compacts. The New
England regional compact encompassed Connecticut
(joined in 1987), Maine (1975), Mass. (1982), New
Hampshire (1987), Rhode Island (1984) and Vermont
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deregulate, the federal McFadden Act. The resulting process
of regionalisation shaped the US retail banking market
throughout the 1980s. Towards the end of the previous
decade more states had passed liberal nationwide
reciprocity laws or open-entry provisions.126 In 1990, a
total of 27 states provided at least nationwide reciprocity
(several states enforced the interstate banking regulations
via a trigger date that was set on 1990) . The following
table indicates the current status of legislation in each
state and lists the states affected by the legislation.
(1987). Shortly thereafter, in 1985 another major
compact was established in the southern region
involving 10 states.
Clair, R.T. / Tucker, P.K., ibid, pp.12-13;
also Benett, V.M., 'Interstate, Southern Style', in:
US Banker. Oct. 1987, pp.79-85.
For a categorisation of different interstate banking
laws see Calem, P., 'Interstate Bank Mergers and
Competition in Banking', FED of Philadelphia, in:
Business Review. Jan./Febr. 1987, pp.4;
also Eisenbeis, R.A., 'An Analysis of Regional
Approaches to Interstate Banking', in: Commercial
Banking and Interstate Expansion, ed. by Frieder, L.,
Ann Arbor, 1985, pp.51-52.
106
Table 7: Current Interstate Banking Legislation in the US
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Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
1990
Thus, the US retail banking market has undertaken a
considerable step forward towards a 'nationwide* market
during the past decade. Despite the fact that the Congress
still has not waived the federal prohibition of interstate
banking, and although reciprocal laws - at first sight -
appeared to be rather discriminatory to large commercial
banks based in money-centre states (which were excluded
from most out—of—state entry provisions), the definitions
of regions in tandem with more than half of all states -
including the most populous and fastest growing - allowing
full nationwide market entry, represented a significant
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market enlargement. With regard to the expansion
possibilities of nonbank competitors, the fact that the
bulk of these deregulative steps occurred towards the end
of the 1980s, is certainly an important reason for the
market positioning that could be achieved by competitors.
However, the remaining barriers to geographic expansion for
commercial banks in the US - to date - can hardly harm
their market positioning strategies.
Apart from the German Sparkassen-sector, geographic
expansion or market-entry restrictions for commercial banks
in the German banking market are non-existent. Hence
deregulative steps of the above kind were not necessary. On
the other hand, the creation of the 'Single European
Market' in banking after 1992 leads to a comparable
enlargement of the retail banking market as in the US.127 The
passage of the Second Banking Coordination Directive in
Both processes, the US interstate banking and the
Single European Market are by their very nature
deregulation processes. Among other differences, a
chief difference between both processes lies in the
direction of the process. The Single Market will be
created as a top-down approach, starting from the EC
council of ministers, the commission, and the European
parliament, that creates directives which have to be
transferred into national law. Whereas the US
deregulation initiative stems from individual states




1988 , which sets minimum capital requirements for banks
(ECU 5 mill.)/ specifies the mutual recognition of home
country control resulting in one European banking licence,
abolishes the capital endowment clause in the establishment
at a branch in a member country other than the home
country, and sets minimum standards for Europe-wide banking
regulations, represents a great market opportunity for
large European commercial banks - among them the 'big
three' in Germany - to expand their business via de novo
entry or mergers and acquisitions.
'The Second Banking Coordination Directive will prove
to be a milestone in the evolution of a genuine common
market in banking', Llewellyn, D.T.,'Financial Services
and Competition', in: Banking World. Febr. 1989, p.28.
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2.4 Private Households' Changing Purchasing Behaviour
of Financial Services
The retail banking market is characterised by a strong
dependency on the private sector of the economy. In the US
as well as in Germany, private households represent the
most important demand aggregate for commercial banks1
credit and deposit facilities. Appendix 12 provides the
development of households' growth of financial assets and
liabilities. The following diagram indicates the
development of domestic private households' cash assets in
relation to the other sectors of the national economy in
Germany throughout the 1980s:
Table 8: Cash Assets of Domestic Nonfinancial Sectors in
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly reports, Vol.33,
Iss.5, 1981, p.41; Vol.38, Iss.5, 1986, p.55;
Vol.42, Iss.5, p.54
This increase of private households' savings is a direct
consequence of two determinants, the constant growth of
private disposable income throughout the 1980s, in
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conjunction with relatively high savings ratios. The US
economy is thereby characterised by a much stronger growth
in personal income, as compared to the German economy (see
figure 9 below). On the other side, the savings ratios in
both countries were on a slightly declining slope
throughout the previous decade, with the German ratio (on
average around 13 percent of the disposable income) well
above its US equivalent (on average between 5-6
1 ?9
percent).
Private households disposable income
Bin. DM / Bin. $
Years
—Germany 1 USA
Figure 9: Private Households Disposable Income
Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report. 'Die Sparquote der
privaten Haushalte in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
im internationalen Vergleich', vol.42, iss.l, 1990.
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Apart from this general tendency towards increasing cash
assets and hence wealth among private households in both
countries, a shift in the demand pattern of financial
services was observable. Triggered by greater market
transparency and higher product and service awareness,
private individuals developed more price and yield
sensitive attitudes regarding their financial services
• ... 130 • .
investment and deposit decisions. This trend was first
identifiable in the US in the mid-1970s, in the form of
rapidly shrinking savings deposits among thrift
institutions and commercial banks in favour of the newly
introduced money market mutual funds which paid money
market rates. In Germany, increasing investment preferences
for government bonds (ie Bundesschatzbriefe), investment
certificates, and to a lesser degree shares, besides the
traditional long-term investment vehicle, the life
insurance policy throughout the 1980s were an indicator for
this tendency. In contrast to the more conservative
investment approach of German private households, US
private households traditionally prioritise shares as one
of their major investment instruments.
see Btischgen, H.E., 'Analyze und Prognose der
Geldvermogensbildung als Grundlage des Passivgeschafts
der Kreditinstitute - Perspektiven und
Strategieansatze', in: Markt und Bank, vol.16, iss.46,
1985, pp.1-33; also Steinbrink, K. / Herrmanns, W. ,
'Das Anlegerverhalten und seine Auswirkungen auf die
Geschaftspolitik der Sparkassen', in: Zeitschrift fur
das qesamte Kreditwesen. vol.36, 1986, pp.286-290.
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With regard to the banks' asset side, private
households' tendency to invest money primarily under yield
and not liquidity considerations, in conjunction with the
tendency to take up credit disposition facilities based on
personal creditworthiness, increasingly created a short-
• 131 •
term consumer debt mentality. As a consequence of this
tendency, private households' share of liabilities of the
domestic, nonfinancial sectors in Germany increased
substantially from 3.9 percent in 1975, to 5.9 percent in
1980, 5.8 percent in 1985, and 6.1 percent in 1989 (see
table 9 below).
Table 9: Liabilities of Domestic Nonfinancial Sectors in






















Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly reports, Vol.33,
Iss.5, 1981, p.41; Vol.38, Iss.5, 1986, p.55;
Vol.42, Iss.5, 1990, p.54
Thompson, T.W. / Edwards, R.D., The Changing World of
Banking. Richmond, 1982, pp.10.
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These figures are well below the US equivalent132, which is
primarily caused by divergent attitudes about short-term
133 • • •
debt as indicated by the usage frequency of for instance
credit cards or short-term consumer loans.134 In particular,
this habit opens up market potential for US nonbank
competitors to compete with commercial banks in the short-
term consumer finance business. Similar developments are
observable in the German market, but to a less intense
degree.
To sum up, on the liability side of a bank balance
private households' investment preferences have shifted
towards a straightforward interest rate and yield
sensitivity, leading to competitive potential for nonbanks
able to provide products and services with attractive
returns. Whereas on the asset side, the general trend
Avery, A. B. / Elliehausen, G.E. / Canner, G.B., 'Survey
of Consumer Finances, 1983: A Second Report, in:
Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol.70, 1984, pp.857-868;
also Elliehausen, G.E. / Wolken, J.D., 'Banking Markets
and the Use of Financial Services by Households', in:
Federal Reserve Bulletin. Mar. 1992, pp.169-181; also
Kennickel, A., / Shack-Marquez, J., 'Changes in Family
Finances', in: Federal Reserve Bulletin. Jan. 1992,
pp.1-18; also Elliehausen, G.E. / Wolken, J.D.,
•Banking Markets and the Use of Financial Services by
Small and Medium-Sized Businesses' , in: Federal Reserve
Bulletin. Oct. 1990, pp.801-816.
Another influencing factor is certainly the different
personal income tax systems. In the US, interest
payments of individuals on for instance short-term
loans are tax deductible as opposed to the German tax
system.
see Gondring, H.P., ibid, pp.234-236.
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towards a higher degree of indebtedness among private
households in both countries creates competitive potential
for nonbanks primarily in the area of short-term consumer
finance. These tendencies are observable in both countries,
but divergent mentalities, investment traditions, and
regulatory systems, such as the income tax system,
determine the specific kind of financial instrument that is
chosen by a national private household.
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3. Overview over Selected Nonbank Competitors in the
US and German Banking Market
This chapter briefly introduces the types of nonbanks
chosen to be analyzed in-depth throughout part 2 of this
dissertation. It sets the stage for part 2 by providing
valuable information on the market-entry variable of our
correlation under investigation.
As mentioned already in section 1.2, part 2 consists of
a structured analysis of competitive changes in the retail
banking markets in Germany and the US triggered by four
different types of nonbanks, insurance companies, thrift
institutions, retail organisations, and credit card
organisations. This analysis, however, focuses among other
things on selected financial services offered by these
nonbank competitors, in order to examine their competitive
relevance as a real threat of substitution to commercial
banks' equivalent services. It does not provide information
on the type of nonbank itself which entered the market.
Hence, for the sake of completion, and to hand over from
the relatively broad analysis of the influencing factors
affecting our hypothesis, to the detailed analysis of part
2 that is concentrated on establishing the correlation
itself, this chapter is required as a necessary link.
Furthermore, before discussing in detail various market-
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entries and the banks' strategic replies, it is necessary
to state the selection criteria for our sample of nonbank
competitors.
3.1 Selection criteria
The US banking market is characterized by a high degree
of fragmentation and specialisation. Hence, many nonbank
competitors exist that compete only in a tiny little market
segment with commercial banks, without substantial market
power to establish a competitive threat. As a result,
nonbank competitors had to be selected that were large
enough, influential, and aggressive to fulfil this
requirement. In addition, their respective services had to
be comparable to the services of their counterparts in
Germany.
Furthermore, due to the fact that two different banking
systems and retail banking markets are investigated to test
the hypothesis, the set of selected nonbank competitors had
to be in existence and of relevance in both countries. The
next four sections briefly introduce these nonbank
competitors and mention their motivation and thrust to
enter the retail banking market.
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3.2 Thrift Institutions
Traditionally, US thrift institutions are - like
commercial banks - depository institutions, but legally
they still do not belong to the group of banks. According
to a Supreme Court decision in 1974, thrifts must offer (1)
enough bank services to be perceived as an alternative
source of funds by customers, and (2) must significantly
participate in any bank service line chosen to be
considered part of commercial banking. Many thrifts still
do not fulfil these legal requirements. Thus, they are not
affected by bank regulations nor controlled by banking
supervisory bodies. In the literature they are classified
as so-called near-banks. The group of thrift institutions
in the US encompasses Savings and Loan Associations (S &
L), Mutual Savings Banks (MSB), and Credit Unions (CU).
3.2.1 Savings and Loan Associations
S & Ls are organised and controlled in a similar way to
banks. The idea of S & L institutions is quite old. These
institutions have been founded for the purpose of providing
credit to poorer layers of the population. Mainly to enable
them to build or purchase their own home but with
relatively low, hence affordable, interest rate levels. So
these institutions were historically targeted at the low
120
income earners segment of the retail banking market, with
special emphasis on mortgages and the property finance
business.
However, due to the depression in the late 1920s,
135
whereby roughly 40 percent of all S & Ls went bust ,
Congress subsequently passed the Federal Home Loan Bank Act
in 1932 which implemented the Federal Home Loan System
(FHLS). This system operates similar to the FRS, namely as
a lender-of-last-resort and supervisory body.
As far as the licensing procedure is concerned, the
concept of dual banking is applied. In total, less than
4000 S & Ls are currently operating in the marketplace, of
which 42 percent are federally chartered and 58 percent
possess a state charter.136 Furthermore, all federally
chartered S & Ls must be members of the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). This membership implies
insurance coverage up to $ 100,000 for individual deposits.
Membership for state chartered S & Ls is optional.
As already mentioned, S & Ls were traditionally engaged
in residential loan activities. This subsequently led to an
Smith, G. , Money and Banking, Financial Markets and
Institutions. Menlo Par, 1982, p.317.
Gondring, H.P., Finanzmarkte im Wandel, Struktur- und
Marktveranderunqen im Finanzsystem der USA. Frankfurt,
1989, p.75.
121
inflexible asset portfolio ranged against flexible term
deposits. In 1985, for instance, 61 percent of S & L loans
were devoted to mortgages, many of which carried fixed
interest rates or contract loan rates that could be changed
• • • 137 •
only on a limited basis. Since the passage of the DIDMCA
in 1980 (see 1.3.4.1) they have been permitted to invest up
to 10 percent of their assets in consumer loans within the
same range of regulations as commercial banks. In addition,
they have become increasingly engaged in the credit card
business, corporate loans, and NOW-accounts. On the deposit
side, new thrift deposits were authorised to carry interest
rates adjustable with money market conditions, allowing S
& Ls to compete more effectively with money market mutual
funds (MMMF). In other words, the expansion of the original
mortgage business into consumer finance made them to an
important competitor in the retail banking market segment.
Similarly to S & Ls, German Bausparkassen (the German
counterpart to Building Societies), were traditionally
engaged in the long-term mortgage lending, and house and
property finance market. They are also separately regulated
and supervised (§1, §3 of Bausparkassengesetz; Building
Societies Act). Unlike US S & Ls, however, they operate in
a legally protected market niche, and are not allowed to
get involved in other banking businesses. Hence, their
Rose, P.S., The Changing Structure of American Banking.
New York, 1987, p.307.
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product range is narrower in comparison to S & Ls. Due to
the fact that both types of institutions are players in
mostly the same market segment, and the inroads undertaken
by both types of organisation into the retail banking
market, despite some national differences, they will be
analyzed in more detail in chapter 5 of this investigation.
Apart from S & Ls, the US thrift industry encompasses
two other types of institutions, CUs and MSBs, which also
show some competition to US commercial banks, but cannot be
compared to Bausparkassen because of different business
roots. For the sake of completion they are briefly
mentioned on the following pages.
3.2.2 Mutual Savings Banks
Mutual Savings Banks (MSB) are similar to S & Ls in
terms of organisation, although both kinds of thrifts
differ with regard to their mission. MSBs were historically
founded to provide save deposits to the working class.138 A
typical feature of MSBs is their geographic location.
Almost all of them are clustered in the New England states.
Originating from the objective to attract workers' savings,
they gradually developed into the mortgage business
Kaufman, G. , The US Financial System, Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey, 1980, p.154.
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competing directly with commercial banks and S & Ls. In the
past few years, these MSBs became extraordinarily
aggressive in this market segment. Partly as a consequence,
they invented the NOW account, and moved from the
traditional short-term mortgages with large downpayments,
to the longer term conventional mortgage. In addition, they
received the same powers as S & Ls regarding consumer
finance loans, and were permitted to convert easily from
mutuals into federal savings banks. Thus, it was obvious
that competition intensified.
MSBs are entirely state chartered and roughly 70 percent
are members of the FDIC, whereas 18 percent belong to the
FSLIC.139
3.2.3 Credit Unions
CUs are, measured by volume of deposits and transactions
in consumer finance loans, the largest group of depository
institutions belonging to the category of thrifts. They
provide credit only to members - predominantly middle-class
income earners and professionals such as lawyers - who have
to have a common bond of occupation or association, or to
groups within a specially defined district, neighbourhood,
or community. However, this common bond requirement has
Johnson, J. / Roberts, W. , Money and Banking: A Market-
Oriented Approach. New York, New York, 1982, p.293.
124
been liberalised in recent years, giving the industry an
expanded membership base. To date almost 50 million US
citizens hold membership in CUs all of which reguire
1 An
primarily credit for consumer durables. Hence, these
institutions are also a competitor to commercial banks in
the consumer loan market segment.
In terms of licensing and supervision, two-thirds of
roughly 18,000 CUs hold a federal charter, whereas the
remainder is state chartered. In addition, membership of
the so-called National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund
(NCUSIF) is mandatory.
3.3 Credit Card Organisations
The provision of consumer credit and short-term
financing facilities in the form of credit cards is
generally performed via universal credit cards according to
1L1
the 1 three-party-system' , as opposed to the issuance of
specialized customer cards applied by retail organisations
which will be discussed in the following section.
The three-party-system encompasses the credit card
issuer, contractual intermediaries primarily retailers, and
140
141
Gondring, H.P., ibid, p.79.
Keller, A., Kreditkarten. Diesenhofen, 1981, p.21.
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the customers. Credit card bearers (the customer) are
liberalised from the obligation to pay cash by producing a
credit card which has been issued after a test of their
creditworthiness. The contractual intermediaries'
outstanding receivables are paid by the issuing company,
which, in turn, charges the credit card bearer on a monthly
basis. In order to achieve a profitable system, two
requirements must be fulfilled: (a) a large number of
bearers, and (b) a dense network of contractual
intermediaries. As a consequence, only five credit card
organisations in the US were able to establish a
functionable network. These are American Express, Diners
Club, Carte Blanche, Master Card and Visa. These networks
are implemented in the German as well as in the US banking
market (see Appendix 2).
With regard to the marketing concept of credit card
issuers, two basic strategies are pursued. Firstly, the
mass-marketing of credit cards to gain maximum distribution
among ordinary customers, and secondly, a more targeted
approach towards HNWI (High Net Worth Individuals) through
the issue of exclusive (ie. gold-cards) credit cards,
endowed with additional services such as travel and
insurance services in line with much higher credit limits.
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3.4 Retail Organisations
Finance companies and retailers made inroads into the
retail banking market by applying the concept of 'financial
1 A?
symbiosis'. They started diversifying into financial
product lines to mutually benefit from experience gained in
sales and retailing. The rise of captive finance companies
is a good example to describe that. Firms such as Ford, GE,
Westinghouse, or IBM set up their own finance subsidiary to
promote the sales of their parent company's manufactured
products. A typical feature of these subsidiaries is the
fact that they are not supervised by a specific regulatory
body. Based on their business activities, two broad
categories of finance companies can be differentiated,
consumer finance and commercial finance companies. Consumer
finance companies are predominantly concentrated on
instalment credit, to purchase consumer durables, or
unsecured short-term credit to private households. Whereas
commercial finance companies focus on short and medium-term
financing of businesses, as well as factoring and leasing
businesses.143
Rose, P.S., The Changing Structure of American Banking.
New York, 1987, pp.330-350.
Aquilar, L. , 'Banks and Nonbanks at the End of the
80s', FED of Chicago, in: Economic Perspectives. Jan./
Febr. 1990, p.13; also Luckett, C. , 'Recent
Developments in the Mortgage and Consumer Credit
Market', in: Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol.68, 1982,
pp.2 8 5.
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Due to the focus of this dissertation on retail banking
primarily to private households only retailers, in both
countries, will be analyzed in the main part (chapter 6).
Retailers compete with commercial banks primarily in
consumer-orientated product lines. The original objective
was to provide credit to consumers in order to sustain
their retail sales. However, by now very large retail
stores in the US as well as in Germany provide in-store
financial centres which offer credit facilities, insurance,
or securities investment on top of clothes, furniture, or
food.
There exist two main explanations for the inroads they
undertook into the financial services industry which
qualified them as nonbank competitors to commercial banks.
Forced by a changing market environment in retailing,
primarily in the US, for instance through the emergence of
new discount and speciality stores during the past decade,
incumbent retailing chains experienced stiffer competition
in conjunction with a poor outlook in terms of growth for
their own industry. On the other side stood the banks'
record of almost consistent asset growth and impressive
profitability figures even during periods of general
economic downswings. So it appeared more than clear that
retailers tried to capitalise on the expertise they had
gained in retailing, because the retailing of financial
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services, like the retailing of merchandise, is a customer-
driven industry.
One of the most crucial assets they could build on was
their nationwide distribution network including the large
customer base. Hence through the issue of specialised
credit cards to open customer accounts as a means of sales
promotion, these companies could easily obtain a
significant share of the consumer finance market. In 1985
already, the number of issued specialised cards in the US
was four-times the number of issued universal credit
1LL
cards. Hardly any changes in the marketing strategy or
additional cost were necessary to gain these synergy
effects.145
In order to emphasize the 'consumer-dedication', and the
variety of services offered, the structure of Sears
Roebuck, the largest US retailer, is briefly described as
an example:146
Judt, E. , 'Der US-Kreditkartenmarkt im Uberblick', in:
Bank und Marketing. 1985, Iss.8, p.14.
For a more detailed analysis of the retailing industry
and its similarities to the financial services industry
the following source is recommended.
Friars, E., Money Merchandising: Retail Revolution in
Consumer Financial Services. Management Analysis
Centre, Chicago, 1985
Sears Roebuck, Annual Report, various issues throughout
the 1980s.
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Merchandise Group, including more than 900 department
stores and shops all over the US and adjacent
countries
- Sears World Trade Inc., the import-export branch of
the concern
Discover Card, the firm's own credit card operation
Sears Savings Bank with about 100 branches nationwide
- Allstate Insurance Group
Dean Witter Reynolds Financial Services Group, the
company owned investment banking arm
Coldwell Banker, its nonbank bank subsidiary and real
estate broker
3.5 Insurance Companies
The US insurance industry includes social security
institutions, life insurance institutions, property &
liability companies (these are 'fire', marine, accident,
1 L.~7
and health insurance), and pension funds. In light of the
relatively low level of social security in the US in
contrast to the German system, life insurance and private
pension plans reach a high importance in the US.148 For the
Vaughan, E.J., Fundamentals of Risk and Insurance. New
York, 1982, pp.52.
In 1988, life insurance companies reached an aggregate
balance sheet total of more than $ 600 billion.
Gondring, H.P., ibid, p.93.
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purpose of the dissertation the following will only focus
on life insurance companies and services, leaving aside the
other pillars of the insurance industry.
According to the McCarron Act of 1945, only states are
permitted to charter and supervise insurance companies in
I/O , , . . c
the US. Similar to the state banking legislation,
insurance legislation specifies minimum capital
requirements, reporting procedures, minimum contents of
insurance contracts, permissible insurance formulae and the
like. Each state requires a separate insurance licence and
also differs in its legislation, which represents a
significant barrier for an insurance company attempting to
operate on a nationwide basis. The supervisory function is
performed by so-called 'insurance commissioners' in each
individual state. On a federal level, these commissioners
are members of the 'National Association of Insurance
Commissioners' (NAIC). This organisation has no legislative
power. It is nothing else but an information exchange for
• 150
its members.
German insurers are also independently supervised and
regulated (Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz (VAG); German
Insurance Company Act). These regulations include similar
Edminster, R.O., Financial Institutions: Markets and
Management. New York, 1980, p.167.
compare Vaughan, E.J., ibid, p.144.
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business restrictions, requirements, and constraints as in
the US. In any way, insurers in both countries attempted to
widen their deposit base, by attracting away deposits
originally stemming from the commercial banking sector.
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Part 2:
Analysis of the Substitution Potential of
Selected Financial Services Offered by Nonbanks
Entering the Retail Banking Market, and
Commercial Banks' Strategic Reactions, in
particular in terms of IT
4. Market-Entry of Life Insurance Companies
4.1 Qualification of Capital Creating Life Insurance
Policies as a Substitute Product to Bank Deposits
Capital creating life insurance policies, as for
instance the 1gemischte Lebensversicherung (mixed life
insurance policy)' in Germany, or whole life/new wave
policies in the US, guarantee a fixed minimum payment,
payable with completion of the insurance period, and also
include profit participating rights which are variable
depending on the profit generated by the insurance company
133
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over time. The insurance taker possesses a right on both
payments regardless of the fact that he might die before
completion of the insurance contract.152 As a consequence of
that payment scheme, the regular payments made to the
insurance company by each insurance taker during the life
of a policy incorporates both a savings part, to finance
the final payment to the insurance taker with completion of
the insurance contract, and a risk part, to ensure payment
in case of preliminary death of the insurance taker. The
characteristic feature of these policies is the combination
of a typical savings procedure with an insurance service.
With regard to the market share of life insurers153 in
general, and the share of investment of all private
households in life insurance policies in particular, one
can note that in the interval 1980-88, the capital stock of
all domestic life insurers in Germany rose from DM 173.3
Greene, M.R., Risk and Insurance. 4th edn., Cincinatti,
1977, p.425; also
Farny, D., 1Zur Rentabilitat langfristiger gemischter
Lebensversicherungen1, in: Zeitschrift der
Versicheruncrswirtschaft. vol.72, 1983, pp.363-80, here
p.364.
A capital creating life insurance policy does include
both cases, preliminary death of the insurance taker,
and regular duration of the contract.
compare Stammer, K., N i cht banken a 1 s
Substitutionskonkurrenten auf dem Bankleistunqsmarkt,
Frankfurt, 1987, sect. 2.2.
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billion to DM 380.3 billion.154 That equals on average an
annual rate of increase of 10.3 %. The main reason for that
significant growth lies in the sale of capital creating and
other life insurance policies. During the same interval,
private households increased their investment in life
insurance policies from 18.3 % up to 21.4 %. This trend
goes in line with a significant decrease in investment in
typical bank deposits. They declined from 42.8 % in 1980,
to 28.6 % in 19 8 8 .155 Similarly, although on a more moderate
slope, the capital stock of all life insurance companies in
the USA in 1986 reached a total of $ 820 billion.156 That
development - at least in the German retail banking market
represented a considerable movement of refinancing
capital in the form of deposits away from the banking
sector.
Capital creating life insurance policies qualify for a
number of reasons as substitute products for typical
savings products of commercial banks:
Schwebler, R., 'Kapitalanlagen der Lebensversicherer:
Tendenzen und Perspektiven', in: Die Bank. 7/1989, pp.
378-382, here p.378.
Schwebler, R., ibid, p.379.
n.a. , Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
'Selected Financial Institutions', in: Federal Reserve
Bulletin, vol.72, 1986, no.6, Tab.1.37.
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(a) similar to the commercial banking industry, insurers
are subject to strict supervisory regulations in both
countries. These regulations include such detailed
issues as permissible average death rates, interest
rates, and applicable formulae to ensure fair and
• • • • 157
sound calculations of the insurance policies. Due to
the long maturities of capital creating life insurance
policies (on average over 25 years), the attractive
payment scheme, and the strict supervision, these
policies are regarded as very secure investment
instruments by private households as compared to other
securities.
(b) in terms of profitability, capital creating life
insurance policies in most cases exceed comparable
investments in banking products. In the case of German
ICO
mixed life insurance policies, recent studies have
shown that investment in these policies achieved the
second-best yield, just behind the yield of government
bonds.
These regulations on top of general laws governing the
solidity of insurance companies, are enforced by the
VAG (Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz = Insurance Act) and
controlled by the Federal Supervisory Office for
insurance companies in Germany.
Schmidt, R. / Frey, P., Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz:
Bundesaufsichtsgesetze , Kartellrecht der
Versicherungswirtschaft. Munich, 1983, Tz.l.
Farny, D., ibid, pp.370; also Rudolph, B., 'Sollten
Banken am Versicherungsmarkt tatig sein', in: Die Bank.
12/1987, pp.655-661, here p.657.
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The profitability of a life insurance policy is
determined by three components:
- the German Insurance Act guarantees a minimum
nominal interest rate of 3.5 percent per year.159
- the special payment scheme of a capital creating
life insurance policy guarantees a profit
participating right. Again the Federal Supervisory
Office for insurers mandates for a minimum
distribution of 90 percent of the profits160 among the
insurance takers.161
- a third important factor lies in the tax advantage
over comparable banking products. Firstly, under
German tax law, an individual's insurance
contributions, including the savings part of a capital
creating life insurance policy, are tax deductible up
to a certain maximum amount. In addition, until 1987
no capital gains tax had to be paid on the final
Pestenhofer, H., "Reform der Lebensversicherung kommt
1987 - Altkunden werden nicht benachteiligt', in:
Handelsblatt. 6th May 1986, p.Bl.
These profits are net profits after retained earnings,
dividends and other provision have been put aside.
Angerer, A., 'Lebensversicherung - 100 Jahre danach',
in: Versicherunqswirtschaft. vol.39, 1984, pp.688-693,
here p.692.
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payment after completion of the contract. Since the
Tax Reform Act of 1988, it is only fully tax
deductible within certain income ranges.162 However,
comparable expenses made for investment, such as all
kinds of savings plans offered by banks, are not tax
deductible under German law.
Whereas the German mixed life insurance policy - solely
from a profitability perspective - can be regarded as a
highly competitive product, the US whole life policy is
less competitive. The main reason for that development is
the abolition of interest rate ceilings on bank deposits,
and the strong growth of money market funds and accounts at
the beginning of the 1980s. The yield ranges in many cases
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between four and five percent. In addition, under US tax
law an individual's annual insurance contributions are also
tax deductible, but full capital gains tax must be paid on
the final payment after completion of the policy.164 Only
recently with the launch of new wave policies (see next
section), that situation has begun to improve.
Rudolph, B., ibid, p.657.
Vaughan, E.J., ibid, p.344.
Lucas, V.B., 'Saving functions of life insurance', in:
Life and Health Insurance Handbook. 3rd edn., Homewood,
Illinois, 1973, pp.39-52, here p.44.
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(c) Traditionally, the significance of life insurance
policies as means of security for individuals is
determined by the social security system of a country.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the so-called 'three-
165 • •
pillar-system* of social security in Germany worked
very well. However, the 1980s witnessed a growing
concern in the working population - in light of
increasing rates of unemployment, and decreasing
performance of the mandatory federal pension insurance
to finance the pensions of the retired population -
over the level of income after retirement. The gap
between the net income level before and after
retirement is gradually increasing. That gap can only
be closed through private pension plans which
predominantly are life insurance policies of various
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kinds. Consequently, the weakness of the national
social security system can be identified as an
important motif of private households to allocate more
savings to life insurance than to other investment
possibilities.167
The three-pillar-system consists of the mandatory
federal pension insurance, company-provided pension
schemes, and private pension plans.
Pohl, M. / Stracke, G., 'Financial Services in
Deuschland (4): Marktstrategien der Versicherer', in:
Die Bank. 4/1988, pp.191-211, here p.192.
also compare Laskowski, G., 'Die Lebensversicherung im
Gesamtsystem der A1terssicherung', in:
Versicherunaswirtschaft. vol.39, 1984, pp.759.
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The social security system in the US has always been less
sophisticated in comparison to the German system. As a
result, private pension plans and therefore life insurance
policies, due to their long-term nature, have traditionally
been among the strongly preferred investment vehicles for
long-term savings plans in the US. With the introduction of
high-yield financial innovations, primarily through brokers
and investment banks, towards the end of the 197 0s and
early 1980s, however, the traditional high market share of
whole life policies started to decline. High inflation and
unemployment rates during that time were responsible for a
growing disbelief in the functionability of the official
social security system, leading to a strategy among many
individuals to go for high interest investment alternatives
in order to sustain - via private pension schemes -a
certain standard of living after their retirement.168
However, the differences in trends in both countries
regarding the significance of life insurance policies, that
is the relative incline in Germany, as opposed to the
relative decline in the USA, is inherently determined by
the social security systems in these countries.
(d) A fourth component that is important in discussing the
question of substitutionability, is based on the
n.a., 'Upheaval in life insurance', in: Banking World.
25 June 1984, pp.44-52, here p.47.
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existing competition in refinancing among insurers and
commercial banks. Capital creating life insurance
policies are not only a competitive product in the
case of an individual seeking the best alternative for
his or her first long-term saving plan. They are also
a direct competitor in the case of re-investment
possibilities of insurance policies ready for the
final pay-out after completion of the contract. By
offering attractive reinvestment packages, such as the
combination of an insurance policy with an investment
169 • • ...
fund , insurers avoid a significant capital outflow
into the banking sector. In the process, the
refinancing possibilities of commercial banks are
directly affected by that movement. Through the
application of what might be called a 'fish-trap-
170 . ,
effect' , these insurance companies attempt to ensure
themselves a steadily growing refinancing base on the
back of the banking sector.
In combining these four components, it can be concluded
that capital creating life insurance policies, because of
their security, long-term nature, and high returns,
n.a., 'Assekuranz zieht ein Drittel der Spargelder an
sich', in: Sparkassenverband-Zeitung, 30 Jan. 1987,
p. 34 .
Kaven, J.P., 'Banken und Versicherungen zwischen
Konkurrenz und Kooperation', in: Kreditwesen. 4/1987,
pp.148-151, here p.150.
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represent a highly competitive product compared to typical
banking deposit facilities in Germany. The US counterpart,
in contrast, increasingly lacked market attractiveness
because of its relatively low returns, attractive interest
rates paid by money market products, and the general
deregulation of interest rates on bank deposits in the
1980s.
4.2 Developments in Competition and Insurers'
Strategies in the US and German Markets
4.2.1 Developments in Competition in the US Market
Traditionally, life insurance policies have always been
highly preferred financial instruments for most US private
households to invest savings. The reason is that the
relatively low level of the US social security system
compared to the German system, put great pressure on
individuals to look for secure, long-term investments in
order to ensure a stable standard of living, and pension
payments after retirement. As a conseguence, capital
creating life insurance policies such as the already
mentioned whole life policy, have long been on the market
in the US.
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Due to high-yielding financial services, such as cash
171
management accounts or money market mutual funds , offered
by financial conglomerates (ie Merryll Lynch) and broker
houses towards the end of the 1970s, however, life
insurance policies started to strongly decline in market
share. As a result of rapidly shrinking sales figures, many
US insurers showed signs of deteriorating profits and
ultimately solidity. In addition, the formerly most
important selection criterion for private households to
purchase a life insurance policy, the security, was
constantly fading because of mistakes made in the
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supervision of insurance companies , and the fact that most
bank and securities investments were insured by the FDIC.
Hence, the whole life policy in the US was in a big trough
at the beginning of the 1980s; whereas in Germany it was
exactly the opposite.
US insurers first attempted to regain parts of lost
territory by introducing yearly renewable term insurance
• • • • ... 173 .
policies as so-called modified whole life policies , which
Aguilar, L., 'Still Toe-To-Toe: Banks and Nonbanks at
the end of the '80s', in: Economic Perspectives. FED
of Chicago, vol.14, iss.l, Jan/Feb. 1990, pp.12-23,
here p.14.
n.a. , 'State Watchdogs are Outmanned and Outgunned' , in:
Banking World. 25 June 1984, p.52.
Beck, J.G, 'Die Lebensversicherung in den USA: Wohin




essentially exploited loopholes in the US tax system in
that provisions which were made due to the issue of these
policies could be deducted from corporation taxes. However,
in 1984 the US Congress closed this loophole by changing
the relevant sections in the US tax legislation.
The above financial innovations, the change in tax
legislation, and the changed demand pattern forced insurers
to create new product strategies in order to survive in the
market. That strategy was the unbundling of the risk
insurance part and the savings element of the classical
whole life policy. In a second step, these elements were
rebundled. The savings part was placed with investment
banking facilities, generally in the form of investment
accounts, and was combined with 'ordinary' life insurance
policies. That method guaranteed high returns and
simultaneously high liguidity for the investor, because the
accumulated funds can be withdrawn on demand. Typical
products that incorporate this method are universal life
and variable life insurance policies.175 These products are
1 ~7f\
commonly known as 'New Wave Policies'. Because of the fact
that the saver's money is directly transferred out of the
This loophole was created through a specific
interpretation of section 818c and 820 of the US tax
legislation.
n.a., 'An Array of New Products to Woo the
Policyholder', in: Banking World. 27 Dec. 1982, p.106.
n.a., 'Upheaval in Life Insurance', ibid, p.47.
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insurance sector into the investment banking industry, US
supervisory authorities mandated double licensing
procedures for a new wave policy. That means the
supervisory authorities of both financial sectors must
grant permission before a new product can be distributed on
the market.177
In order to guickly market these products a wave of
takeovers, alliances, mergers, and establishments of
subsidiaries between insurers and investment banking
organisations took place towards the second half of the
1980s. As a result, the array of new services combining
risk insurance and securities investment grew constantly
during the remainder of the previous decade. To date, the
product variety and qualitative modifications is still much
larger in the US in comparison to Germany.
The more intensifying competition between the insurance
and commercial banking industry in the US - since the mid-
1980s - is hence based on three essential developments.
Firstly, the market attractiveness of capital creating life
insurance policies in terms of returns and liquidity, grew
significantly through the introduction of new wave
policies. Secondly, the close link-ups between insurers and




of product combinations involving a risk insurance and
capital investment element, created a 'service' with
greatly enhanced substitution capabilities to typical bank
deposits. Thirdly, due to the transfer of insurance savings
into the investment banking sector, life insurers' demand
for commercial banking services to redeposit funds started
to decrease, and hence also the potential of banks to at
least participate indirectly in the wealth accumulation of
private households outside the banking sector. With regard
to competition in the consumer finance business, insurance
companies do not pose a serious threat to commercial
banks.178
4.2.2 The Competitive Situation in Germany
Before discussing competitive moves and developments in
detail, it is necessary to briefly identify two factors
that constitute a significant difference to the competitive
situation in the US market. In Germany, the non-separation
of investment and commercial banking functions has led to
(a) a close business relationship between insurers and
commercial banks in terms of the participation in
refinancing funds created through existing insurance
contracts, which, in turn, has gradually resulted in (b) a
see Aguilar, L., 'Still...', ibid, pp.12-23, here p.21;
also Pavel, C. / Rosenblum, H., 'Banks and Nonbanks:
The Horse Race Continues', in: Economic Perspectives.
vol.9, no.3, May/June 1985, pp.3-17, here pp.13-14.
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system of cross-shareholdings between both industries to
ensure that cooperation.179
The combination of both factors might lead to the
conclusion that these shareholdings represent a strong
implication on the development of competition. Studies
undertaken to investigate the significance of these cross-
shareholdings, cooperations and their implications on
competition, have found that only minor holdings exist
between large and medium-sized life insurance companies and
banks, which cannot justify the assumption that competition
has long been eliminated by these strategic movements.180 But
it is nonetheless worth recalling, at least in contrast to
the situation in the US where cross-shareholdings hardly
exist due to the Glass-Steagall regulation, that about one-
third of all major insurers in Germany hold stakes in
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commercial banks and that long-lasting relationships such
as the cooperation between the 'R + V' insurance company
• 182 •
and cooperative banks certainly do affect competitive
179 .
compare Vollmer, L. , 'Kooperation und Konzentration
von Banken und Versicherungen', in: Die Bank. 7/1989,
pp.352-358, here p.353.
180
Bayrische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank AG, Weqweiser
durch deutsche Unternehmen 1985. 28th edn., Munich,
1986, pp.654.
181
compare the analysis done by Stracke, G. / Pohl, M. ,
'Financial Services in Deutschland (4) : Marktstrategien
der Versicherer', ibid, pp.200-211.
182
Harder, P.C., 'Neben Standardprogrammen auch
individuelle Versicherungsangebote ' , in: Handelsblatt.
24 May 1989, p.24;
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developments. It would be wrong, however, to conclude that
competition is severely constrained.
With regard to the first factor mentioned above - the
participation of banks in the process of redepositing funds
accumulated in insurance companies - major differences
caused by the German Insurance Act do exist. Unlike in the
US, where the clear-cut separation of the insurance and
commercial banking industries has mandated strong
competition to attract refinancing funds, because insurers
increasingly redirected released insurance funds into
investment banking facilities (compare previous section),
thereby side-stepping the banking industry, German life
insurers in contrast traditionally offer a wide range of
refinancing facilities to commercial banks. Typical
facilities are loans against SD certificates, debentures,
and mortgage bonds.183 In addition, strict lending controls184
strongly limit insurers' potential to directly grant credit
to companies. The only way to do that is via financial
This relationship is in existence for more than 30
years. Many bank directors of large cooperatives are
also members - at least in the supervisory boards - of
the R + V insurance subsidiaries which operate as
independent organisations within a holding structure.
For a more in depth description of investment and
capital deposit trends within the German life insurance
sector compare Schwebler, R. , 'Kapitalanlagen... ' ,
ibid, pp.378-382.
§66 of the VAG.
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intermediaries which then bear the risk of default. As a
consequence, insurers, as a rule of thumb, grant 40 percent
of the accumulated insurance money as refinancing funds to
the banking sector, 2 5 percent of which is then used as
credit facilities for companies through the application of
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banking products. Thus, a not unimportant business
relationship - almost in the form of a symbiosis - is grown
over time between banks and insurance companies influencing
the development of competition in the German market.
Despite these historically grown relationships, the
strong wave of capital creating life insurance products and
related services thrown on the market towards the end of
1982 created strong competition. Insurers' underlying
rationale was two-fold. Firstly, to secure the strong
market penetration reached throughout the first half of the
186
1980s , and secondly to diversify into the deposit
business traditionally dominated by the universal banking
sector. This strategy culminated in two areas of interest
and therefore competition:
Schwebler, R. , 'Chancen und Probleme im
Beziehungsgeflecht von Banken und Versicherungen', in:
Die Bank. 22th edn., 1986, p.73.
According to the Bundesbank, life insurance companies
reached a total of 61.5 percent of the capital stock
of all insurance companies in 1984.
n.a., 'Assekuranz zieht ein Drittel der Spargelder an
sich', Sparkassenverbands-Zeitunq. 30 Jan. 1987, p.11
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(1) competition in the area of new or first deposits in
the form of life insurance policies instead of bank
deposits
(2) competition in the area of potential redepositing
funds accumulated within insurance companies through
policies ready for pay-out.
Both segments require different product strategies. In the
case of segment (1), the promotion of capital creating life
insurance policies shifted a significant share of private
households' investments away from banks into the insurance
industry (see section 4.1). In addition, life insurers
started to unbundle typical insurance services (the risk
part) and saving services (saving part). They then created
a pool of individual services which were rebundled to
create new products. A typical example for that strategy is
the so-called 'Berlin-loan' (a loan that used the
advantageous tax status of Berlin before reunification)
which could be combined with a life insurance policy.187 This
development is comparable to examples of universal life or
variable life policies of the US market, although it
happened somewhat later.
Stracke, G. / Pohl, M., 'Financial Services in
Deutschland (4): Marktstrategien der Versicherer',
ibid, p.196.
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With regard to segment (2), it is important to mention
that not only competition, but also a great deal of
cooperation does exist between insurance companies and
commercial banks in Germany. Quite often, because of lower
risk considerations, life insurers use banking facilities
to redeposit their accumulated funds. In contrast to
deposits made by private households, however, insurers
because of the scale of their investments, their well-
informed staff, and variety of investment alternatives,
enjoy a much stronger bargaining power. Consequently, banks
are forced to pay more attractive interest rates in order
to keep these refinancing facilities.
This reaction has two important impacts on banks.
Firstly, profit margins in the retail banking function of
a bank are squeezed, and secondly, the business structure
of the portfolio of investors becomes more dependent on a
few large-scale investors such as insurance companies.
Thus, the deposit activities of insurers - despite the
involvement of banking products and services - accelerates
the process of disintermediation of the banking sector.
Less private households - as a tendency - place their
savings with banking facilities.
Whereas in the USA the high intensity of competition is
caused by investment funds offered by predominantly
investment banks to attract away a large proportion of
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insurance funds ready for redepositing, this type of
product gained momentum only very recently in the German
market. German life insurers, instead, issued investment
certificates to keep these funds within the insurance
sector, and thereby even prolonging - from a commercial
bank's perspective - the duration of bound capital lost to
insurers through life insurance policies.
Insurance companies did that - at least the large ones
such as the Allianz group, Gerling, or Achener-Miinchener
Versicherung - through the establishment of capital
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investment subsidiaries. The Allianz group capital
investment subsidiary, for instance, in 1988 managed funds
of worth over DM 1 billion, consisting of primarily
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investment certificates and investment funds. Others, such
as the Achener-Miinchner insurance group, acguired a large
fully-licensed commercial bank (the BfG Bank, which is
among the top twenty banks in Germany), and converted into
a holding structure in order not to remain just competitors
in a few markets, but to be able to offer the full range of
That step is understandable bearing in mind that
according to predictions in the year 2000 roughly DM
200 billion of insurance funds locked in insurance
policies will be ready for pay-out.
Stracke, G. / Pohl, M., ibid, p.197.
Stracke, G. / Pohl, M., 'Financial Services in





A significant difference in the development of
competition between capital creating life insurance
policies and banking facilities is attributable to the
distribution channel. Whereas banks still sell their
products primarily via branches in Germany, that is a more
static way, insurance companies market their products via
a highly dynamic sales force. With a total of roughly
80.000 full-time salespeople and about 250.000 part-
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timers , insurance companies reach a much higher density
than bank branches. The majority of these salespeople
operate as one-company representatives primarily focused on
private households. In addition, they are generally
aggressive, well-trained, and work on a commission base.
Hence it was possible to quickly market a new life
insurance policy on a broad scale. In a second strategic
movement, insurance companies cooperated with banks in
using banking staff to cross-sell banking products and life
This strategic movement and similar ones are generally
summarized under one concept which is called 'All-
finance-concept ' , under which one holding company
offers the whole range of financial services reaching
from securities, credit cards, insurance, to typical
banking products. It represents the German equivalent
to the process of financial supermarkets and
conglomerates that started in the US at the beginning
of the 1980s.
Stracke, G. / Pohl, M., 'Financial Services in
Deutschland (4): Marktstrategien der Versicherer1,
ibid, p.193.
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insurance policies out of one hand via bank branches. They
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thereby combined special insurance and banking know-how.
To sum up, in Germany as opposed to the US, life
insurers do not only compete vigorously with commercial
banks through substitute products like capital creating
life insurance policies. They also cooperate with banks in
using banking products and services predominantly in case
of redepositing their accumulated insurance funds. However,
due to the quick market penetration via a dynamic sales
force, organisational vehicles such as takeovers of banks,
and the creation of holding companies, life insurance
companies significantly increased their capital stock. As
a consequence, the disintermediation process of the banking
industry was accelerated, ultimately leading to growing
pressure on the profit margins and a changed business
structure of the portfolio of investors within commercial
banks.
4.3 Commercial Banks' Reactions in Both Countries
As we have seen in the previous two sections,
competition between insurers and banks in the US
intensified primarily through the creation of new and
compare Kaven, J.P., ibid, p.151.
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innovative products. Parallel developments in the German
market are observable, but only in a less intense way and
with a time lag of about three years. The reasons for that
development inherently lie in the evolution of the German
insurance system mainly shaped by three factors: the
relatively high significance of insurance companies as
purchasers of banking deposit facilities, the traditionally
strong market attractiveness of mixed life insurance
policies, leading to an increasingly growing market share
(bearing in mind that at the beginning of the 1980s
consumers' purchasing behaviour pattern and preferences
started to shift), and the strict regulations governing the
terms and conditions of insurance policies.
However, due to the introduction of capital creating
life insurance policies, banks were forced to react in
order to avoid a too strong decline of their market share
in the retail banking services market. Following the US
example of 'New Wave Policies', German commercial banks
tried to counterbalance the shift in the consumer demand
pattern by introducing products that pay market rates and
are comparable to capital creating life insurance policies.
One of these products, the 'Banksparplan mit
Versicherungsschutz' (bank's savings plan including
insurance coverage) also combines an insurance and savings
part. A main difference to the capital creating life
insurance policies is the high transparency of both product
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elements.193 Apart from this transparency there exist other
competitive advantages over capital creating life insurance
policies:194
the value of the savings plan is permanently
accessible through weekly or monthly account
statements.
the repurchase value of a 'Banksparplan mit
Versicherungsschutz1, in contrast to the repurchase
value of a capital creating life insurance policy,
automatically reaches the amount of all saving
contributions plus interest at a certain date from the
very first day of the purchase of the product. The
reason is that banks, because of the less cost-
intensive distribution via branches, do not charge
fees for settling the deal as insurers do.
a significant advantage is the predetermined bonus
payment with completion of the savings plan, as
n.a.,"Banken und Versicherer im Kampf urn die
Notgroschen', in: Geld Maqazin. vol.14, iss.7/8, 1984,
pp.37-42, here p.38.
compare Koch, P., 'Banken und Versicherungen.
Kooperation und Konkurrenz;, in: Bankkaufmann, iss.ll,
1987, pp.18-24, here pp.19-20; also
Kiirble, G. / Hamann, T. , 1 Sparplan mit
Versicherungsschutz und gemischte Lebensversicherung
als vergleichbare Produkte', in: Zeitschrift fur das
qesamte Versicherungswesen. vol.74, 1985, pp.371-402.
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opposed to insurance policies of which the profit
participating element is a priori not known.
On the other side, a bank's savings plan including
insurance coverage does not enjoy any tax advantages as its
competitive product is eligible to.
In the second half of 1983, Deutsche Bank, the largest
commercial bank in Germany, launched its savings plan
including insurance coverage to fight off competing life
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insurers. The other large clearers followed m line.
In light of great pressure to market that product, the
banks' biggest problem was the provision of insurance
coverage. Due to banking regulations and the traditional
functional separation of banking and insurance, most
commercial banks in Germany lacked own insurance
subsidiaries. Hence they were forced to cooperate with
insurance companies to be able to provide both elements of
the new product, their own savings account and the
insurance part. That meant from a customer's perspective,
two business partners were required to purchase a savings
Stracke, G., 'Financial Services in Deutschland (5):
Marktstrategien der Banken', in: Die Bank. 11/1988, pp.
590-607, here p.590.
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plan including insurance coverage.196 Thus in terms of
competition, insurers and banks de facto only competed in
• 197
the savings part of the product.
Both distribution channels, bank branches as well as the
insurer's sales force, were required to market the product.
That necessitated a close linkage between the bank and its
partner. Deutsche Bank, for instance, cooperated with the
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Berlimsche Lebensversicherung AG. However, cooperation
always means the sharing of profits, the amalgamation of
two separate corporate identities, and the linkage of
generally two independent sets of corporate objectives. In
the mid-1980s German banks realized, that and as a
consequence changed their strategy. They started to either
establish their own insurance subsidiary, or to take over
smaller insurance companies already operating in the
market. The KKB Bank KGaA, hundred percent owned by
Citibank, was the first commercial bank to found an
Remsperger, H., 'Erscheinungsformen, Ursachen und
Implikationen von Allfinanz-Strategien', in: Die Bank,
6/1989, pp.299-309, here p.300.
Rudolph discusses in a study about the strategic
question whether banks should at all get involved in
the insurance business the close historical relations
and areas of competition between banks and insurers.
Rudolph, B., ibid, pp.655-57.
Deutsche Bank also started to offer separate risk life
insurance policies and 'ordinary' life insurance
policies via the Berlinische Lebensversicherung.
Stracke, G. / Pohl, M., 'Financial Services in
Deutschland (4): Marktstrategien der Versicherer',
ibid, p.197.
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insurance subsidiary on April 1, 1985, the KKB
Lebensversicherung AG. Deutsche Bank, the largest German
clearer followed somewhat later. It founded its subsidiary,
Deutsche Bank Lebensversicherung AG, with an endowment
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capital of DM 3 0 million on September 1, 1989. That
decision was also influenced by the looming German
reunification, the forthcoming Single Market in Europe, the
constantly growing national insurance market, and the
ability to offer 'genuine' capital creating life insurance
policies, including its tax advantage, instead of savings
plans with insurance coverage. Besides capital creating
life insurance policies, the Deutsche Bank Lebensver¬
sicherung AG offers primarily standard products such as
accident insurance and attractive risk insurance packages.200
It also distributes its products solely via bank branches
and integrates its marketing plan into Deutsche Bank's
• 201
overall marketing plan.
Dresdner bank, the second-largest commercial bank in
Germany, chose to broker the products of existing insurance
n.a. , 'Deutsche Bank Leben startet friiher als geplant' ,
in: Borsen-Zeitunq. 22 August 1989, p.17.
ibid; also
n.a., 'Banks Stride into the Insurance Market', in:
Banking World. Jan. 1985, p.42.
Slottko, S.M., Vice-President of Deutsche Bank
Lebensversicherung AG, 'Lebensversicherung am Beispiel
der Deutschen Bank', in: Bank und Markt. Febr. 1991,
pp.5-10, here pp.7-8.
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companies, and has agreed to use Allianz as exclusive
supplier in eight German states since 1989. In this
context, both companies swapped significant eguity stakes.
Allianz, the largest insurance group in Europe, now holds
a twenty-three percent stake in Dresdner bank, whereas
• 202
Dresdner bought up ten percent of Allianz' share capital.
Commerzbank employed a third kind of strategy. It
decided to create a joint venture with Deutsche
Beamtenversicherung, a long-established company
specialising in the insurance needs of government
employees. In addition, Commerzbank also took a direct
forty-eight and a half percent stake in its insurance
partner.203
Even the network of cooperative banks and its
traditional insurance partner, R + V insurance AG, decided
to intensify their already close relations.
The way these German banks have expanded into the
insurance business was only possible through the favourable
n.a., 'A Challenger to Germany's Heavyweight Banking
Title', in: Business Week. 12 August 1991, pp.36-37,
here p.36; also
n.a., 'Europe's Insurers Draw a Bead on 1992', in: The
Economist. 28 Oct 1989, pp.117-118, here p.117.
Commerzbank AG, Annual Report. 1991, p.63; also Lee,
Peter, 'An Air of Vulnerability', in: Euromonev. July
1991, pp.71-76, here p.76.
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national regulatory framework for banks. The following
table compares permissible bank insurance activities in
twenty major industrial countries.
Permissible Bank Insurance Activities in 20 Major Countries
1988 Premium" Sale ot Ownership of Insurers
Country (U.S.S In billions) Insurance Direct Holding Co.
United States $431.4 No No
"
No
Japan 284.6 Yes Yes Yes
West Germany 79.3 Yes Yes Yes
United Kingdom 69.0 Yes Yes Yes
France 52.2 Yes Yes Yes
Canada 26.5 No No No
Italy 20.0 Yes No Yes
Australia 18.5 Yes Yes Yes
South Korea 16.5 No No No
Switzerland 15.1 Yes Yes Yes
Netherlands 15.0 Yes Yes Yes
Spain 14.7 Yes Yes Yes
Sweden 9.5 Yes No No
Belgium 6.3 Yes Yes Yes
Austria 6.2 Yes Yes Yes
Finland 5.9 Yes No Yes
Denmark 4.8 Yes No Yes
Norway 4.7 Yes No No
Ireland , • 3.2 Yes Yes Yes
Israel ' .. « 2.5 Yes Yes Yes
"Source o! data: Sigma. April 1990. published by Swiss Re. Figures are based on We/health and property/casually rxxnbined
total premiums.
Table 10: Permissible Bank Insurance Activities in 2 0 Major
Countries
In tandem with the change iri product strategy came a
change in the distribution strategy. These products are
predominantly sold via the banks nationwide branch network.
According to the principle of one-stop shopping,
specialized insurance service stations were implemented in
large branches. Nonetheless, the close relations between
both sectors of the finance industry, primarily in the area
of distribution, were kept in place to mutually benefit
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from each other's specialized know how (synergy effects).
In contrast to the German market, the strict separation
of commercial banking and insurance in the US that
virtually prohibits close cooperations and cross-
shareholdings, and the business relations between
investment banks and insurers, severely limited the
strategic response of US commercial banks. They are not
allowed to upgrade typical savings plans into capital
creating savings accounts with a kind of insurance
coverage, as under German law. The only possibility to
regain parts of lost refinancing capital, is through the
provision of very attractive redeposit facilities for life
insurers via their own capital investment subsidiaries.
However, even this trick to participate in the capital
accumulation within insurance companies was strongly
constrained through the introduction of fund-based life
insurance policies. Unlike in Germany, where this type of
product - which essentially combines life insurance and
securities investment - was hardly offered in the previous
decade, US life insurers reduced the market potential of
commercial banks by using them as follow-up products for
their own capital creating life insurance policies. In so
doing, the once caught savings money of private households
was artificially kept out of reach of commercial banks.
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4.4 Changes in the IT Strategy to Respond to Changes
in the Market Environment
As discussed already in the previous sections of this
chapter, commercial banks in both countries attempted to
fight off competition from insurance companies by forming
various kinds of cooperations and alliances with them.
These encompass mergers, acquisitions, establishments of
insurance subsidiaries by banks, and close product
alliances between banks and insurers. What has to be
discussed on the following pages, is whether that general
business strategy, as an answer to the market-entry and
market penetration of a nonbank competitor, has led to a
significant change in the banks' IT strategy ?
From a mere IT perspective, regardless of the form of
cooperation that has been chosen, cooperation always means
a link-up between two or more organisations with in general
independent and different IT architectures. The problem of
integration is hence one of the key issues to be resolved.
It is therefore necessary to briefly analyze the way a bank
and an insurance company could cooperate IT-wise, before
discussing in detail activities of individual banks in both
countries.
In so doing, it appears adequate to look at the
organisational structures generally implemented within
163
banks and insurance companies. Both types of organisations





















Figure 10: Organisational Structures of Banks and Insurers
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According to this simplified model204, the central layer is
characterized by finance, service, administrative, and
controlling functions. In addition, this layer is
responsible for DP equipment, data processing management,
systems design, development and maintenance, and the like.
In contrast, on the regional layer, concentration and
administration functions for the various customer target
groups , and also direct customer responsibility, are the
prevailing functions. The local layer (eg. branch outlets
in the case of a bank, and the mobile or semi-stationary
insurer's sales force) is shaped by mainly service, sales,
and direct customer contact functions.
A longer-term cooperation between both partners would
require integrative steps on all three layers. However,
looking at the issue from a purely IT-strategic angle, one
can identify primarily the central layer, because of its
status as host of the main IT functions, and secondly the
local layer, due to its front-end and interface position
that is important to sell, for instance, newly designed
financial products, as crucial layers that need to be
integrated.
The main IT functions on the central layer of a
compare von Linsingen, D., 'Technik als Motor fur die
Kooperation von Banken und Versicherungen', in:




financial institution can be classified into five groups:
systems development, IS technology, service systems,
administrative systems, and management information and
reporting systems. The systems development category
encompasses all processes related to system analysis and
design, maintenance of software applications, integration
of different applications, and the like. Under the heading
IS technology, the wide area of DP centre management can
be understood. That includes the installation and
maintenance of banking hardware, from mainframes down to
personal systems, the processing of day-to-day
transactions, and all related tasks. The service system
function is responsible for the technical infrastructure.
That consists of communication links such as local or wide
area networks, related services such as bridge
applications and network software, self-service components
and other electronic banking facilities. The heading
administrative systems has been deliberately chosen very
vaguely to include the vast area of customer and market
data. This function encompasses the whole range of bank
typical database systems related to banking services (ie
savings and other deposit systems, short-, medium-, long-
term credit systems, time deposit, or securities systems),
and external market information (ie Reuter1s database,
stock exchange information) . Finally, the management
information and reporting systems function comprises of
all kinds of bank controlling systems.
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Elaborating from this recognition, it is possible to
deduct and pinpoint those IT activities that must be
tackled and changed within a bank - if necessary - to
implement a functionable link on the central layer of both
organisations, and also to outline the necessary IT
activities to be addressed in order to build up the

























Figure lis Organisational IT Model
«
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Both organisations store and process their customer and
market information in different ways and systems. In order
to launch a bundled service or a newly designed product,
with elements of both partners, the existing customer and
market data need to be integrated and mutually accessible.
This could be done on the banks1 side - only the
commercial banks' side will be analyzed in the following
because of the focus of this investigation - through
changes in its customer and market information systems.
Secondly, the expansion of the banks' product range also
requires new application systems and databases to be
created in order to support those new services. The
specifications and requirement profiles are thereby
determined by both partners. Finally, the link-up between
both partners can only be implemented if the technical
infrastructure - that is communication components such as
network links, computer-to-computer communications, and
bridge programs - is in place.
Competition in these new products and services will
ultimately be won or lost on the local layer, that is in
the branches and through the sales force. Hence, also this
layer requires IT investment such as terminals, LANs,
portable PCs, communication functions with the central
layer, and access to centrally stored data.
In what way individual commercial banks in both
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countries have actually tackled the problem of cooperation
between both types of organisation, will be analyzed in
the next two sections.
4.4.1 IT Strategies Formulated by German and US Banks
All commercial banking groups of the German universal
banking system, cooperative, savings, and large clearing
banks, were equally hit by the market-entry of insurance
organisations, and had to react with regard to their IT
strategy. In the following, the network of individual
cooperative banks and the large clearers will be analyzed
in more detail.
From a mere IT perspective, the network of individual
cooperative banks and the large German clearers are
organised in a very similar and hence comparable way.
Whereas the large clearers run their own DP centres and
technology groups, the organisation of cooperative banks
in Germany has set up an independent organisation, the
Fiducia Informationszentrale AG (in the following simply
called Fiducia) , that serves the DP and IT needs of
cooperative banks in the south and southwest of Germany. A
similar institution was established in the northern and
mid-western region of Germany. In terms of computer power,
equipment, and IT responsibilities, Fiducia fulfils tasks
similar to those of the IT function of, for instance,
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Deutsche Bank. Whereas Deutsche Bank's central IT
organisation handles the IT needs of hundreds of branch
outlets all over Germany, Fiducia serves the IT needs of,
in 1990, 572 individual and independent cooperative banks
• ... 205
hooked up with the institution.
Both the IT needs and requirements of a branch outlet,
and those of an averaged-sized cooperative bank, are very
similar due to the range of products and services being
offered in these institutions which is almost identical.
For the purpose of this investigation, therefore,
Fiducia's individual partner banks and the large clearers
branch outlets will be treated as comparable entities from
an IT point of view. Hence, analyzing Fiducia's strategic
response to implement the cooperation between insurer and
bank, and supporting it with a brief analysis of the IT
activities undertaken within Deutsche, Dresdner, and
Commerzbank, culminates in a clear picture of the
strategic response of the German commercial banks in terms
of IT.
Before discussing in detail individual IT activities
that had to be undertaken and their aggregated
significance, it is necessary to briefly outline the
general IT strategy in place at the time (1985) when the
Fiducia Informationszentrale AG, Annual Report. 1990,
p. 15.
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market-entry of insurers occurred.
In 1984, Fiducia206 ran a large database system called
207 • • • •
FIDIS / GENOS based on a hierarchical organisation that
operated the banks front-office business. This system
offered a 24 hours online service and was accessible via
APL (Advanced Programming Language) database routines. It
stored and processed service-related data for a whole
range of services reguired for the daily business in a
retail bank, such as various kinds of savings account
deposits, credit services, time deposit accounts,
securities investment accounts etc. With regard to the
model developed in the previous section, GENOS could be
identified as the cooperative banks' central customer data
management and service system.
In 1985, with the appearance of relational database
systems (ie DB 2) and their inquiry tools such as AS
(Application system) and SQL (Structured Query Language),
requests by many partner banks for more online services,
easier database access facilities, increasing GENOS
transaction figures, and more market-related information
The following analysis is based on the findings
obtained through extensive interviews with executives
within Fiducia's application development and
controlling functions.
Fiducia Informationszentrale AG, Annual Report. 1984,
p. 10.
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and customer profitability requests, a strategy was
formulated to gradually transform the GENOS database
system into an information system based on relational
database structures.208
The strategy was to be implemented according to a
209 •
three-phased plan. In stage one, the operational database
segments (GENOS segments) managing the daily business of a
bank were to be migrated into the new database shell. In a
second step, the application programs accessing the
database system needed to be modified according to the new
data model and tools. During the third step, towards the
end of the 1980s, data of related organisations, such as
the R + V insurance group and the Bausparkasse Schwabisch
Hall (BSH), with which a cooperation agreement existed
dating back to the 1960s, and other external data sources,
for instance stock exchange news, should also be
integrated into the new database system. In other words,
the evolution of the GENOS system was planned as an
incremental process, in which the link-up with related
organisations was only of secondary importance in the
first place. Furthermore, the availability of the required
technology, such as relational database systems and their
also compare Fiducia Informationszentrale AG, Annual
Report, 1985, pp.18-19.
unpublished presentation by Degener, R. of Cooperative
Bank Gottingen, Gottingen, 1986, pp.145-147.
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data entry and inquiry tools, was certainly an important
factor in the investment decision-making process.
However, in response to the market-entry of insurance
companies, the above strategy had to be changed. Project
activities, application development, and technology
investments that were scheduled two to three years later
were made earlier. Fiducia intended a much closer link-up
with its traditional partner, the R + V insurance group.
That meant in detail:
(a) Access to R + V's customer data files had to be
realized. To achieve this, Fiducia created a new
• 210 •
database system called Ruvis , that was essentially
a reduced image copy of R + V's customer database
including customer's name, address, and policy
details. In that context various project teams were
engaged in coding database extraction and match-code
programs. These programs were necessary, because
Fiducia's internal data identification and customer
key system was completely different from R + V's
equivalent.
(b) With regard to application development activities, a
new online dialogue system was developed to access
n.a., RZ-Aktuell. special edition, Sept. 1991, p.22.
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the insurance information as part of the Ruvis-
system. This dialogue system was offered to
individual cooperative banks as an additional GENOS
service.
(c) In order to implement a quick communication link
between Fiducia and R + V within the cooperative
network called GENO-net, data transfer was conducted
via physical exchange of tapes and cartridges. In a
second step, almost two years later (mid-1987), this
data exchange was done via electronic file transfer
by a computer-to-computer communication line that was
installed for that purpose.211
These activities, including the purchase of required IT
• • 212
kit such as DB 2, AS, or NetMaster software licences , ran
parallel - but with a high priority - to the original IT
strategy of re-organising the GENOS segments. In terms of
duration of these activities, a functionable link between
Fiducia and R + V, and the availability of online access
from individual partner banks was reached in the first
half of 1986, more than a year after the decision to
respond to the market-entry of the nonbank competitor.
n.a., RZA-Extra, Dec. 1991, p.4, also




The cost of the above design and integration activities
amounted to:
cost of purchased software licences DM 550,000
- additional cost of database licences DM 300,000
project cost to design the online system DM 350,000
cost related to system integration and communications
DM 2,000,000
Both Dresdner Bank, which chose a close cooperation
agreement with Allianz, and Commerzbank, which implemented
a cooperation with Deutsche Beamtenversicherung (DBV)
including the purchase of large equity stakes, essentially
pursued the same approach in terms of IT as in Fiducia's
case. The required IT activities -mainly software and
related integrative tasks - to establish these links are
virtually identical except for company-specific
differences. One of those was the establishment of a
standardised IT platform among Commerzbank1s cooperation
partners. They agreed to jointly develop standard user
access menues, use the same PC architectures, operating
systems etc., to enable sound links and data exchange
between the partners. In addition, by following the way of
cooperation, investment costs for the purchase of an
entire insurance application package were not incurred as
in the case of Deutsche Bank.
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Similar to Fiducia's original IT strategy of an
evolutionary development of the central customer
management system, Dresdner Bank, Deutsche Bank, and
Commerzbank too had decided to gradually change their
respective systems, although the time frame chosen was
much longer. The availability of relational database
technology, for instance, did not immediately lead to
redesign projects, the creation of a new database shell,
and extensive maintenance activities on all related
software packages. Moreover, these banks internally agreed
to design new applications, if demanded by the market,
based on the new technology, and to create bridge and
conversion programs in order to ensure program-to-program
communications with the original, central customer
management system. Parallel to these activities,
individual applications had to be incrementally migrated
to the new technology platform.
In the case of Deutsche Bank, which decided to
establish an insurance subsidiary from scratch, a
completely new IT infrastructure had to be created.
Essentially, the IT activities required were very similar
to the ones Fiducia performed in 1986/87, although on a
broader scale. Firstly, in Jan. 1989 Deutsche Bank
purchased a central insurance application package (called
WS) on the market, and subsequently modified it within
the next nine months according to its standards. Hence,
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extensive redesign and project costs were incurred on top
of the initial purchase price. The overall cost of quickly
providing a workable application amounted to roughly DM 12
Million. Due to the fact that the parent company decided
to run this application on their central mainframe,
additional CPU and storage device utilisation costs, and
expenses for several high speed communication lines
between the subsidiary and the parent's central DP centre
were also charged. This cost block amounted to DM 4.5
• • • 213 • •
million in 1989. These issues in 1989 led to another cost
item of initially DM 5-6 million with double digit cost
figures in the years 1990 and 1991.
Secondly, with regard to the document and insurance
contract management within the subsidiary, a scanning and
document retrieval system called FileNet with 126 Personal
Computers, large optical disc storage facilities, and
client-server communications based on physical bus network
technology (Ethernet) was purchased and installed. This
system has enabled the Deutsche Bank Lebensversicherung AG
to handle 1.5 million documents since its foundation in
Sept.1989, without transferring a single piece of paper.
Through this system the entire customer function such as
This cost block increases dynamically in line with
changes in transaction volumes regarding insurance
contracts. Hence, by now (end of 1992) it will be
certainly between DM 5-6 million due to increased sales
of insurance policies.
178
contract details, address changes, or printouts of life
insurance account balances and the like is performed
decentralised. In addition, several bridge programs had to
be developed to ensure a constant match between the
customer data captured in the central insurance
application and the decentralised service solution. The
overall cost of these IT activities added up to DM 6
million.
Thirdly, in order to establish a link between Deutsche
Bank's internal customer management system called Cerberus
and WS, several project teams were involved in creating
database matchcode and extraction programs. To facilitate
a smooth funding of these IT activities, Deutsche Bank
generated a special fund in the sense of a systems expense
budget with roughly DM 50 million in 1989 and DM 30
million in 1990. About 80 percent of this budget was taken
up by the above IT activities, front-end activities on the
local layer which will be mentioned below, and other
related activities such as intense training courses to
p 1 /
operate the new applications.
The above examples and the general strategy analysis of
the previous section have shown that commercial banks
Deutsche Bank, for instance, trained eight thousand
employees between 1989-90 to operate these insurance
applications and to be able to counsel customers.
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decided to sell insurance policies via their branch
outlets. This brings us to the local layer of the model
illustrated by figure 10. Selling insurance products
besides typical bank and savings services in a branch
outlet represents a substantial expansion of the product
range offered to retail banking customers. This situation
inter alii reguires the decentralised availability of the
insurance application on the local layer.
Insurance products, unlike for instance savings account
services, require more intense financial advice and
knowledge from an individual bank employee. This means at
least two things for a commercial bank. Firstly, a general
skill problem has to be overcome, a factor that will not
be looked at any further in this dissertation, and
secondly a satisfactory IT platform needs to be available
within a branch to be able to provide this enhanced
financial service. This requirement and the fact that
retail banking customers expect more "financial
engineering" of a bank employee to create suitable
solutions tailored to their individual set of needs (see
section 2.4), influences the profile of the job
environment. A certain polarisation trend is observable.
On one side customers expect convenient and quick service
for routine banking transactions, through for instance
various kinds of self-service components. On the other,
however, they demand sophisticated financial consulting
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covering a whole array of services, ranging from insurance
policies, house financing and property facilities,
investment banking products, to all kind of credit
services. Such a job environment could be called an
Integrated Financial Services Consulting Station (IFSCS).
From an IT perspective, such a service station
necessitates decentralised computer power on the local
layer, and communication facilities with the central
layer. In the case of Fiducia's RUVIS system, this
insurance application must be available as an integral
part of the IFSCS in each individual partner bank. As a
consequence of this recognition, Fiducia increased the
number of installed personal computers and terminals
between 1986-87 by 159 percent, from 187 to 455, (see
figure 12 below) and by 50 percent from 4321 to 6470.















Source: Fiducia, Ann. Report 1990, p.25
Personal Computers
Figure 12: Fiducia's Terminalisation between 1986-1990
In a similar way, Dresdner Bank increased its number of
personal computers devoted solely to retail banking
between 1987-91. In 1987 they grew by 55 percent, in 1988
by 44 percent, in 1989 again by 33 percent, and in 1990,
as well as in 1991 by 27 percent.
• ?16
Thus, parts of this hardware cost also have to be
regarded as cost attributable to the strategic defense of
the nonbank entry. However, it would be wrong to conclude
Fiducia during this time was hundred percent devoted
to IBM hardware. Thus, IBM's own installation and ^ales
records provide accurate data about these cost items.
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that only the market-entry of insurers was a motive for
the purchase of this IT equipment. It was imbedded into
the general trend towards an 'Allfinance-strategy' and the
related issue of IFSCS by most German commercial banks.
Hence it is impossible to work out what percentage of the
hardware cost is exactly attributable to the market-entry
of insurers. The total investment cost concerning personal
computers amounted up to DM 2 million, and more than DM 10
million was spent on other types of banking terminals.
In line with the general tendency towards 'Allfinance'
and due to the fact that Deutsche Bank decided to sell
insurance policies via its already existing nationwide
branch network, substantial computer power had to be
installed on the local layer. Similar to Fiducia's way of
thinking this meant: (a) the purchase of initially (in
1989) several hundred personal computers to create the
hardware platform for an IFSCS environment in the branch
outlets, and (b) in order to realise the vision of bank
and insurance products 'out-of-one-hand', an additional
online dialogue application had to be programmed and
integrated into the standard banking services dialogue
system, to enable bank employees to provide adequate
service concerning insurance products. Furthermore, a file
transfer facility had to be created to transfer the
locally captured customer and policy data from the branch
into the central WS application system.
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Commerzbank, in contrast, did not invest in a company-
wide IT platform within the interval 1980-90. It waited
until the first half of 1992 to acquire a similar number
of PCs and workstations as Deutsche Bank had done two
years before. In order to be able to provide
decentralised computer power, however, Commerzbank in 1990
equipped its employees with laptops dedicated only to the
insurance business.
The aggregated sum of these hardware and components
cost, and the design cost presented above already - in
Fiducia's case - amounted to roughly 30 percent of the IT
budget devoted to the retail banking function in the year
1986/87. In the case of the other three large German
clearers, the establishment of life insurance subsidiaries
and all related IT activities in the year 1989, also
created an investment figure of well over twenty percent
of the IT expenditures targeted at the retail banking
function. In this context, it is worth noting that
Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank showed lower budget and
investment totals (but similar investment ratios expressed
in percentage points) in comparison to Deutsche Bank which
decided to set up its own subsidiary from scratch. This
difference on the other hand needs adjustment in recalling
the fact that both banks purchased significant stakes in
its partners. Both partners, Allianz and DBV, however, are
large insurance companies which run well equipped DP
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centres that also incur substantial systems expenses
expressed in the administrative cost block of their
balance sheets. By purchasing for instance an almost 50
percent equity stake, 50 percent of the partner's IT
expenses are automatically purchased as well. These costs
must be added to the traceable IT activities and related
investment cost as discussed on the previous pages. Due to
a lack of information it is impossible to work out this
"acquired cost block" for Dresdner and Commerzbank. Hence,
the apparent cost difference between Deutsche Bank, where
most IT cost is visible, is certainly smaller than
expected in the first place when the factor of 'acquired
IT cost' is taken into consideration.
Thus, the market-entry of a nonbank competitor into the
German retail banking services market led to reactions
within the commercial banking sector in terms of IT.
Fiducia's reaction could be thereby identified as the
first major response of German commercial banks. With a
time lag of roughly 15 months to the market-entry of
insurance companies, a significant proportion of the IT
budget was devoted to finance IT activities directly
related to the strategic response of the banks.
Furthermore, investments that were planned two to three
years later were made much earlier to react to the
increase in competition.
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In the US market, none of the large commmercial banks
that were asked indicated significant IT activities to
respond to the market-entry of insurers. Moreover, the
strict regulatory separation between the commercial
banking and insurance industries, impeded similar
cooperation agreements or de novo establishments of
insurance subsidiaries as in the German market that would
have required substantial IT investments up to the
significance level of twenty percent of the IT budget
devoted to retail banking. Hence, a change in the US
banks1 IT strategy to respond to the market-entry of
insurance institutions was not observable.
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4.5 Main Results
Traditionally, capital creating life insurance policies
were prioritised investment and savings instruments in
private households' portfolio of investment activities in
the US. Until the 197 0s they ranked much higher than in
Germany. These investments represent highly competitive
products compared to typical banking deposit facilities
because of their security, long-term nature, tax
deductibility, and returns. However, due to competitive
money market products and the beginning of the
deregulation of interest rates, these products
increasingly lost market attractiveness in the US retail
banking market at the beginning of the 1980s. As a
consequence of the cooperation between insurance companies
and investment banks, and the resulting introduction of
new insurance services, the 'New Wave Policies', this
trend could be slightly reversed from the mid-1980s
onwards. In comparison with the development of capital
creating life insurance products in the German market
throughout the 1980s, where a steady growth was
observable, a relative decline of importance must be
noted. Nevertheless, the strategic alliances between
insurers and investment banks represented strong
competition to US commercial banks in the retail banking
market.
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Within this competitive market environment, US
commercial banks were in a relatively impeded market
position to respond to the market-entry. Due to the strict
regulatory separation of commercial banking and insurance,
cross-shareholdings were prohibited and business
cooperations between both industries were severely
constrained. In addition, US life insurers reduced
commercial banks market potential by routing insurance
savings funds into the investment banking sector without
participation of commercial banks.
In Germany, competition between the insurance and
banking industry was traditionally less strong in
comparison to the US. This is true due to four main
factors:
(a) Enterprises of both financial industries hold
significant shareholdings of companies belonging to
the other industry
(b) Insurance companies provide the banking sector with
substantial redepositing facilities
(c) In financing other sectors of the economy, insurers
tend to utilize typical banking services as an
intermediary
188
(d) The creation and provision of capital creating and
other life insurance policies is predominantly done
via cooperations between banks and insurance
companies
This initially relatively friendly competitive situation
in the German market increasingly intensified throughout
the second half of the 1980s, with banks establishing
their own subsidiaries. The resulting competitive
pressures for members of both industries were accompanied
by the following factors that increasingly gained market
relevance: (1) banks were faced with an increasing yield
and price sensitivity of customers, and a general tendency
towards capital creating life insurance policies and
securities investments, and (2) insurance companies also
focused on their own capital gathering function, by
introducing financial innovations that combine risk
insurance components with various kinds of capital
creating elements, in order to sustain their level of
profitability. Furthermore, due to decreasing savings
ratios in Germany, the competitive rivalry over first
deposit facilities between banks and insurance companies
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is expected to intensify even further.
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Schwebler, R., 'Kampf der Giganten oder neues Stadium
in der Kooperation von Banken und Versicherungen ?',
in: Versicherunqswirtschaft, vol.41, 1986, pp.7.
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In the US, the market entry of life insurers, on a
broad scale, occurred at the end of 1984 and the beginning
of 1985 with the launch of new wave policies. The market
introduction of modified whole life policies, about one
year earlier, represented just an interim stage. Due to
the regulatory restrictions and the limited insurance
powers that have been discussed already, and the fact that
commercial banks did not regard insurance companies as a
serious threat, hardly any significant strategic reply,
such as cooperations or takeovers, that could have
reguired a change in the banks IS strategy happened
throughout the 1980s. The following diagram illustrates
218
this relationship.
This diagram is only intended to illustrate the market-
entry of a nonbank competitor and its effects on the
competitive reaction between bank and nonbank in the
year of the market-entry, and commercial banks' IT
reaction to this market-entry after a certain time-
lag. The years before and after the market-entry and
the IT reaction respectively are not relevant in light
of the hypothesis under investigation. Hence, they are
held guasi-constant, which leads to the idealised shape
of both graphs. In addition, the IT expenses with
regard to this nonbank competitor are perceived to be
insignificant before and after the IT response
occurred. Similarly, the competitive relation between
bank and nonbank, after the market-entry, is assumed
to remain on the intensified level. Furthermore, due
to the focus of this investigation on the dates of the
market-entries and IT reactions, and the fact that IT
cost data could only be obtained at the end of the
accounting periods of the interviewed banks, peaks
might be illustrated in the case of the IT response
graph.
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Banks' IT reaction to the market—entry of
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Figure 13: Banks' IT Reaction to the Market-Entry of
Insurers into the US Retail Banking Market
In the German market, in contrast, banks perceived the
market-entry of insurers completely differently. At the
end of 1982, a first wave of capital creating life
insurance products was thrown on the market, which was
only moderately answered by commercial banks via products
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such as the •Banksparplan mit Versicherungsschutz'. In the
process, cooperation agreements with insurance companies
were the preferred strategic response that did not
culminate in significant IT investments. However, the
launch of financial innovations according to the pattern
of new wave policies in the second half of 1985, and
takeovers of banks by insurance companies triggered
substantial IT activities. Fiducia's reaction in 1986
(which stands for about 25 percent of the entire German
retail banking market), can be identified as the German
commercial banking industry's year of a major strategic
reply. Despite the fact that KKB Bank, which is only an
insignificant player on the German market, on April 1,
1985, was first in establishing an insurance subsidiary.
The IT activities reguired to reply to the market-entry
of these nonbank competitors encompassed substantial
programming and system integration activities, database
design projects, investment in software licences, and
various hardware components such as terminals, PCs, and
communication facilities. The aggregated cost of these IT
activities, expressed as a percentage figure of the IT
budget devoted to IT expenditure and investments in
Fiducia's retail banking function in the year 1986/87,
amounted to roughly 30 percent. A similar figure was spent
in 1989 by Deutsche Bank (well over twenty percent of the
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retail banking budget devoted to IT investment), when it
decided to create its own life insurance subsidiary, and
by Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank through close cooperation
agreements. Hence, these IT activities represented a
significant change in the banks' IT strategy to respond to
the market-entry of life insurers into the retail banking
market. In addition, IT investments that were planned two
to three years later had to be made much earlier, due to
the competitive pressures created by the nonbank market-
entry. The following diagram illustrates the relationship
between the market- entry of the nonbank competitor, and
the change in the banks' IT strategy. The red-coloured
graph thereby describes the competitive relation between
nonbank competitor and the banks, whereas the green-
coloured graph illustrates the banks' strategic response
in terms of IT. According to our measurement process of
the IT variable, the aggregated cost of the IT activities
specified in the previous section is expressed as a
percentage figure of the IT budget devoted to IT
investments in the retail banking function of the bank in
the year of the strategic response, they are then compared
with the significance level of twenty percent, and finally
plotted below or above the level of significance.
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Banks' IT reaction to the market-entry of






























































Figure 14: Banks* IT Reaction to the Market-Entry of
Insurers into the German Retail Banking
Market
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5. The Market-Entry of Thrift Institutions
5.1 Development of Bausparkassen and Thrift'
Products as Substitution Potential to Bank
Deposits
Both, the German Bausparkassen and the US thrift
institutions were traditionally engaged in the long-term
mortgage lending and property finance business. Both types
of institutions were also clearly distinctive from
commercial banks in that they were not part of the banking
sector and separately supervised and regulated (see
section 3.2). Because of this situation they are regarded
as nonbanks, but due to the relative closeness of their
products and services to commercial banks' range of
services they are commonly known as near-banks.
Under the German Bausparkassen-system, the
Bausparkassen (the German equivalent to Building Societies
in the UK) in general promote Bauspar contracts as cost
efficient financing vehicles for private households to
obtain property (this includes the building of houses, the
purchase of houses or flats, and refurbishment activities
to sustain the property).
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The main idea of a Bauspar contract is the so-called
• • 219
'saving-in-advance aspect (Vorsparaspekt), and the
combination of a savings and credit element. This concept
means that a customer who has signed a Bauspar contract
first of all has to pay monthly contributions into a
specifically allocated deposit account over a fixed period
of time, with a fixed interest rate, generally 2.5, 3, or
, 220
4 percent depending on the duration of the contract. Once
the customer has reached the pre-set savings limit, he is
eligible to a low-interest loan with rates two percentage
points higher than the deposit rates. He then is in the
position to either exercise the option and to take up the
loan, or to waive it. Similar to the competitive situation
in the building societies' market in the UK, where all
larger societies followed the rate recommendations
• • • • . . . 221
provided by the BSA (Building Societies Association)
resulting in a quasi-monopoly in the provision of
mortgages until the mid-1980s, the Bausparkassen
collectively offer the above mentioned interest rate
Stracke, G. / Pohl, M., 'Financial Services in
Deutschland (2): Marktstrategien der Bausparkassen',
in: Die Bank. 08/1987, pp.412-439, here p.424.
for a detailed description of the rate system see
Schmitz-Morkramer, G. , 'Deutsche Bank Bausparkasse auf
Erfolgskurs', in: Die Bank. 05/1988, pp.278-281, here
p.279.
Callen, T.S. / Lomax, J.W. , 'The Development of the
Building Societies Sector in the 1980s', in: Bank of




The advantage of the Bausparkassen-system for an
ordinary saver is the low-interest loan which is often
well below going market rates. On the other hand, the
customer has to pay a fixed commission (a certain
percentage figure of the total value of the loan) when
signing a Bauspar contract, and the loan is only
obtainable at a certain date (the allocation cannot be
postponed) in its entire value (partial allocation of the
loan is also not permitted).
Throughout the 1970s and until 1980, the Bausparkassen-
system showed steady growth due to the fact that (1) it
was easy to understand by ordinary savers, (2) it was
integrated in the wealth accumulation programme of the
government for low-income savers, (3) it benefitted from
the general increase in wealth and standard of living
resulting in the desire for house ownership. However, the
first years of the 1980s were shaped by decreasing profit
margins and a decline of new business. This trend was the
consequence of market saturation tendencies, rising
unemployment rates, and decreasing savings ratios due to
the second oil price shock and the subsequent recession, a
sharp reduction of government expenditure for the wealth
accumulation programme, and a changing structure of the
private house building market( less multi-family houses
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were built in that time ) . Thus, the Bausparkassen were
forced to look for other ways to generate profits.
Again similar to the developments in the UK, the
Bausparkassen in the first half of 1985 made inroads into
the retail banking deposit market by introducing products
which were similar to savings accounts. The first product
of that kind - the BHW Dispo 2000 - was launched on Febr.
1, 1985 by BHW, the second largest Bausparkasse of the
German market. 224 These products essentially represented a
development of Bauspar contracts as instruments of housing
and property finance into relatively high yielding savings
accounts, as compared to normal bank savings accounts
which paid only 2.5 percent interest.
Apart from the attractive returns, these innovative
products carry the following features which indicate the
development out of the rigid Bauspar contract as mentioned
In 1984, a total of 400,000 houses (houses include
flats and apartments) were completed in West Germany.
This figure shrunk to 300,000 in 1985, and reached its
lowest point in 1986 with roughly 230,000 new houses,
van Hooven, E. , Member of the Board of Directors of
Deutsche Bank, press conference speech on 13 March
1987, pp.1-13, here p.4.
For a detailed discussion of the reasons that
influenced the market of Bausparkassen see
Stracke, G. / Pohl, M., 'Financial Services in
Deutschland (2): Marktstrategien der Bausparkassen',
ibid, pp.421-422.
For a ranking of the largest Bausparkassen see Appendix
3) .
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on the previous pages, and also qualify their substitution
potential to bank deposit products:
(a) partial withdrawal of the deposited money is possible
without loosing parts of the loan
(b) in case of rejection of the loan by the customer, the
commission plus interest is automatically paid back
(c) partial allocation of the loan can be negotiated
(d) it is possible to opt for higher interest rates (and
also a longer duration) after having signed the
contract
In the US market, the market-entry of thrift
institutions was mainly triggered by a significant change
in the banking legislation. Traditionally, thrift
institutions were specialised on long-term savings
• • 225
accounts and the mortgage lending business. But they were
not allowed to offer any kind of sight deposits or
checking accounts, which meant that competition with
commercial banks in the area of payment transactions was
virtually impossible, and that the thrift's asset
see Rose, P.S., The Changing Structure of American
Banking, ibid, p.307; also Kaufman, G., The US
Financial System. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1980,
pp.150.
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portfolios tended to be rather inflexible. A large
proportion of assets was fixed on a low interest rate
level with long durations. In 1985, for instance 61
percent of S & L assets were devoted to mortgage loans,
many of which carried fixed interest rates or contract
loan rates that could be changed only on a limited basis.226
These inflexible asset portfolios, paired with high risk
lending activities was one of the main reasons, inter
alia, for the thrift crisis in the 1980s. In contrast to
Bausparkassen, however, thrift institutions were permitted
to offer a wider range of services related to residential
finance and long-term saving.
. • .
The passage of the DIDMCA in 1980 , which for the first
time permitted the provision of sight deposits and the
usage of cheques and credit cards to utilize these
accounts, and the Garn-St. Germain Act of 19 8 2 228 that
extended these rights, constituted the opportunity for
thrift institutions to compete with commercial banks in
Rose, P.S, 'The Changing...', ibid, p.307.
see Frazer, D.R. / Kolari, J.W., The Future of Small
Banks in a Deregulated Environment, ibid, pp.47-53;
also McNeill, C.R., 'The Depository Institutions and
Monetary Control Act of 1980', in: Federal Reserve
Bulletin, vol.66, 1980, pp.444-453, here p.450.
Moran, M., 'Thrift institutions in Recent Years', in:
Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol.68, 1982, pp.726-738,
here p.737; also section 1.3.4.1.
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the consumer finance and third-party payment market.
As a consequence of the DIDMCA, thrifts in 1981 started
230 •
to offer so-called NOW-accounts (Negotiable Order of
Withdrawal), which are similar to typical checking
accounts, and also diversified into money market
231 • • • •
accounts. In addition, the provisions of the Garn-
St.Germain Act of 1982 widely enhanced thrifts' power to
offer demand deposits (ie the introduction of Super NOW
• 232 •
accounts was permitted ) and to engage in the consumer and
business loan market. Thus, by the end of 1982, thrifts
were in the position to leave their competitive insulary
and to severely cut into the entire consumer finance and
deposit base of commercial banks. At least in the
beginning, thrifts thereby benefitted from a legal right
to offer interest rates 0.25 percent above those of
commercial banks which were bound because of the
Gondring, H.P., ibid, p.149.
DIDMCA of 1980, Title 2.
see Kalogeras, G., 'Examinig the Money Market Funds',
in: The Bankers Magazine, vol.164, 1981, No.l, pp.66-
72.
A Super NOW account is eligible only to NOW customers,
corporations are excluded. It carries unlimited
transaction features, and does not have any interest
rate restrictions. On the other hand, it carries a 12
percent reserve requirement.
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Regulation Q specification. The following diagram
indicates the competitive thrust of thrift institutions
triggered by the deregulations discussed above.
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Source: FED of Chicago, 1990
Figure 15: MMDA vs. MMMF growth in the US
Between 1982-83 money market accounts increased
dramatically, a development that was substantially
influenced by the competitive developments in the thrift
industry as a consequence of the enhanced product powers.
By 1983, however, any rate differentials that existed
due to Regulation Q were removed. Regulation Q itself
was entirely phased out by January 1, 1987.
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Due to the attractive interest rates of these accounts,
which at the time of their creation exceeded those of
commercial banks' counterparts (in line with MMMFs and
CMAs offered by financial conglomerates such as Merryll
Lynch), banks rapidly lost deposits. 234 Thus, a strong
substitution potential between thrifts' products and
typical bank deposits was created by a change in the
banking legislation in the US retail banking market in the
first two years of the previous decade.
5.2 Analysis of Competitive Developments in both
Countries
Unlike their US eguivalents, German Bausparkassen are
more strictly regulated. Since the passage of the DIDMCA,
US thrift institutions belong to the group of depository
institutions, which basically have similar powers to
commercial banks. Under the German Bausparkassengesetz
(Building Societies Act), diversification strategies of
Bausparkassen are only permitted into areas directly
related to property finance, and into business areas that
• • 235 •
are clearly supportive to the Bauspar business. . This
see Seligman, B. , Money Market Funds. New York, 1983,
pp.69; also n.a., 'Money Funds: Raging Success', in:
The Banker, vol.133, 1983, no.689, pp.7-8.
§4 of the Bausparkassengesetz.
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regulatory situation initially shifted the Bausparkassen1
focus of attention on possible alterations in their
product policy. Before launching these innovative products
such as 'Dispo 2000', the Bausparkassen sector, between
1982-84, introduced various kinds of interest rate
alternatives and bonus schemes in order to enhance the
?~Z£.
market attractiveness of Bauspar contracts. Wiistenrot' s
long-term but high interest deposit alternative was just
237
one example.
The distribution of these products as well as ordinary
Bauspar contracts was done via a mobile and highly
flexible sales force. This channel carries the great
advantage that new services like the Dispo 2000 can reach
the market very guickly and effectively, because of
motivated and hence aggressive sales people working on a
commission base.
Similar to the distribution policy concerning life
insurers and commercial banks in the German market,
Bausparkassen and commercial banks were traditionally
engaged in close cooperation agreements. Due to the fact
that only Bausparkassen are legally entrusted with the
Wiistenrot is among the three largest Bausparkassen in
Germany.
Stracke, G. / Pohl, M., 'Financial Services in




right to offer Bauspar contracts , banks that intended to
participate in this business and to boost their own
building and construction credit facilities, had to settle
cooperation agreements. These agreements generally
included that Bausparkassen satisfied their short and
medium-term credit and refinancing needs by taking up
their partners' credit facilities. In turn, banks got
involved in the acquisition of new Bausparkassen customers
• • 239
who were directly sent to the cooperating Bausparkasse.
The negative economic developments at the beginning of the
previous decade, however, and the inroads made into the
retail banking market by large Bausparkassen, were the
main reasons for the breakdown of many of these
cooperation agreements by the mid-1980s.
In order to leave their competitive insulary, the
largest Bausparkassen started to broaden their competitive
platform by developing into 'Allfinance'-concerns with the
Bauspar business as a core business area. This development
led to conversions into a holding structure, the
establishment of banking subsidiaries such as the
Wiistenrot-Bank and the BHW-Bank, and cooperations with
p / A




van Hooven, E., ibid, p.9.
"lG
Storck, L. , 'Das BHW als Finanzdienstleister: Wieviel
aus einer Hand', in: Bank und Markt, July 1989, pp.13-
21, here p.16; also Stracke, Guido / Pohl, Michael,
205
from 1987 onwards also offered investment certificates,
savings and credit facilities, and insurance policies.
This increase in competition is also indicated by an
enormous growth in advertisement expenditure within the
Bausparkassen sector. In 1987, this figure grew from a
negligible amount, to DM 170 million, of which the top
p/ 1
three organisations invested 60 percent.
In the US, many large thrift institutions that intended
to aggressively market their innovative products, along
the same lines as the Bausparkassen did, had to broaden
their capital base. This also led to numerous conversions
from 'mutualised' organisation forms to public limited
p/ p
companies throughout the 1980s.
5.3 Commercial Banks' Strategic Reactions in the US
and Germany
Pushed by the market-entry of Bausparkassen which
provided increasingly similar products to typical bank
deposits and hence eroded the distinction between the
'Financial Services in Deutschland (2) : Marktstrategien
der Bausparkassen', ibid, p.429.
Stracke, G. / Pohl, M., 'Financial Services in
Deutschland (2): Marktstrategien der Bausparkassen',
ibid, p.424.
Dougall, H. / Gaumnitz, J., ibid, pp.68.
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commercial banking and Bausparkassen industries, and US
thrift institutions which offered almost the same product
range as compared to commercial banks in the consumer
credit and deposit business, commercial banks in both
countries were forced to react.
In the German market, large commercial banks reacted by
establishing de novo their own Bausparkasse subsidiary. In
Spring 1987, Deutsche Bank was first in founding a
p/7
Bausparkasse, the Deutsche Bank Bauspar AG. Dresdner
Bank, the second largest clearing bank pursued the same
approach by establishing de novo its own subsidiary
(Dresdner Bank Bausspar AG) in Spring 1988, whereas
Commerzbank at the same time established a cooperation
agreement with Leonberger Bausparkasse in line with its
general cooperation strategy to team up, for example, with
the Deutsche Beamtenversicherung in order to react to the
market-entry of insurance companies.
Apart from the reason to react to the inroads
undertaken by Bausparkassen, the market environment of the
house building and property market in Germany also changed
in a way that influenced the long-term consumer credit and
property business of commercial banks. Determining factors
Schmitz-Morkramer, G. , 1Bausparen in der Deutschen
Bank', in: Der Lancrfristiqe Kredit. vol.6, 1987,
pp.190-192, here p.190.
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that had an impact on the decision-making process of banks
to participate in the Bausparkassen system were:
(1) only 40 percent of West German families at the end of
1986 were house owners. Bearing in mind that private
houseownership is one of the main pillars of the
nation's wealth creation, this meant a significant
market potential to be satisfied in the second half
of the 1980s.244
(2) As of January 1, 1987, government created a tax
incentive to save money for the purpose of house
building that supported guick downpayments on house
building loans, and also created a legally
advantageous status for the self-utilisation of newly
p /c
built housing facilities.
(3) The continuously growing influx of people from
Eastern Europe into Germany - between 1988-90 more
than two million - culminated in excess demand and
p//
accommodation shortages particularly in urban areas.
(4) In light of a deterioration of the social security
van Hooven, E., ibid, p.5.
Modification of §10 (e) of the German Income Tax Act
(Einkommensteuergesetz) .





system in Germany (see previous chapter), house
ownership is one of the key investment areas for
private households to ensure a safe and sound
p / ~j
standard of living after retirement.
In positioning the subsidiary in the market, banks
regarded Bauspar contracts as an extension of their
already existing product range. From a product policy
perspective, this strategy ensured (a) that the classic
savings deposit could be protected, and (b) the long-term
mortgage business of the parent company was not
cannibalised. In addition, the Deutsche Bank Bauspar AG,
for instance, introduced a very attractive rate system -
similar to the rate alternatives of incumbent
Bausparkassen between 1982-84 - with in total seven
p / Q
different alternatives of Bauspar contracts. In 1989 and
1990, the Bausparkasse subsidiaries of the large clearers
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reached the break-even zone.
With regard to cooperative banks, these institutions
for almost 30 years had a Bausparkasse - the Bausparkasse
Wielens, H. , Member of the Board of Directors of
Deutsche Bank Bauspar AG, Flexibilitat und
Zuverlassiqkeit - Deutsche Bank Bausparen. Press
conference speech on 13 March 1987, pp.1-8, here p. 4.
Wielens, H., ibid, pp.7-8.




Schwabisch Hall (BSH) - as a dedicated partner operating
within the cooperative banks network. Roughly at the same
time, in the second half of 1986, a more intensified
cooperation was decided to fight off competition from
• • 250
independent Bausparkassen and large commercial banks.
The distribution of Bauspar contracts was initially
done solely via the branch network of the parent company
similar to insurance products. This strategy guaranteed
nationwide coverage of the new products. However, the
German Federal Supervisory Office mandated the creation of
• 251 • •
an independent sales force in order to achieve
competitive eguality to independent Bausparkassen.
By the end of the previous decade, as a result of the
strategic response, the market share of large commercial
banks in the house building credit business increased to
7.46 percent, from 4.8 percent in 1985. Independent
Bausparkassen, in turn, lost market share. They went down
from 17.27 percent in 1985 to 13.11 percent in 1990. The
following table summarises this change.
see Kleiner, H. , 1 Bausparen als Schltisselprodukt am
Finanzdienstleistungsmarkt', in: Bankinformation.
08/1987, pp.27-31.
Schmitz-Morkramer, G., 'Deutsche Bank Bausparkasse auf
Erfolgskurs', ibid, p.280.
210
Table 11: The Housebuilding Credit Market 1985-90
Assets in Bin DM Market Share in %
1985 1990 1985 1990
large CB 38.34 70.06 4.8 7.46
Savings Banks 185.01 237.14 23.18 25.25
Coop. Banks 89.28 111.09 11.18 11.82
Bausparkassen 145.88 132.52 17.27 13.11
Columns do not add up to 100 because other types of banks
have deliberately been left aside for the purpose of
simplicity.
Source: German Bundesbank, Monthly Report, Statistics
Supplement, Febr. 1991
In the US market commercial banks reacted quickly to
growing competition from the thrift industry. They
immediately began to offer money market deposit accounts
which led to the rapid rise of this product until it
reached its peak in 1986/87, with roughly $550 billion of
deposits (see figure 15), and also adjusted interest rates
of their savings accounts up to the level of competing
products. This was also accompanied by the phasing-out of
the artificial rate differential between thrifts and
commercial banks' deposit products.
Unlike the large independent Bausparkassen which run
nationwide branch networks, US thrift institutions, due to
interstate banking restrictions (see section 2.3.2), were
only competitors in local banking markets. In these local
markets they were characterised by community strength,
customer loyalty, and established distribution links. The
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expansion of their product range was a great opportunity
to benefit from these market relations and to increase the
market share in their local markets. On an aggregated
nationwide basis, this would have meant severe competitive
threats to large commercial banks. However, due to the
facts that thrifts operated only locally, that they did
not have any reserved 'territory' such as the Bauspar
market in Germany because of explicit regulations, and
that their product range was similar to commercial banks',
large commercial banks did not regard them as a
significant competitive threat. Moreover, by pushing their
own products and services (and new ones such as MMDAs) ,
they could easily counterbalance the inroads made by
thrift institutions.
In contrast to the strategic reply of German commercial
banks (de novo establishments) , the US equivalents











Figure 16: US Bank Acquisitions 1982-89
This development was largely influenced and triggered by
several environmental factors inherent in the US banking
market:
(1) Most large US commercial banks showed sluggish
growth, declining profitability ratios, and declining
asset quality partly due to LDC-debt problems,
resulting in huge write-offs and loss provisions. As
a consequence, they showed signs of
undercapitalisation which made de novo expansion
extremely expensive. Diagram 17 illustrates the RoA
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see Rose, P.S., 'Profiles of US Merging Banks', in:
Bank Mergers: Current Issues and Perspectives, ed. by
Gup, B.E., Boston, 1989, p.13; also McLaughlin, M. /
Wolfson, M., 'The Profitability of Insured Commercial
Banks in 1987', in: Federal Reserve Bulletin, «July
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development of commercial banks in the 1980s.
RoA of Commercial Banks
- 1979 to 1989 -
Percent
1
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Years
Source: FED of Chicago, 1990
Figure 17: RoA of US Commercial Banks 1979-88
(2) The beginning of the interstate banking deregulation
(Maine, 1978, and subsequently the New England
regional Compact) process with the creation of
1988, pp.404,410,411; Walliqh, H.C., The International
Debt Situation: An American View. Speech given to the
Verein fiir Sozialpolitik, Frankfurt, 8 Febr. 1985;
also Nussbaum, P., 'Banking 1988: A Market View'f in:
Economic Perspectives. July/Aug. 1989, p.7.
214
reciprocity laws and regional compacts offered
opportunities to acquire banks and thrifts, and hence
retail deposits and credit facilities across state
253
borders.
(3) Legislative steps undertaken by the Congress, namely
the Garn-St.Germain Act of 1982 and the FIRREA
(Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act) of 1989 to loosen the emergency
rules governing the acquisition of failing bank and
thrift organisations, created attractive takeover
opportunities for large commercial banks.
As a result of the above factors, money centre banks such
as Citibank purchased a number of S & L institutions but
pr /
only in selected local markets. It was often the only
possibility to geographically diversify the loan
portfolio, the deposit base, and to gain access to local
retail markets. In contrast to German banks which
predominantly started from scratch, US banks were faced
Calem, P., ibid, pp.4; also Clair, R.T. / Tucker, P.K.,
ibid, pp. 12-13; also Clair, R.T. / Tucker, P.K. /
Siems, T.F., 'Removing the Remaining Barriers to
Interstate Banking', in: The Bankers Magazine. Jan/Feb.
1991, pp.11-17; Goudreau, R. A. / Wall, L.D.,
'Southeastern Interstate Banking Consolidation: 1984-
89', in: Economic Review. FED of Atlanta, Nov/Dec.
1990, pp.40.
Layne, R., 'Citibank plans Network of Niche Branches',
in: American Banker. 31 Oct. 1990, p.8.
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with the task of integration. Commercial banks such as
pcc t t ,
BancOne , NCNB, and Citibank, applied a transition
strategy to convert acquired S & L institutions into a
community bank by adding typical commercial bank products
and services (ie revolving credit or commercial loans) to
the traditional consumer mortgages and savings products.
Appendix 6 presents a transition model frequently applied
by Citibank. William J Heron, Citi's Executive of the US
Consumer Banking Group, described this strategy as
follows:
"Citi has built this branch network through S & L
acquisitions at an initial low cost with a lot of follow-
up work. We have tended to buy relatively small, unhealthy
institutions and spent quite a few years fixing them up."2
5.4 Strategic Reactions in terms of IT
As discussed already in the previous section, German
commercial banks decided to either fight off competing
Bausparkassen by creating de novo their own Bausparkasse
subsidiary, as in the case of Deutsche or Dresdner Bank,
or to implement close cooperations as Commerzbank and the
cooperatives did. In the US, the main business strategy
Svare, J.C., 'The BancOne Experience', in: Bank
Management. Nov. 1990, pp.19-24.
Heron, W.J., in: Citicorp's Strategies for the
Nineties. New York, 1990, p.16.
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applied was the acquisition and integration of S & L
institutions. What remains to be analyzed on the following
pages is whether these business strategies were
accompanied by a significant change in the banks' IT
strategy ?
Similar to the cooperations between life insurers and
German commercial banks, as discussed in the previous
chapter, the cooperation agreements in the case of
Commerzbank and Leonberger Bausparkasse, or the
cooperative banks, via Fiducia as their central DP
organisation, with Bausparkasse Schwabisch Hall (BSH),
require a link-up between two independent IT
architectures. The problem zones and areas for immediate
IT activities related to this issue as identified in
section 4.4 (compare organisational IT model, figure 11)
also apply in this case. Hence it is not necessary to
discuss them again in this chapter, because apart from
different products - insurance policies on one side, and
Bauspar contracts on the other - there is no difference.
In addition, both types of products are distributed in the
same way so that almost identical requirements on the
central and local IT layers are existent.
The general IT strategy in place in the mid-1980s, in
the case of Fiducia, before the market-entry of
Bausparkassen occurred, was the evolution of the
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FIDIS/GENOS database system into a relational database
information system according to the three-phased plan
already mentioned in section 4.4. In response to the
market-entry of Bausparkassen, this strategy had to be
changed. IT investments and application developments that
were planned two years later had to be made earlier.
In order to gain access to BSH's customer and policy
data, Fiducia developed a new database system called
Hallis. This system, essentially a restricted shadow
system of BSH's own database, provides individual customer
information about the number of Bauspar contracts,
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allocated loans, maturity dates, and the payment history.
In tandem with another database system supporting the
property finance business called Immoplan, and the
required match code and data extraction programs, an
online dialogue application was also developed and
integrated into the GENOS shell as an additional online
service for individual cooperative banks. These IT
activities were completed by the end of 1987 and went on
stream in January 1988. The overall cost related to these
activities amounted to the following:
Schwenk, D., 'Hallis Informationsservice der
Bausparkasse Schwabisch Hall', in: Bankinformation.
09/1990, pp.20-23, here p.21.
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- cost of additional relational database software
licenses: DM 160,000
- programming expenses and related project cost to
develop Hallis, Immoplan, and the attached dialogue
systems: DM 637,000
- additional expenditure for communication and network
software: DM 900,000
In line with the completion of these application
development, design, and purchase activities of IT kit,
came the completion of the computer-to-computer
communication line that enabled immediate data transfer
via file transfer between Fiducia and BSH (also see Ch.4).
As another important component of the Concept of
Integrated Financial Service Consulting Stations (IFSCS),
that was introduced in section 4.4. in the previous
chapter, and the related process of financial engineering,
the provision of Bauspar contracts and financial
consulting in the business area of house and property
finance, had to be integrated into the already existing
service stations. This decision required the availability
of decentralised computer power and was certainly a
determining factor in the purchase of additional personal
computers and terminals in 1987/88. Figure 13, section
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4.4, illustrates the increase of personal computers and
terminals during that interval. The total investment cost
related to these hardware components amounted to 3.5
million DM. However, it would be tantamount to pure
guessing to work out the precise percentage figure of the
cost directly attributable to the market-entry of
Bausparkassen, in relation to the planned investment
expenditure to realise the IFSCS concept.
In the case of founding a subsidiary from scratch,
similar large IT investments had to be made. First of all,
the entire subsidiary and its branches had to be equipped
with basic IT kit such as cabling facilities,
communication links, terminals, personal computers,
printers and the like. In addition, the diversification
into the Bauspar business either meant extremely complex
and relatively long-lasting software development
processes, or the purchase of an entire Bauspar contract,
customer, and administrative application system from an
independent Bausparkasse and its subsequent modifications
according to the new environment. In light of the urge of
the decision, both Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank chose
the second alternative. Both companies bought the Bauspar
application system from the Landesbausparkasse Kiel. The
cost attributable to this purchase amounted to roughly DM
6 million.
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Apart from the mere purchase of IT kit and the
application package, two additional IT activities had to
be performed. Firstly, more than 800 individual programs
of the initial application package were changed and
redesigned due to different key systems, Bauspar contract
alternatives, and filing attributes between the
Landesbausparkasse Kiel and the purchasing commercial
bank. Large programming and maintenance costs were thus
incurred on top of the purchase price. Secondly, the new
subsidiary also required its own mainframe computer to run
the application, or a sufficient amount of computing time,
power, and storage capacity provided by a mainframe in the
parent's DP centre. Again both commercial banks went for
the second alternative, which meant an additional cost
block charged for the utilisation of the mainframe
computer. Roughly DM 4 million were charged by the parent
company for the provision of this IT service. The
aggregated sum of these individual cost items and IT
activities directly related to the diversification into
the Bauspar business, represented a significant fraction
of the overall IT budget devoted to retail banking
activities. With regard to the cost of these IT
activities, the aggregated sum within Deutsche Bank and
Dresdner Bank amounted to twenty-five percent of the IT
budget devoted to the retail banking function. The cost of
Fiducia and Commerzbank, which realised the cooperation
approach, were somewhat lower but still above the twenty
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percent limit.
In the US, the market-entry of thrifts did not require
258
any significant strategic reaction in terms of IT. As
found out in the previous section, large commercial banks
acquired mostly failing S & L institutions, triggered by
the thrust to geographically diversify their loan and
deposit portfolio by extending their network of retail
banking outlets. They did not regard the market-entry of
thrift institutions as an important competitive threat.
The only interesting aspect in terms of IT concerning
the integration of acquired institutions is the merge of
the acquired IT platforms and infrastructure with the
bank's existing IT platform. However, the motif behind the
consolidation of IT platforms, networks, and DP centres is
cost control and economies of scale. Banks can eliminate
redundant circuits, personnel, application programs, or DP
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centres, and thus streamline their operations. The IT
Apart from cyclic IT expenditure in calculational
automation and various related PC-based solutions to
smoothen mortgage and other long-term lending
processes, that represented only minor IT cost, US
commercial banks did not invest in this business
segment in the 1980s.
see Lendis, K. , 'Technology Conquers the Mortgage Mill*
in: Bankers Monthly. July 1990, pp.33-36.
see Eckerson, W., 'Bank Mergers Test Mettle of Network
and IS Staffs', in: Network World, vol.29, iss.29, 22
July 1991, pp.2,62; also Kay, S., 'Citicorp Blends
Technologies as Means to Corporate Ends', in:
ComputerworId. vol.24, iss.28, 9 July 1990, p.88; also
Burger, K., 'BancOne Corp: Thinking Big in Texas', in:
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activities related to the integration process can
therefore not be classified as strategic IT activities to
react to the market-entry of a nonbank competitor.
The problems which generally arise in this context,
namely the incompatibility of software applications, key
systems, or hardware components opens up a very
interesting aspect to be investigated. However, the
research thrust of this dissertation does not allow to
look at this issue any further. Nevertheless, it
represents a good starting point for other investigations.
Bank systems & Technology, vol.27, iss.4, Apr. 1990,
pp.38-42; also Craft, J.D., 'Retail Banking in the
1990s: Nonbanks try to make you a Nonentity', in:




Thrift institutions in both countries are traditional
providers of long-term property finance and mortgage
lending. Until the 1980s they were competitors to
commercial banks only in this long-term credit segment.
Due to significant changes in the banking legislation
(DIDMCA of 1980, Garn-St.Germain Act of 1982) and the
resulting product range liberalisation, US thrift
organisations were permitted to leave their competitive
insulary by providing highly attractive sight deposits,
various kinds of consumer and business loans, credit
cards, and checking accounts. In addition, until 1983 they
benefitted from an advantageous interest rate differential
over commercial banks because of Regulation Q. These
products implied a strong substitution potential to
typical bank deposits because of their attractiveness and
similarity. In Germany, the Bausparkassen operate in a
legally protected market niche (§1 (1) Bausparkassen-
Gesetz, (Building Societies Act), and also enjoy
advantageous government support for their products.
However, a generally deteriorating market environment due
to decreasing savings ratios, rising unemployment, and
changing structures of the private house building market
in the first years of the 1980s, necessitated product
policy alterations to ensure long-term survival. The
financial innovation of Bauspar contracts which basically
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combined the original credit element with a high yielding
deposit account, represented substitute products to in
general low-yielding savings deposits (ie 2.5 percent) of
commercial banks.
In spite of this competitive substitution potential and
hence market environment, US commercial banks were in a
relatively secure market position to respond to the
market-entry, that happened on a broad scale in 1982 (the
passage of the DIDMCA in 1980 led to an initial increase
in competition in 1981). The introduction of money market
accounts, and interest rate adjustments of their deposit
accounts up to the level of competing products (supported
by the phasing-out of regulatory incurred rate
differentials in 1983), were sufficient movements to react
to the inroads made into the retail banking market. In
addition, the existing interstate banking regulations
qualified thrifts only as very local competitors. Thus, US
commercial banks did not regard thrift institutions as
severe competitive threats that would require a
significant change in their business and IT strategy.
Triggered by favourable geographical deregulations,
emergency legislation to acquire failing thrift
institutions, and their own financial situation, they took
over various thrifts in selected regional banking markets,
converted them into community bank branch outlets, and
finally integrated them. From an IT strategic point of
225
view, these steps only required system integration
activities under cost control and economies of scale
considerations. Apart from routine IT investments to
enhance long-term mortgage lending processes, and to keep
up with technology changes, a change in the IT strategy
was not observable. The diagram below illustrates the
'negative correlation' between the market-entry of thrifts
into the US retail banking market, and the change in the
IT strategy.
Banks' IT reaction to the market—entry of
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Figure 18: Banks' IT Reaction to the Market-Entry of
Thrifts into the US Retail Banking Market
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In the German market, commercial banks reacted
differently to the market-entry of Bausparkassen. In
response to the market-entry, that occurred in the first
half of 1985 with the market launch of innovative products
such as Dispo 2000, and the subsequent acquisition of bank
subsidiaries through large Bausparkassen paired with their
conversion in holding structures (in 1987), German
commercial banks founded their own Bausparkasse
subsidiary, as for instance Deutsche Bank in 1987 , or
established close cooperations with incumbent
Bausparkassen, such as the network of cooperative banks
and Commerzbank did. In addition, favourable profit
prospects in the recovering German house building market,
a constantly deteriorating social security system, the
growing influx of people from Eastern Europe, and tax
incentives supported this decision. Through an aggressive
marketing and distribution policy (via the parent's branch
network) between 1987-89, commercial banks were able to
increase their market share in the house building credit
market by 64 percent on the back of independent
Bausparkassen' market share.
Similar to the strategic response to the market-entry
of life insurers, such an aggressive strategy required
significant IT investments. Fiducia's reaction in the
second half of 1986, which was again first among the
German banks, and Deutsche Bank's answer half a year
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later, represented the point in time of a major change in
strategy in the German commercial banking industry. The IT
activities reguired to respond to the market-entry of this
type of nonbank competitor encompassed substantial
programming and maintenance activities, the purchase of
basic database and network software packages, the design
(as in Fiducia's case) of a new Bauspar application
system, or the purchase and modification of an already
existing application package (as in the case of Deutsche
and Dresdner bank), and significant investment in hardware
and decentralised computer power (personal computers) to
realise the IFSCS concept. The total cost to respond to
the market-entry amounted to a significant fraction
(between 20-25 percent) of the overall budget devoted to
retail banking in that year. The following diagram
attempts to graphically illustrate the 'positive
correlation' between the market-entry of Bausparkassen and
the strategic response in terms of IT.
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Banks' IT reaction to the market—entry of
Bausparkassen into the German retail banking market
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Figure 19: Banks' IT Reaction to the Market-Entry of
Bausparkassen into the German Retail Banking
Market
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6. The Market-Entry of Retail Organisations
6.1 Retailers' Financial Services as Substitution
Threats to Banking Credit Facilities
In contrast to the previous two types of nonbank
competitors and their respective services which mainly
represented competition to commercial banks in the deposit
• • 260
segment of the retail banking services market, retailers
in turn, are primarily engaged in the credit business and
hence represent a competitive threat of substitution in
the credit segment of the retail banking services market.
According to German banking law, a retailer - as a
typical nonbank institution - that is engaged in the
credit business, needs a full banking licence.261 In the US,
financing and credit activities of nonbanks are not
constrained because they are not subsumed under the
banking legislation. This situation limits the range of
business activities for German retailers - as opposed to
US retailers - to short-term merchandise finance and the
credit card business.
260 • •
compare Stammer, K., ibid, sect. 3.2.
261
§1, sect. 1 of KWG.
26?
Both types of business economically represent the
granting of credit, but legally do not qualify as a
lending activity. Under German law these activities are
regarded as means to officially postpone the actual
payment of the purchase price at the day of purchase.
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The granting of credit through retailers and other
nonbanks such as oil companies or car rental
organisations, is generally performed as a sales promotion
vehicle to support sales of the main merchandise. Two
kinds of credit are commonly used depending on the target
group of the retailer. These are supplier credit, granted
to small companies, and consumer credit provided to
individuals. Due to the focus of this dissertation on the
consumer banking business, the following sections will
solely deal with consumer credit.
The main medium of credit financing to private
households is the credit card. It is applied according to
the two-party credit card system as described in section
3.3. Apart from benefits such as building up customer
databases, and cross selling through direct marketing, the
issue of a retailer credit card enables the retailer to
build a 'privileged relationship' 263 with its customers. The
rationale behind this concept is to sustain customer
loyalty, and to pre-empt a higher proportion of the
individual's purchasing power to the retailer whose card
Reischauer, F. / Kleinhans, J., Kreditwesencresetz.
Berlin, 1985, Comment on §1 of KWG.
Worthington, S., 'Retailer Credit Cards: A Competitive
Threat', in: International Journal of Bank Marketing.
12/1990, pp.3-9, here p.5.
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they hold.264
With regard to the significance of retailer credit
cards as instruments in the consumer finance business,
that embody a threat of substitution to banks' credit
facilities, the last decade witnessed substantial
differences in the US and German markets. In Germany, in
contrast to the US, where commercial banks diversified
much later into the short-term consumer banking business,
commercial banks were traditionally engaged in private
banking. Therefore, competition in consumer credit
facilities did not intensify to the same extent as it did
in the United States. In addition, the readiness of most
US households to temporarily carry large amounts of debt
as compared to Germany where cash payment is still
prevailing, facilitated the introduction of retailer
credit cards to postpone the payment of the purchase
price.265
The volume of direct merchandise financing facilities
outstanding, the 'notes and accounts payable' in the US
Burke, T. , Retailer Plastic - Own Label Credit Cards -
A new Competitive Weapon in the High Street. 1989,
unpublished Working Paper No. 38, The Polytechnic of
Central London, London, 1989.
Lyons, T.L., 'Retailers in Financial Services', in: The
Bankers Magazine, vol.168, 1985, no.l, pp.17-21, here
p.18; also
Cooper, K. / Fraser, D., ibid, p.199.
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increased from $ 514.4 bin in 1980, to $ 668.4 bin in
266
1986, the year with the most recent data available. In
Germany, at the same time, it reached a total of roughly
DM 300 bin.
Regardless of the kind of short-term credit financing
facility, supplier credit or consumer credit, the credit-
taker is in the same position as if he had taken a bank
credit. Hence, a substitution link between both kinds of
credit facilities is recognisable. However, this link is
only valid under the assumption that the credit-takers'
creditworthiness in both cases is high enough to satisfy
the credit standards of a bank. It is commonly known that
retailers do not examine the creditworthiness of a
customer to the same extent as bankers must do due to the
267 • •
risk of default. The probability, therefore, that an
individual with a low credit rating will obtain consumer
credit from a retailer via its credit card, despite a bank
credit was denied, is relatively high.268
This account held a balance of $ 547.1 bin in 1981, $
550.7 bin in 1982, $ 595.7 bin in 1983, $ 647.8 bin in
1984, and $ 682.7 bin in 1985.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
'Nonfinancial Corporations', in: Federal Reserve
Bulletin. vol.74, iss.3, Mar. 1988, S.A., Tab.1.49.
Retailers do also not have the same power to force
customers to open their books as bankers have.
compare Hess, J. , 'Wo die Banken nicht mitziehen,
springt der GroBhandel ein', in: Handelsblatt. 10 May
1982, p.19.
233
As a consequence of this situation, the volume of
consumer receivables outstanding only partially qualifies
as substitution potential to bank credit facilities. In
addition, it must be noted that many nonbanks that use
short-term consumer financing for the purpose of sales
promotion, still do require banking credit to satisfy
their refinancing needs, except for large ones which can
use the commercial paper market as a refinancing source.
That reduces the implications of consumer credit business
lost to these nonbanks for commercial banks. Due to a lack
of information about the financial behaviour pattern of
retail organisations, it is impossible to quantify the
extent of these implications on the short-term credit
business of commercial banks.
As a result, it can be pinpointed that the financial
services of retail organisations, in the form of short-
term consumer finance, represent a threat of substitution
to bank credit facilities. But due to the on average low
credit rating of debtors, these facilities in many cases
do not qualify as competitive potential to comparable bank
credits. Furthermore, banks still remain the prime
refinancing source of many retail organisations. Hence,
the unconstrained recognition of a substitution link
between both types of credit facilities must be limited
because of the above findings.
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6.2 Development of Competition through the Market-
Entry of Retailers in the US
Frequently, large retail organisations and
manufacturing companies that got involved in financial
services activities, established so-called captive finance
companies or nonbank bank subsidiaries to handle these
• • • 269 • • •
activities. The establishment of captive finance
companies by for instance large car manufacturers such as
GM or Chrysler, to support car sales via car loans,
• 270 •
leasing arrangements , and other short and medium-term
financing facilities, is thereby only concentrated on the
credit business due to the legal requirements specified in
271 • • •
the BHCA and Glass-Steagall Act , m order to avoid being
supervised as a commercial bank. Whereas nonbank bank
subsidiaries, in contrast, are permitted to offer a whole
range of financial services including for instance
consumer credit, various kinds of deposits, and even
compare section 3.4.
In the second half of the 1980s triggered by the
process of securitisation, these organisations also
diversified into the asset-backed securities market by
transferring the concept of CMOs (Collateralized
Mortgage Obligations) onto auto loan receivables.
Lerbinger, P. , 'Asset-backed Securities am US
Kapitalmarkt', in: Die Bank. 6/1987, pp.310-315, here
p.310.
According to these acts a commercial bank is involved
in both, the deposit business and commercial lending
activities.
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securities or insurance products. As a consequence, the
competitive relationship between these nonbank banks and
commercial banks in terms of substitution potential must
be regarded as very intense, because they are able to
almost completely substitute the financial intermediation
of banks. In addition, unlike captive finance companies
which need banks to satisfy their refinancing needs, due
to a non-existing deposit business, these nonbank banks
are entirely 'self-sufficient'.
The typical example of a retailer diversifying into the
retail banking services market by applying the nonbank
bank approach, is Sears Roebuck & Company (Sears). Sears'
idea is to satisfy consumers financial needs, which change
as they pass through various stages of their life cycle,
and to keep these consumers within Sears' financial
network. Based on an in-depth knowledge of the purchasing
behaviour and financial situation of each customer
(because of large customer databases), Sears is in the
position to tailor-make financial packages for each
individual customer. Furthermore, due to continuous
updates of the customer information files, customers can
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be instantly targeted in case of new financial services.
Ellis, J.A. / e.a., 'Who's Getting the Bucks - And
Who's Not ?', in: Banking World. 10 Febr. 1986, p.67.
Stracke, G. / Pohl, M. , 'Aktivitaten von Waren- und
Versandhausern im Finanzdienstleistungsmarkt Europas ' ,
in: Die Bank. 2/1987, pp.94-97, here p.95.
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27A.
The SearsCharge and Discover Cards play a key role in
Sear's diversification strategy into the retail banking
market. In 1982, Sears bought the brokerhouse Dean Witter
Reynolds (compare section 3.4), and used that business in
tandem with Coldwell Banker, its nonbank bank subsidiary,
to launch SearsCharge and to implement in-store financial
centres in each large Sears department store. These
centres were staffed with professional bankers who offered
commonly used credit and deposit services, financial
. # ...» 275
products of well-established financial institutions, but
also stocks, shares, and real estate services.276
This strategy did not change until 1989, when Sears
• • • • 277
recognized that 'selling socks and stocks did not mix'
because of fundamental differences in the customer's
perceived ambience of purchasing relatively complex
securities or real estate services. However, despite that
setback in the general financial strategy, the range of
financial services offered, belonging to the retail
banking services market, is still large enough to be a
real threat of substitution to commercial banks.
^
In the USA, retailer cards dwarf (by now) bank cards
in numbers issued; Sears alone issued 61 million cards
and these account for 65 percentum of Sears' sales.
Worthington, S., 'Retailer Credit...', ibid, p.6.
275 . #
Stracke, G. / Pohl, M., 'Aktivitaten...', ibid, p.94.
2'6
Worthington, S., 'Retailer...', ibid, p. 6.
277 ibid.
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In January 1986, Sears intensified competition in
consumer credit even further by introducing the Discover
Card, which rivals usual bank credit cards in that this
card278 is applicable in many shops and locations besides
279
Sears' own department stores. It was targeted at
customers who either held a SearsCharge card already, and
other credit card holders who paid annual fees without any
incentives by the issuing banks for increased card usage.
The Discover Card had several advantages over other credit
cards such as VISA or MasterCard:
the absence of any annual fee
- lower service charges (1-1.5% below bank card
charges)
- incentives for frequent usage such as bonus points or
travel awards
- Sears well-known brand name280
As a result, the Discover Card quickly reached its
break-even point and in 1989 achieved a profit of well
For a discussion of the advantages of credit cards to
retailers please also see Kirkman, P. , Electronic Funds
Transfer Systems. New York, 1987, pp.47-51.
Lerner, F.H., 'Nonbank Banks: The Credit Card War',
in: Bankers Monthly. 4/1990, pp.34-35, here p.34;
also Worthington, S., 'Credit Cards in the United
Kingdom - Where the Power lies in the Battle between
the Banks and the Retailers', in: Journal of Marketing
Management. 1988, vol.4, no.l, pp.61-70.
Worthington, S., 'Retailers...', ibid, p.6.
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over $60 million (in 1988 a profit of $19 million) and of
$116.7 million in 1990.281 Both cards represent the backbone
of the income generated by Sears Merchandise Group during
the same period. These earnings are clearly money that
could have been made - at least partially - by commercial
banks issuing credit cards, or other financial
conglomerates such as American Express.
Very recently Sears launched another financial service
called 'Prime Option' which essentially is a VISA card
without any fees. This strategic movement could siphon off
revenues from VISA members through intra-brand
competition, and hence could deteriorate commercial banks'
credit card business even further. However, VISA'S legal
pop
response was an antitrust challenge which has yet to be
settled.
To summarize the main results, retailers' market-entry
into the retail banking services market, primarily via
nonbank bank subsidiaries, represents a successful and
almost entire substitution of the financial intermediation
of commercial banks in that market. This is done without
any significant usage of bank credit facilities for
Lucas, P., 'Sears keeps its Prime Option open', in:
Credit Card Management. 04/1991, pp.62-68, here p.64;
also Lerner, F.H., ibid, p.34.
Lucas, P., ibid, p.66.
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refinancing purposes. Furthermore, the credit card segment
of the retail banking services market faces stepped-up
competition from companies like Sears, which are able to
coordinate both the card issuing element and the consumer
acquisition activities in the credit card system. This
283 • •
polarisation trend weakens the ability of bank cards to
compete with nonbank card products, because in general a
commercial bank only controls one element of the card
284
system and requires cooperation in the other. In
addition, retailers such as Sears are in an increasingly
strong position in the bank card system through control of
the point-of-sale via POS-terminals and similar
• 285
information technologies.
6.3 Competitive Developments in the German market
In Germany, retailers discovered the financial services
poz. t
segment in the second half of 1984. Successful retail
organisations such as Quelle - which took over Noris Bank
287 •
, Karstadt AG, or Kaufhof AG, started to establish
Dunn, P.T. / Poe, D.A., 'Preserving the Integrity of
the Bank Card', in: Journal of Retail Banking. 08/1990,
pp.35-44, here p.42.
compare Appendix 2 .
ibid, p.41.
Hirn, W. / Poweleit, M. , 'Mit Sicherheit erfolglos',
in: Manager Maaazin. 04/1988, pp.228-238, here p.231.
ibid, p.238.
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finance facilities by creating their own subsidiaries, or
via cooperation agreements with well-established banks and
insurance companies.
According to German banking law, a nonbank bank
subsidiary that is engaged in the credit business, legally
and structurally independent from the parent company, not
primarily concentrated on the sales promotion of the
• • 288
parent's merchandise, and has reached a certain size ,
requires a full banking license.
Similar to the US, the establishment of these
subsidiaries was mainly focused on the following
activities:
diversifying into the lucrative market of short-term
consumer credit
- stabilizing and intensifying customer relationships
via customer accounts
providing attractive credit facilities as a means of
sales promotion
In pursuing these activities, retailers realized the
competitive advantage over commercial banks to be able to
compare Szagunn, V. / WohlschieB, K. , Gesetz iiber das
Kreditwesen in der Fassung vom 11.7.1985, Comments.
4th. edn., Stuttgart, 1986, Tz.30.
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satisfy a financial need at
addition, retail shops in
more than 13 hours (incl.
bank competitors.
, , , ?89
the time of its creation. In
Germany stay open on average
Saturdays) longer than their
However, unlike their US equivalent Sears Roebuck,
German retailers did not offer the full range of credit
and deposit products. They mostly constrained their
product range to providing credit as a sales promotion
vehicle. A good example to illustrate this strategy is
Quelle, Germany's largest mail order organisation, and
also among the largest department store chains. Its
banking subsidiary 'Quelle Bank' only offers two products,
• • 290
a mail order banking account called Telefon-Plus-Account
with a minimum deposit of DM 2000, no overdraft option,
and attractive interest rates (about two percentum over
the going market rate); and secondly an assortment of
instalment credit facilities ranging from DM 2000 to DM
. . . 291
70,000 with fixed interest rates.
A reason for this behaviour lies in the difference




also compare Spanier, H.D., 'Wettbewerb urn den
Privatkunden: Financial Services', in: Die Bank.
vol.21, 1985, pp.548-53, here p.552.
n.a., 'Quelle Bank beginnt Geschaftsbetrieb', in:
Borsenzeitunq. 12 Febr. 1990, p.6.
ibid.
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customers are 'educated' to go for one-stop-shopping,
whereas Germans tend to follow the line of multi-stop
shopping. Furthermore, the fact that significant
shareholdings of commercial banks in all four large German
• • • • 292
retail organisations do exist - Commerzbank and Deutsche
Bank together for instance hold more than fifty percent of
the share capital of Karstadt AG, and hence important
voting rights on the supervisory board - is certainly an
important factor that has an impact on the array of
services to be provided by these retailers. It seems
obvious that the bankers on the boards of these retail
organisations had, and still have, an eye on the product
strategy concerning direct competition to the products and
services of their own organisations.
As long as these German retail organisations are not
attempting to be a real and credible threat of
substitution to the entire financial intermediation of
commercial banks in the retail banking industry, the
intensity of competition will be less strong in comparison
to the USA. The currently relatively weak competitive
position to commercial banks is also supported by the lack
of refinancing sources resulting of the small range of
Credit institutions hold stakes of more than fifty
percent in Karstadt AG, roughly thirty percent of the
equity capital of Kaufhof AG, and a twenty-five percent
stake in Horton AG.
Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank AG, ibid, pp.
310, 332, 336.
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consumer deposit products offered by these retailers. That
trend of competition has also been pinpointed by a study
of Arthur Anderson & Company, which analyzed competitive
trends and tendencies in the European retail banking
industry. Based on fieldwork and interviews done in 1985-
86, A & A predicted that retailers will not gain a
significant market share in the retail banking services
industry within the interval of 1985-95: "Retailers are
not expected to gain a significant share of the banking
market. Since German customers have a cautious attitude
towards security, competence, and trustworthiness, most of
our respondents indicated that retailers will only have
significant success in customer instalment financing and
credit cards. Moreover, even these areas are not likely to
be very profitable".293
Although, the bulk of data for this study was collected
in the mid-1980s, the previously mentioned example of the
mail-order giant Quelle indicates that the predicted trend
is still valid. With regard to retailers' own charge
cards, none of the large German retailers could reach a
satisfactory distribution in comparison to their American
counterpart. Despite the fact that the German retailers
tried to imitate Sears concept of the SearsCharge card. As
late as the Spring of 1988, German retailers attempted to
Arthur Anderson & Co., The Decade of Change: Banking
in Europe - the next ten years. London, 1986, p.110.
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break into the credit card market by launching a joined
project called 'Deutsche Kreditkarte' 294 (German Credit
Card) . This project, however, never got off the ground,
primarily because of the relatively high cost related to
• 295 •
issue and management of the cards. According to an
analysis conducted by the German Retail Institution, the
total cost of a retail credit card would amount to three
percent of total sales for an individual retail
• • 296 • •
organisation. The German Wettbewerbsgesetz (Competition
Act) on the other side does not permit to charge the
customers for these extra costs not related to the
purchased product. Hence, the only way for an individual
retailer to recoup these costs is via higher prices, which
in turn carries the risk of lower sales. In spite of these
impeding factors, a few retailers started to issue their
own retail cards with attractive credit limits and without
card fees. Hertie AG, for instance, a large department
store chain, issued 400,000 retail cards by the end of
n.a., 'Die Kreditkartenschlacht', in: Bankkaufmann.
12/1987, pp.29-31, here p.29.
The main cost elements that have to be borne are:
production cost of the card
issuance cost, and customer account service cost
authorization cost
- registration and tracking of sales done with a
card
creation and mailing of monthly account balances
payment control
- court cost, if payment is denied
IBM-Germany, unpublished analysis of the Retail
Industry, 1990.
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1989 and achieved seven percent of total sales in the same
• 297
year via these cards.
Apart from their involvement in consumer credit
facilities, German retailers - in contrast to their US
equivalent - also diversified into the insurance market on
a broad basis. Karstadt AG and Kaufhof AG in the autumn of
1986 formed alliances with insurance companies by founding
• . • 298
joint ventures owned by both partners on an equal basis.
The objective was to provide in-store financial centres
staffed with trained employees of the insurance partner.
However, both projects failed in 1988 due to a lack of
enthusiasm, marketing support, allocated funds, and the
perception of the retail partner 'that typical German
households do not purchase insurance policies in a
299 •
department store'. As a consequence of this development,
retailers in general still treat their insurance
activities as a 'backwater business'.
Despite these developments, there do exist some
business areas in which retailers finance activities
represent competition to commercial banks:
Kohlleppel, L. , 'POS - Vor dem Start', in:
Bankinformationen. 04/1989, pp.10-19, here p.11; also
IBM-Germany, unpublished analysis of the Retail
Industry, 1990.
Hirn, W. / Poweleit, M., ibid, p.234.
ibid, pp. 234, 236.
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(a) instalment credit to consumers offered through the
retailer's banking subsidiary are on average more
attractive than a comparable short-term bank loan.
(b) some other retailers, such as Quelle, are planning to
issue credit cards and to get involved in the
investment fund business. 300 In so doing, they are able
to broaden their refinancing base which eventually
will harm the banks credit business, and will widen
the area of competition in financial services between
both industries.
However, a strong penetration of the retail banking
services market through retailers in Germany, even in the
consumer credit segment, is impeded by mainly three
barriers. Firstly, due to the universal banking system,
the scope and efficiency of service provision within banks
operating in that market segment is very high already. It
is therefore extremely difficult and costly for a retailer
to differentiate itself through, for instance, higher
service standards or more attractive products. Secondly,
the bank branch density in Germany is high compared to the
USA due to non-existing interstate banking barriers. Hence
one of Sears' paramount competitive advantages, namely its
nationwide geographic spread, is simply not applicable as
n.a. , 'Quelle Bank beginnt Geschaftsbetrieb' , ibid, p.6.
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a competitive advantage to the German market. Thirdly, due
to the significant shareholdings of commercial banks in
leading retail organisations, retailers tend to prefer
cooperative steps instead of rivalry regarding the
• • ... 301
expansion of their array of financial services.
6.4 Commercial Banks' Strategic Reactions in both
Countries
The previous two sections have shown that the
competitive developments and hence the intensity of
rivalry between retail organisations and commercial banks
in both countries differ significantly, which tends to
impinge on the intensity of the strategic reaction. In
general, however, it is worth recognizing that the market-
entry of retailers has the potential to change the market-
power and control at the point-of-sale (POS) . From the
banks' perspective, this trend implies the risk for the
commercial banking industry in Germany and the USA to
loose parts of the consumer finance and the funds transfer
business as typical and traditional banking business. In
order to avoid this development, the banks were forced to
react at the point-of-sale. That strategic reaction is
known under the heading 'POS-Banking'. POS-banking is
Arthur Anderson & Co., ibid, p.14.
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basically determined by three functions:
electronic payment at the point-of-sale via plastic
cards instead of payment by cheques and cash
- electronic transfer of transactions from the retailer
to the bank
- PIN-entry and authorization instead of manual
signatures and their examination
POS-banking is targeted at a subsector of the
approximately 60 billion transactions made in the US
» • • 7(1? , , ,
retailing industry , and 13 billion in the German
counterpart303, and can also be described as an attempt by
the banking industry to tackle one of the remaining areas
in the payment and funds transfer business where cash304 and
cheque payment is still predominant.
In the US, throughout the last decade, POS-banking has
long been a business area neglected by most commercial
banks, in part because of the rapid growth of the ATM-
market305. Only since 1986, when the retail industry began
Steiner, T.D. / Teixeira, D.B., ibid, p.100.
Kohlleppel, L., ibid, p.10.
For further discussions about cash payments please see
Kirkman, P., ibid, pp.8-15.
compare McAndrews, J.J., 'The Evolution of Shared ATM
Networks', in: Business Review. May/June 1991, pp. 3-16.
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to invade commercial banking business on a large scale,
the number of POS terminal installations increased from a
mere 17,000, to over 48,000 by 19 8 9 . 306 Appendix 15 provides
more data on the number of installed machines.
Whereas the German POS-model307 is a joint and nationwide
operating system of the entire commercial banking
industry, the US model is characterized by a variety of
regional POS-systems. Due to the interstate banking
regulations, POS-banking also belonged to the group of
financial services only permitted to be performed on a
state-wide and later regional basis. Hence, the strategy
of many commercial banks was to cooperate in a certain
region by setting up joint switch networks and transaction
clearing facilities. In the process, the banks were able
to gain ownership of only approximately fifty percent of
the installed POS equipment, attached telecommunications
and switching facilities. The reason is that retailers
themselves are a major implementation force. A few large
and enterprising retailers in the US installed proprietary
systems in which they control their POS transaction up to
Wehenmeyer, Stefan, 'POS in USA: Grundsatzlich andere
Struktur', in: Bank und Markt. June 1989, pp.22-25,
here p.22.
For an in-depth legal analysis of credit card and POS
banking systems according to German civil law please
see Petring, R. , Storungen bei POS-Zahlungen.
Frankfurt, 1990.
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the point where it reaches the acquiring bank. In
addition, none of the US top ten draft capture networks -
draft capture terminals are to date the most frequently
used type of POS-terminal in the US - are owned and run by
banks.309
Thus, the competitive strategy of retail organisations
in this business area becomes clear. By issuing their own
credit and debit cards, managing the data capturing and
switching process at the point-of-sale, and running the
data processing function related to the entire POS-banking
process, they are in the position to provide 'everything
out of one hand', and to take over traditional banking
business in short-term consumer finance and funds
transfer. Since the passage of Regulation E in Summer
1988, retail organisations are even permitted to clear
card transactions via the ACH (Automated Clearing House),
310 •
the EFT processor of the Federal Reserve System. This
regulation officially allows retailers to sidestep the
POS-banking networks set up by the commercial banking
industry, and thereby constitutes direct independence from
the transaction fee system otherwise imposed by banks.
; Steiner and Teixeira have listed several examples such
as J.C.Penny, ARCO, MOBIL etc.
Steiner, T.D. / Teixeira, D.B., ibid, p.105.
309 ibid.
310 • •
Wehenmeyer, S., ibid, p.25.
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Apart from retailers' proprietary systems, one of the
main problems related to banks' strategic reply is the
required participation of retail organisations. POS
networks require the acceptance of a wide range of bank
and nonbank cards, merchant deposit accounting, the
integration of many different POS terminals, the
establishment of back-office processing facilities,
software packages, and the like; in other words, setting
up and running POS-banking facilities means substantial IT
investments. Attempting to recover at least part of these
costs, through imposing high transaction cost on
participating retailers, proved to be counterproductive
and deterred many retailers from cooperating with banks.
Thus, both the banks and retailers, because of the cost
factor, did not particularly push the concept of POS-
banking in the US throughout the last decade. In 1989,
only ninety-two million POS-transactions were made, less
than 0.2 percent of the number of cheque transactions.311
On the other side, POS-banking certainly has its
justification in that it reduces the transaction cost for
a purchase down to an estimated 32 cents, whereas an
average cash purchase amounts to 48 cents, 50 cents for a
cheque payment, and 97 cents for a credit card. In
Germany, similar significant cost differences have also
Steiner, T.D. / Teixeira, D.B., ibid, p.100.
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been estimated. In addition, it could also reduce the
amount of cheque losses and provide faster checkout
service.
However, despite the competitive threat of retailers to
take over parts of the funds transfer and consumer finance
business, the implementation of proprietary systems, and
also despite the POS activities between 1986-89, POS-
banking did not evolve as a major banking utility
throughout the last decade. It might increase in
significance towards the mid-1990s, but that remains to be
seen.
In order to prevent loosing business to competing
nonbanks, the German commercial banking industry started a
joint action culminating in the German POS-banking
agreement signed in the end of 1984 by all members of the
industry.313 This agreement314 entrusted the GZS
The cost for a retail transaction in Germany were
estimated:
- cash payment: 11.1 Pfennige
- cheque payment 41.1 Pfennige
- credit card 93.7 Pfennige
IBM-Germany, unpublished analysis of the Retail
Industry, 1990; also
Glogowski, E. , Neue Finanzdienstleistunqen:
Bankenmarkte im Wandel. 2nd edn., Wiesbaden, 1990,
p.133; also
Steiner, T.D., / Teixeira, D.B., ibid, p.102.
Rodewald, B., 'Point of Sale - mehr nur als Technik',
in: Bankinformation. 11/1986, pp.9-13, here p.9.
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(Gesellschaft fur Zahlungssysteme) with the task to
develop a neutral and nationwide POS-banking system based
on the eurochegue-card (EC-card).
In terms of competition, this agreement laid down:
(a) the elimination of POS competition among individual
banks because of a common solution
(b) a common bargaining platform concerning the cost of
POS-banking for the commercial banking industry, in
that it stated that all costs of the retailing
industry related to POS-banking have to be borne by
the retailers themselves.
In particular this clause (b) of the agreement illustrates
the perception of German commercial banks regarding the
competitive threat of retailers.
The way the German commercial banking industry has
Schneider has written a complete chronological list of
the agreements between the GZS and participating banks
throughout the 1980s. Schneider, C.P., Point-of-Sale
Zahlunqen mit der EC Karte. Konstanz, 1990, Appendix.
The GZS fulfils the following tasks:
management of the Eurocard system
management of the eurochegue system and its
processing needs
development and management of electronic
procedures related to funds transfer in Germany
(such as the ATM-network and POS banking)
processing and issuance of traveller chegues
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reacted towards the market-entry of nonbank competitors
and POS-banking as a new technology, indicates a major
difference to the US equivalent. The German banking
industry, in terms of technology, tends to act rather
7U
cautiously and also prefers a centralized approach. That
means many data processing functions, electronic banking
processes, and IT developments are either performed by a
• • ... 317
jointly owned institution such as the GZS , or at the
most performed by a few large DP-centres such as Fiducia
(compare ch.4).
The reason for this centralized approach lies in the
structure of the German banking system. In terms of branch
density, savings and cooperative banks enjoy a competitive
advantage over private commercial banks. This would be of
great value for an individual, nationwide operating POS
banking system of, for instance, the association of German
savings banks. Large private commercial banks, on the
other side, have a strong lobbying power. The only way to
find a consensus that is beneficial to all members of the
industry, therefore, is a joint solution that virtually
Schwabe, G. / Dolinsky, D. / Krcmar, H. , 1 Der
Einsatzstand von Expertensystemen - eine Umfrage', in:
Die Bank. 05/1990, pp.261-264, here p.261.
Twenty percent of the GZS shares is held by DG-Bank
(the head institution of the cooperative banks), forty
percent by the association of German savings banks




In December 1984, the GZS set up a test and pilot study
based on an on-line POS-system that uses the magnetic-
stripe technology of the EC-card. In 1987, only two-
hundred POS-terminals were installed in two test cities,
Berlin and Munich.318 The GZS thereby operated as a switch-
, authorization-, and clearing-institution for commercial
banks and merchants. In the process, the GZS charged each
connected retailer a fee of DM 0.07 per transaction, plus
319
0.2 percent of the purchase value. Due to these costs,
and the required investments in terminal and communication
line technology, the response by retailers was initially
very low. The price of a POS terminal in Germany ranges
between DM 3,000 and DM 12,000; whereas the US equivalents
are much cheaper (between $500 and $5 0 0 0) .32°
Rodewald, B., ibid, p.10; also Dorner, H.,
'Automatisierte Abwicklung von Zahlungskarten: Zum
Stand der Dinge', in: Bank und Markt, Jan. 1988, pp.
14-18, here p.15.
Gerke, W. / Oehler, A., 'Die Kosten eines POS-Banking
Systems fiir Einzelhandel und Kreditwirtschaft und ihre
Verteilung', in: Bank und Markt. Nov. 1986, pp.14-18,
here p.14.
Wehenmeyer, S., ibid, p.22; also Glogowski, E., ibid,
p.134; also Gerke, W. / Oehler, A., 'Quantifizierbare
Wirkungen von Point-Of-Sale-Systemen in der
Kreditwirtschaft', in: Bank und Markt. 10/1986, pp.7-
14 .
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In addition to this field study, the GZS in 1988/89
started another test project, concerning the usage of
• • 321
chip-card technology as a carrier technology for a future
nationwide POS-banking system. With the issue of 40,000
chip cards in a Bavarian district in the area of
Regensburg, the GZS explored this technology throughout
19 8 9 . 322
Apart from these two pilot-studies established by the
GZS, there has not been any other POS-banking activity
within the German commercial banking sector during the
past decade. Only very recently, between 1990-92, the
number of POS terminal installations, based on EC-card
technology, has started to gain momentum. This was partly
triggered by a new POS-banking movement that started in
January 1990, the so-called electronic cash (EC-cash). EC-
cash can be described as a process set up by the
commercial banking industry to
(a) overcome the indecisiveness of the GZS to complete a
functionable and accepted concept for POS banking
(b) introduce a decentralised approach independent of the
For a detailed analysis of the technical
specifications, the evolution, and functionality of
cards and their underlying card technology in the
German banking market please see Wigand, W., Die Karte
mit dem Chip. Berlin, 1991.




(c) reduce the overall cost of POS-banking for retailers
(d) create incentives for retailers to install POS
equipment
EC-cash introduces a concept of multiple agreements in the







20: The German EC-Cash Model
A retailer thereby signs an agreement with an array of
commercial banks willing to participate, and also with an
independent switch network organisation (eg. a company
called Telecash which is a joined venture between IBM and
the German Bundespost-Telekom) . The banks guarantee the
instant crediting (real-time) of all EC-cash transactions
(and charge a fee), whereas the network organisation is
responsible for the implementation of POS equipment, the
running of the network, authorization, and clearing (this
task was until 1990 fulfilled by the GZS only) . The
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retailer only has to pay a certain fraction of the
purchase value to the network organisation to cover all
cost and inconveniences related to the POS transaction.
This percentage figure, however, depends on the number of
POS terminals installed and the monthly EC-cash
• 323 • •
transaction figure. If this concept gains acceptance
throughout the 1990s, it could reintroduce competition
between individual banks in the area of POS-banking.
Proprietary systems, as happened in the US retailing
industry, have not been developed so far. The only
important movement in that direction in the 1980s was done
by American Express (Amex). This company established a
joint venture, the Allcard Service GmbH (ACS), together
with Alldata, a DP facility management organisation. ACS
provided dedicated POS terminals, performed the
authorization and clearing tasks via specifically
implemented network facilities (based on Alldata
hardware), and was responsible for the acquisition of
participating merchants. Initially, this POS system was
only based on Amex credit cards. Since Amex purchased the
majority of ACS, it included eurocheque cards in order to





Thus, similar to the developments in the USA, but to a
much stronger degree, German commercial banks did not
regard the market-entry of retailers as a severe threat of
competition, and hence did not push POS-banking as a major
banking utility. Moreover, by the end of the 198 0s POS-
banking was still in the conceptual planning and
experimentation stage. Appendix 15 presents an overview of
the number of ATMs and EFTPOS terminals in leading
industrialised countries.
6.5 Effects on Commercial Banks' IT Strategy in both
Countries
The market-entry of retail organisations in Germany did
not trigger any significant IT activities within a
commercial bank due to two main reasons. Firstly,
throughout the 1980s, POS-banking never left the planning
and testing stage, and secondly, individual banks
entrusted a central organisation (the GZS) with the
reguired IT tasks related to the development of POS
banking. Hence, an individual IT strategy concerning POS,
Klein, S., Informatisierunq der Waren- und
Kreditwirtschaft als Verhandlunqsprozefi. unpublished
working paper, University of Bremen, Oct. 1991, pp.l-
10, here p.8.
260
that could have been changed, within a commercial bank was
not necessary.
Within the last decade, the GZS invested roughly DM 110
million in both field studies and various other conceptual
projects such as the Europlus card in 1988, or the POS
... , 325
cashing system in 1989, which were never realized. A
logical conseguence in attempting to track the cost of POS
for a large commercial bank would be to ask whether each
stakeholder in the GZS had to pay its share of the cost?
This would have been tantamount with bank internal project
cost to finance an IT activity, although the activity was
conducted externally.
As mentioned already, besides the POS responsibility,
the GZS was for instance also responsible for the clearing
and authorization of all transactions related to
eurocheques and the Eurocard. It charged each
participating bank a fee to process a transaction which
resulted in a lucrative business, bearing in mind the
usage frequency of eurocheques in Germany. The resulting
profits were then used to finance such projects as POS.
Thus, member banks did not have to make any financial
contributions for POS development activities except in the
for a detailed historic overview of the individual
stages of POS in Germany see
Klein, S., ibid, slide 5.
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case of payments to cover potential losses of the GZS in a
certain year.
Furthermore, all relevant application development cost,
hardware expenses such as POS terminals, networking
facilities, and central mainframes were carried by the
GZS. The only IT activities that were performed by
individual banks were spasmodic enhancement and
maintenance activities, to improve and update the card
application systems.
A similar observation can be made in the US retail
banking market. US Commercial banks also regarded POS
banking as a 'test case' in which they decided to jointly
participate in regional networks in order to minimize IT
investment cost, but to be able to expand in case of a
major breakthrough of POS banking. In contrast to their
German counterparts, they initially had to spend more
money to create the networks, implement the switching
software, and to buy POS terminals, but as the
installation figures show, only 30,000 additional
terminals were purchased on a nationwide basis within
1986-89, despite the massive inroads of retailers.
Moreover, approximately 50 percent of these additional
terminals are owned by retailing organisations. According
to a McKinsey market analysis done in 1990, only one bank,
CoreStates, was well positioned in the POS banking market
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by installing POS terminals in a number of department
stores belonging to merchants participating with this
326 ... . • .
bank. Thus, most individual commercial banks did simply
not react in terms of a change of their POS banking
strategy to the market-entry of retail organisations.
Steiner, T.D. / Teixeira, D.B., ibid, p.104.
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6.6 Main Results
Retail organisations, due to the nature of their
business as traditional providers of retail services to
consumers and the resulting experience, which can be
easily transferred to the provision of retail banking
services, are competitors to commercial banks primarily in
the area of consumer credit. Mainly driven by a sales
promotion motif, they provide short-term consumer credit
in the form of loans and credit cards to support sales of
the merchandise. These products represent competitive
threats of substitution to commercial banks' equivalent
services because of the fact that a credit need can be
satisfied at the time of its creation, attractive
conditions of retail credit cards as compared to bank
cards, and the already established customer relationship
including in-depth knowledge of the purchasing behaviour
and financial situation of a customer. However, an
unrestricted substitution link between retail and
commercial bank credit facilities does not exist due to
the on average lower creditworthiness of retailers'
credit-takers as compared to commercial banks' credit-
takers, and that most retailers still require bank credit
facilities as their prime refinancing source.
Nevertheless, retail organisations traditionally are in a
strong position at the point-of-sale, and their growing
involvement in additional sectors of the retail banking
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market via the establishment of nonbank bank subsidiaries
indicates their competitive direction.
Within this competitive environment, German commercial
banks were in a relatively secure market position to
respond to the market-entry. Due to the following factors
they did not regard retailers' market-entry as a severe
competitive threat within the 1980s.
(1) Due to the universal banking system, the scope and
efficiency of service provision by commercial banks
in the consumer credit segment is very high already
(this resembles high entry cost for retailers to
differentiate themselves from banks)
(2) The existence of a nationwide branch network of
commercial banks, in contrast to the US where
interstate banking restrictions have severely limited
this development
(3) Significant cross-shareholdings between leading
enterprises of both industries
(4) German law as opposed to US law mandates a full
banking license for a retailer that is engaged in the
credit business. This legislative barrier has
traditionally limited the range of business
265
activities for German retailers
(5) The mentality of typical German customers to keep a
low level of short-term debt, and the preference of
multi-stop shopping instead of one-stop shopping as
in the US
In the US, due to more liberal nonbank regulations, the
prohibition of cross-shareholdings, the favourable
customer mentality of a preference for one-stop shopping,
and the strong utilisation of credit cards as payment
vehicles in tandem with a tendency towards higher levels
of short-term consumer debt, retailers were in a stronger
position than in Germany. Nevertheless, US commercial
banks did also not regard retailers' market-entry as a
significant competitive threat of substitution.
Competition between both industries in the US existed
since the beginning of the 1980s because of retailers'
creation of banking subsidiaries (by acquisitions in 1982-
83) and the involvement in the securities business (ie
Sears Roebuck's purchase of Dean Witter Reynolds). The
market-entry, on a broad scale occurred in 1986, with
Sears' introduction of the Discover card and the
nationwide installation and expansion of in-store
financial centres within the organisation's retail
outlets. In addition, several retail organisations began
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to install proprietary POS banking systems outside the
banking industry. Triggered by this development, US
commercial banks formed regional alliances to set up small
POS banking networks and to share the cost of the required
information technology. However, the fact that none of the
top ten draft capture networks is run by banks in,
conjunction with the small number of POS terminals
installed at the end of the previous decade (48,000 on a
nationwide basis), gives a clear indication that POS
banking in the US commercial banking industry throughout
the 1980s did not evolve as a major banking utility. In
spite of stepped-up competition by retail organisations,
commercial banks were not urged to change their IT
strategy, in the sense of major investments in POS
terminals, switching software, application development
activities, or computer purchases, to fight off these
competing retailers. The following diagram illustrates the
relationship between the market-entry of this nonbank
competitor and commercial banks' reaction in terms of IT.
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Figure 21: Banks' IT Reaction to the Market-Entry of
Retailers into the US Retail Banking Market
In the German market, the intensity of competition
between retailers and commercial banks was even weaker
than the US situation. The market-entry of retailers at
the end of 1984 and 1985, through the acquisition of bank
subsidiaries, did not culminate in any strategic response,
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including the IT strategy. Banks did not perceive retail
organisations as a competitive threat because (1) the
nonbank bank subsidiaries offered only a very limited
product range, (2) retailers were still largely dependent
on bank credit facilities as refinancing sources, and (3)
a lack of management devotion, funds, and enthusiasm among
retailers' top management for retail banking services was
observable. In addition, the short-term diversification
strategy into the insurance business in 1986, its
subsequent failure in 1988, and the very late engagement
in the card business (since 1988/89) with insignificant
distribution figures as compared to the US, were factors
that confirmed the banks' initial business strategy of
'relative inertia' concerning the market-entry of
retailers. Similar to the reaction in the US market, their
IT strategy could be identified as an experimentation and
'getting used to the technology' strategy. In contrast to
the US, however, this strategy was performed by a jointly
owned institution called GZS, so that individual
commercial banks did not even have any IT expenses to
conduct pilot studies and test installations. By the end
of the previous decade, commercial banks' efforts to
penetrate the point-of-sale with a clear-cut POS banking
and therefore IT strategy had not left the planning stage.
The uncertainty of the relevant information technology (ie
the card technology) required, and the resulting
indecisiveness, was also a limiting factor in this
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context. The following diagram indicates the 'negative
correlation' between the market-entry of retailers into
the German retail banking market and the banks IT
strategy.
Banks' IT reaction to the market—entry of
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Figure 22: Banks' IT Reaction to the Market-Entry of
Retailers into the German Retail Banking
Market
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7. Credit Card Organisations as Competitors in the
Retail Banking Services Market
7.1 Definition of Credit Card Services as Nonbank
Business
According to the three-party-system (compare section
3.3, and appendix 2), credit card organisations fulfil
essentially three functions in dealing with participating
merchants and cardholders. Throughout the process of a
credit card business these functions are:
(a) the credit card organisation performs a sales finance
function for the participating merchant
(b) it also - at least partially - performs a charge
function for the cardholder
(c) finally the credit card organisation represents a del
• 327
credere function for the cardholder
for a more detailed description compare
Revell, J.R.S., 'Banking...', ibid, p. 21; also
Penzkofer, P., 'Die Kreditkarte...', ibid, pp.18.
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None of the above functions is listed in the German
Banking Act (§1 of KWG) that qualifies for a banking
license. In the US, the performance of these functions
similarly does not require the constitution of a
commercial bank.
To be more specific in the case of Germany, the sales
finance function of the card issuing company does not meet
the specified criterion of a typical bank credit which is
7pO
'the provision of instant money loans' . With regard to
the charge function mentioned under (b) , the credit card
organisation merely initiates the payment of debt
outstanding without executing the entire transaction. The
transaction itself is conducted via the customers' /
cardholders' bank account and the banks internal giro and
funds transfer network. Hence the card issuing company
does not perform the giro business which would require a
banking license under German banking law.
• 329 • •
The German Banking Act mandates an exclusive right for
commercial banks to be engaged in the guarantee business.
The del credere function performed by the card issuer does
328
329
Reischauer, F. / Kleinhans J., ibid, Tz. 23.
§1, section 2 of KWG.
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include a certain guarantee element330, namely the issuer's
liability for the cardholder's payment of outstanding
debt. This kind of guarantee, however, is not regarded as
an individual guarantee service that carries a price as
comparable bank services do. It is a conditio sine gua non
of the credit card business, and as such of paramount
• • 331
interest to the card issuer and not the cardholder.
Therefore, German banking law does not subsume the credit
card organisations' del credere function under typical
• • 332
banking guarantee functions.
As a result of these legal aspects, the credit card
services of credit card organisations can be defined as
nonbank business. Only additional services such as the
extension of the payment period, which are banking
services under German banking law, would reguire a banking
license from a credit card issuing company's perspective.
In the US, the definition of a commercial bank does not
enumerate any of the above factors.
For an in-depth discussion of legal issues related to
the guarantee business under German civil law please
see Petring, R., ibid, pp.144-148.
In general, bank guarantees are granted in the interest
of the client who pays for them.
Reischauer, F. / Kleinhans, J., ibid, Tz.50.
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7.2 Market Significance and Competitive Relevance of
the Credit Card Business
The market significance of credit cards in the US and
Germany differs significantly. The fact that all credit
card organisations333, which are to date operating on a
global scale334 are based in the US, indicates the usage
frequency of credit cards in that country and hence their
importance as a convenient means of payment, as opposed to
Germany. The difference in market acceptance335 between both
countries primarily originates from a different perception
about credit and noncash payment behaviour. Appendix 14
provides an overview of the prime payment methods in
selected industrial countries.
In the USA, the financial behaviour of a majority of
the population is strongly influenced by a positive
attitude towards short-term debt to satisfy consumption
needs. This behaviour pattern led to the significance of
cheques and credit card transactions within the payment
system of the US. In addition, the lack of an efficient
guarantee system for cheque clearings in the US made
compare Stammer, K., ibid, sect. 3.3.
The most important organisations worldwide are American
Express, Diners Club, Interbank Card Association
(MasterCard), and BankAmericard Inc.(VISA).
Market acceptance includes both merchants and private
households.
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credit cards the preferred means of payment for these
short-term finance transactions.336
In Germany, eighty percent of all transactions are
still paid cash. Of the remaining twenty percent, the
credit transfer cheque is the most important (more than 50
percent) payment vehicle, followed by direct debit (more
than thirty-five percent) and eurocheque (ten percent).
The rest is paid by credit cards.337 Appendix 14 provides an
international comparison of the methods of payment used in
various leading industrialised countries. Additionally,
credit cards in Germany are to a very large extent used
only as T & E (travel & entertainment) cards. The short-
term consumer credit element is hardly utilised as
compared to the US. This difference in behaviour is caused
by the existence of extensive and traditionally widely
used disposition credit facilities within current
accounts. This disposition credit function in the US is
linked to the credit card, which carries a certain credit
limit, and not to current or checking accounts.
Apart from these general factors, there exists another
reason for the less important status of credit cards in
Germany throughout the 1980s. The well-established and
Morschbach, M. , Struktur des Bankwesens in den USA.
Frankfurt, 1981, p 68.




functioning euro-cheque system represented a high entry
barrier, because of the high distribution figures (more
than twenty million in 1990) and customer loyalty, for the
770
#
market penetration of credit cards in Germany. Appendix
7 indicates the distribution of credit cards in the 1980s.
However, credit card organisations represent a strong
competitive threat to commercial banks in the retail
banking services market. Created as so-called Travel &
Entertainment cards (T & E cards) in the late 1950s,
these cards340 were traditionally concentrated on the
upmarket, wealthy private customers (HNWIs) who required a
convenient, noncash, and efficient payment instrument on
their business and pleasure trips. Thus, the credit card
was a substitute service to short-term holiday credit.
Elaborating from there, the credit card developed other
competitive features such as a convenient credit facility
in the short-term consumer finance market. It also
represents a reserve purchasing power instrument that can
n.a., 'Alles auf eine Karte', in: Wirtschaftswoche.
vol.38, iss.13, 1984, p.63.
compare Revel1, J.R.S., ibid, p.20.
Only bank cards are credit cards in a narrower sense
due to a certain credit limit implied in the card that
must not be exceeded during a purchase. T & E cards,
in contrast, are applicable without restraints, and
they also do not require the opening of an account nor
the payment of interest.
Malschok, K.H., 'Die Position des Diners Club auf dem
Deutschen Kreditkartenmarkt', in: Bank und Markt. Apr.
1982, p.16.
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be used in circumstances of tight liquidity. The American
Express card is a typical example of that.
•7 / -1
As an independent, universal credit card issuer ,
American Express (Amex) directly competes with bank credit
card systems such as VISA or Mastercard that target the
same market segment. In contrast to the universal and
independent issuer Amex, that clearly belongs to the
nonbank sector, VISA and Mastercard have been established
by commercial banks for the purpose of creating a vehicle
that deals with the credit card financing business of all
participating (that is franchise-taking) member banks.
Despite the fact that both organisations do not have a
banking license, they need to be classified as
7 / p
institutions belonging to the commercial banking sector
because of their founders.
Nevertheless, the VISA or Mastercard franchisor bank is
certainly a competitor for another bank that does not
offer credit cards, in that the bank from whom a customer
would otherwise have borrowed money to pay cash for a
product will loose business to the card offering rival.
This competitive relation, however, represents interbank
Another universal credit card issuer, namely Sears
Roebuck with its Discover Card, has been discussed
already in the previous chapter.
Thompson, T.W. / Edwards, R.D., ibid, p.133,140.
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competition and will not be discussed any further in this
investigation due to the focus of this dissertation on
nonbank market-entries and their resulting competitive
relations with commercial banks.
Credit card services of independent card issuing
organisations such as Amex are not only competitors in the
provision of credit card finance. These organisations have
also realized that a credit card represents an important
key to other banking services. By diversifying for
instance into the funds transfer business, lucrative
market potential could open up via cross-selling effects.343
Furthermore, credit cards embody a perfect advertising
platform. Each time the card is produced for a transaction
it shows the issuer's logo. This fact creates a high
awareness of the brand that is ideal for cross-selling
purposes.344 Product loyalty will automatically build up
that could be used to drag away customers from their
traditional banks, and to create competition in many
banking service classes.
These facets of the credit card services business are
supported by a general shift in customers perception of
Bowden, P., 'Visas Strategie fiir Europa' , in: Bank und
Markt. Mar. 1987, pp.18-24, here p.18.
compare Starke, W. , 'Aufbruchstimmung im deutschen
Kreditgewerbe', in: Bank und Markt. Oct. 1988, pp.14-
16, here p.14.
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money and consumption. According to a study undertaken by
Amex in the German market345, this organisation identified
three factors that even enhance the competitive relevance
of credit cards in the future:
the change in generations leads to 'the aware
consumer', which in turn spurs the transformation
process of traditional savers to consumers
the in general relatively high level of education in
Germany gradually leads to a redefinition of money
and savings in the customer's perception
- the increase in wealth over the past twenty years
reguires more creative finance management
Banks that are faced with this increasing threat of
substitution basically have three alternatives to respond.
Firstly, the issue of various kinds of credit cards with
service features similar to those of credit card
organisations'. Secondly, the widely enhanced availability
and provision of cash money. Thirdly, the increase of
disposition credit limits in current accounts, which is a
relevant option only in the German market as mentioned
n.a. unpublished presentation held at a banking seminar




With regard to the first alternative, the issue of a
variety of credit cards, the different card strategies
applied by US and German banks will be discussed in
section 7.4. However, a typical feature of the German
retail banking market, the eurochegue card, which was
identified as a significant entry-barrier already, needs
to be analyzed in more detail regarding its defensive
substitution potential to competing credit cards. The EC-
card basically is a debit card linked to the bearer's
current account. Throughout the 1980s it was only
applicable in tandem with a eurochegue to verify its
validity.346 Both credit and EC-card guarantee the
creditworthiness of the bearer up to a certain limit.
Whereas the credit card represents a postponement of the
actual payment of a purchased good, the EC-card is a
payment instrument similar to cash payment. In Germany,
the application possibilities of credit cards are still
smaller in comparison to EC-cards and related eurocheques
(although this gap is shrinking), because most merchants
At the end of 1990, a few large department stores such
as Peek & Cloppenburg implemented test installations
that utilised EC-cards' magnetic stripe and its encoded
personal identification number (which was formerly only
used at cash dispensers and automated teller machines)
as online authorization vehicles against a negative
file similar to the online authorization of credit
cards. Hence, the underlying eurocheque was no longer
required.
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and companies accept eurocheques, but not all of them are
contracted partners of credit card organisations. The main
difference between both payment instruments, on the other
hand, is that a eurocheque resembles only a guarantee
instrument in the funds transfer between consumer and
merchant, whereas a credit card also provides a credit
function. Thus, a complete substitution between both
payment instruments does not exist.347
A second alternative would be the widely enhanced
provision of cash money. This is primarily done via
proprietary or shared, nationwide ATM-networks in both
countries. From a customer's perspective these machines
represent convenient means to procure cash based on the
magnetic stripe technology of the plastic card they
already hold. However, looking at this option from a
point-of-sale angle, it is much easier for a customer to
produce a credit card instead of first stopping-by at an
ATM which also may not be available in the current
department store. In addition, these ATMs intend to
support cash transactions in a more cost efficient way
from a commercial bank's perspective, whereas credit cards
are intended to push noncash business. Therefore, the
alternative of enhanced cash provision is also not
also see n.a., 'Kreditkartengesellschaften im Aufwind,
Partner Oder Konkurrenten fur Kreditinstitute', in:
Kreditpraxis 1987. p.16.
281
applicable as a defensive action.
Finally, the extension of current accounts' disposition
credit facilities in the German market could be a workable
substitution possibility to rivalling credit cards issued
by independent credit card organisations. This credit
facility directly competes with the credit limits in
general implied on credit cards. However, commercial banks
charge substantial interest rates (around 9.5 percent at
the end of the 1980s) if these overdraft facilities are
utilised. In addition, transaction fees are charged which
also increase the cost of a disposition credit. Hence,
even the extension of disposition credit facilities only
qualifies as a partial substitution to credit cards.
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7.3 Analysis of Competition in the US and Germany
7.3.1 Competitive Strategies of Credit Card
Organisations in the US
To date there exist only two large independent
providers of credit card services that operate the three-
party-system. These are Amex and Sears Roebuck. Throughout
1990, AT & T, a US telecommunications company, diversified
into the credit card business through its launch of the
'Universal card'. Initially offered as a fee-free card, it
achieved 4.1 million account openings with outstanding
■7/0
receivables of more than $1.3 billion at the end of 1990.
The card is essentially a VISA card that can be used to
pay for phone calls. It remains to be seen whether AT &
T's credit card programme will be profitable and
successful in the future. AT & T's card system is a two-
party system, because AT & T is both issuer and account
holder for the transactions. Hence it will not be analyzed
any further in this investigation. Due to the fact that
Sears' strategy has been discussed already in the previous
chapter, the following will be solely concentrated on
349
Amex' strategy.
Braitman, E., 'AT & T extends no-fee card plan', in:
American Banker. 5 Dec. 1990, p.10.
Diners Club will also not be discussed as a competitive
card issuer because it was taken over by Citibank and
thus belongs to the banking sector.
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Competition between Amex and the commercial banking
industry in the US is limited. It merely takes place as
competition between the bank-borne organisations VISA and
Mastercard, and Amex. The banks themselves regarded Amex
more as a business partner than a rival until the early
1980s, because of higher returns that were achievable for
member banks participating in the Amex' card system as
compared to their own bank card systems.350
• • • • 351
Originating from the T & E business , Amex always had
a specific target group in mind when diversifying into the
retail banking market segment. It was and still is focused
on the 'well-earning customer in the upper market segment'
which is characterized by the following attributes:
Performance orientated
a demanding life-style
managers and managers to-be
n.a., American Express- Bank friend or foe', in: The
Bankers Magazine, vol.165, 1982, iss.l, pp.47-49, here
p. 48 .
Before diversifying into the credit card business Amex
was known as a travel agency and issuer of traveller
chegues. In 1958, Amex started issuing T & E cards in
the USA targeted at wealthy customers. This step was
regarded as a logical addition to the core travel
business. Hence, the Amex card is not a typical bank
credit card with a restricted credit limit.
Judt, E., 'Kreditkarten - weltweites Zahlungsmittel',
in: WIST Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium, iss.
1, Jan. 1985, pp.39-42, here p.40.
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, 352
interested in professional money-management
Accordingly, Amex' range of credit cards is tailored
towards this market segment (Gold Card, Platinum Card,
Corporate Card), apart from one exception, the personal
card. By concentrating on high income earners Amex follows
a conseguent high-price strategy, that means high fees to
create an elite image, in order to generate its earnings.
In addition, Amex' merchant discount is much higher (on
average 1-1.5 percent) than that of competing bankcards.
This situation is tolerated by most participating
merchants and retailers because, in general, transaction
volumes charged on these cards are higher than on
competing bankcards. Amex' transaction and processing cost
are thereby comparable to those of other credit card
issuers. Conseguently, profitability figures were in good
shape throughout the 1980s.
In 1981, Amex added on another competitive component by
diversifying into investment banking. It took over
Shearson Loeb Rhoades (1981), Investors Diversified
Services (IDS) Inc. (1983), and Lehman Bros. ( 1984).353 In
n.a. , unpublished presentation by Amex executives... ',
ibid, p.14.
n.a. 'Can Amex and Shearson Live Happily after the
Merger ?',in: Banking World. 18 May 1981, pp.82-87,
here p.84; also
n.a. , 'The golden plan of American Express', in: Banking
World. 30 April 1984, pp.70-74.
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so doing, Amex was in the position to attract affluent
customers' deposits away from banks.
On the other side, broker houses generally reach only
the affluent part of the population who are financially
sophisticated and more inclined to take risks. Through the
IDS takeover, Amex expanded its reach into the middle
income segment and undertook a step forward into the mass-
market of retail banking. It also issued a so-called
affinity card, the Optima card, at the end of the previous
decade. This card guickly gained momentum and achieved
several million accounts in the US by the end of 1988.
Moreover, more than $2 billion of balances were
generated.354
As a strategic reply, commercial banks, from the mid-
1980s onwards, started to rethink their role as
distributers of Amex traveller cheques and gold cards,
that establish bank lines of credit for Amex customers
that these customers can draw on to cover their bills.355
354
355
Steiner, T.D. / Teixeira, D.B., ibid, p.123.
n.a., Can Amex and Shearson..., ibid, p.83.
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7.3.2 Development of Competition in the German Market
In Germany mainly two factors prevented the creation
and rise of independent, universal credit card
organisations. Firstly, the low significance of credit
cards as payment instruments356, and secondly, the worldwide
dominating market position of US credit card
organisations. Consequently, all credit card institutions
mentioned in the previous section established their own
systems in Germany. Although - as we have seen in section
7.1 - the credit card business does not require a banking
license under German banking law, all US card
organisations, either directly or via related enterprises,
are linked with a bank. American Express, for instance,
founded its own commercial bank.357
In so doing, the company is in the position to
diversify even further into typical bank deposit and
credit business. Bearing in mind the strict market entry
conditions of nonbanks under German banking law (see
section 2.2.2.1), the establishment of a fully licensed
bank was a logical solution to keep a door open for future
also see Frost & Sullivan's analysis of the German card
market.
Frost & Sullivan, The European Market For Automatic
Retail Branch Banking, Winter 1990, pp.8.80-8.84.
Otto, K.F., 'American Express in Deutschland - Notizen
aus einem Pressegesprach' , in: Bank und Markt. 1984,
iss.6, p.17.
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diversification strategies into other financial services
areas. The requirement in the USA to prevent being
supervised as a bank or to even own a bank subsidiary,
because of the advantageous legal status of a nonbank,
does not exist in the German market.
7.4 Commercial Banks' Strategic Reactions to
Intensifying Competition in both Countries
Traditionally, the bank-borne credit card organisations
VISA and Mastercard were specialised on mass-market credit
cards to the lower and middle income-earner classes. In
the US, participating member banks started to issue
premium cards, thereby attempting to diversify into more
upmarket segments of the business at the beginning of the
1980s. From 1981 onwards, they offered gold-cards with
additional features similar to the ones of classical T & E
cards.
Citicorp pursued a different approach to fight off
competition. In 1981 and 1983 it acquired two of the elder
but well-known card organisations in the US, Carte Blanche
and Diners Club. 358 In addition to these types of cards,
Citi also offers its bank credit card called Choice Card,
Malschok, K.H., ibid, p.16.
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and participates in the VISA and MasterCard system. Since
then, Citicorp as well as the member banks of the VISA or
Mastercard network, have gradually added on more features,
such as for instance insurance or travel services, to the
range of services coming with a premium card. Thus,
Citicorp's card strategy is clearly aimed at a strong
penetration of the entire credit card market segment of
the retail banking market. It thereby deliberately pushes
competition in all segments of the US card market by
offering a whole range of cards with partly overlapping
. 359 . • . .
service features. Richard S Braddock, Citi's Chief
Operating Officer (COO), expressed the bank's card
strategy as follows:
"...I think their (AMEX) strategy historically has
been image-based and now they are moving down-market.
But our card line is getting quite broad as well. Not
only do we have the normal credit cards and the gold
versions, we have the Choice card, which is
positioned as a price brand. It's gotten to be quite
successful and is actually our fastest growing
card."360
In Germany, commercial banks in 1977 founded the
Eurocard system, according to the US model. The Eurocard
is a worldwide useable T & E card that empowers the bearer
to pay conveniently at a large number of contracted
Judt, E., 'Der US Kreditkartenmarkt im Uberblick', in:
Bank und Markt. Aug. 1985, pp.11-14, here p.12.
Deutsch, B.I., 'A Conversation with Richard S
Braddock', in: Bank Marketing, Jan. 1991, pp.16-21,
here p.20.
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merchants, hotels, restaurants, retailers etc. (in 1988 a
total of 76330 accepting organisations). In a joint,
concerted action, commercial banks established a company,
the GZS361 (Gesellschaft fur Zahlungssysteme, a company
responsible for payment systems) to manage the entire
processing of the Eurocard system , and also settled a
cooperation agreement with Mastercard and the UK-based
credit card system Access. The main objective of the
founding member banks was to create a second cashless
payment instrument at the point of sale besides the
dominating eurochegues and eurochegue-cards. This
objective is reflected by the relatively low distribution
figures of Eurocards issued by Deutsche Bank until 1989.
Only 115.000 cardholders could be contracted as opposed to
a total of more than 20 million eurocheque cards being
issued at the end of the previous decade. 363 Another
related factor was that all large German clearers
primarily targeted their own customers throughout the




see previous chapter, section 6.5.
Schloter, H.W., 1Zwei Jahre Eurocard: Marktchancen
genutzt', in: Die Bank. 6/1979, pp.270-273, here p.270.
n.a., 'Zum Privatkundengeschaft der drei GroBbanken',
in: Bank und Markt. June 1989, p.24; also
Judt, E. , ' Der europaische Kreditkartenmarkt - ein
Uberblick', in: Bank und Markt. July 1987, pp.19-25,
here p.19.
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However, in contrast to typical bank credit cards used
in the USA, the Eurocard, as a product of a cooperation
between all banking groups of the commercial banking
sector, represents merely an extension of the product
range provided for wealthy individuals. It is not an
instrument to intensify short-term credit facilities on a
mass-market basis.
Furthermore, as recently as January 1 1989, individual
banks reached full responsibility regarding 'their
Eurocard 1 .364 Until 1989, only the GZS issued and serviced
Eurocards, and also held the cardholders accounts. Since
the beginning of 19 8 9365, banks voted for the issue and
administration of their own Eurocards, in order to
differentiate themselves in terms of marketing, service,
and product features from other commercial banks. At the
same time, large commercial banks started to issue own
label cards, such as the Deutsche Bank card or the S-Card
of the savings banks. These cards can be characterised as
multi-purpose service cards. They carry bank-specific
logos, are equipped with magnetic stripes and PINs, and
primarily serve as a personal means of contact and
information between bank and customer. Unfortunately,
Glogowski, E., ibid, p.123.
Co-branding possibilities between the 'big three' and
other companies such as the agreement between Deutsche
Bank and Lufthansa for the first time occurred in 1991.
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these cards were so far only targeted as a substitute for
other cards, to be used at the banks' own ATM-machines and
other self-service terminals in order to withdraw cash or
to printout account statements. They were neither created
as credit cards, nor as a competitive or substitute
product to the eurocheque and EC-card system. Hence, in
terms of competition with credit card organisations'
rivalling credit cards, these own label cards do not
qualify as a substitute product366 as in the case of US
banks' own label cards. In line with the development in
the US market, German banks in 1989 began to issue gold
and other premium cards, and also included other
attractive features such as travel services on these
cards.
The main distinction between the German and American
approaches, as a result of the way the Eurocard system
evolved, is that the German commercial banking industry -
in this market segment - is characterized by a general
tendency for the concept of common solutions and the
subsequent restriction of direct competition. In the US,
in contrast, the concept of individualism - as
demonstrated by Citicorp - appears to be a prevailing
tendency.
Hoch, G. , Die Kundenkreditkarte im deutschen
Einzelhandel. Bayreuth, 1989, pp.152-154.
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7.5 Commercial Banks' Strategic Reactions in the US
and Germany in terms of IT
As a consequence of the intensifying competition in the
US credit card market at the beginning of the 198 0s, due
to Amex' strategic moves and the launch of retail credit
cards such as Sears Roebuck's SearsCharge card (compare
section 6.2), a process of centralisation took place. A
commercial bank as for instance Citicorp, which in 1981
provided a variety of different cards ranging from own
label credit cards to purchased labels such as Diners,
decided to centralise its cards processing infrastructure.
This decision among other things meant significant
investment in information technology (hardware and
software) to equip a completely new designed processing
location. The required IT activities encompassed the
transfer and large scale redesign of the entire credit
card business system. The individual programming tasks
ranged from credit applications, data capture, posting,
and statementing functions, to issue and credit collection
programs. At the beginning, the majority of these
applications were coded as batch processing applications.
From the mid-1980s onwards, however, Citi incrementally
replaced these batch programs by online solutions. Bearing
in mind that a credit card basically resembles a bundle of
different features which are not necessarily provided by
one organisation (ie the principle of affinity cards),
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large databases and the related inquiry tools were also
required, as well as extensive communication and software
links from and to the group of individual service
providers. This meant additional cost in the form of
software licenses, related programming expenses, and
hardware expenses to create the communication links. In
addition, commercial banks such as Citicorp, that pursued
the proprietary systems approach, were required to invest
in authorization and clearing facilities. By the end of
1981, Citicorp had moved its entire credit card operations
to Sioux Falls, South Dakota.367 In toto, more than twenty
percent of the IT budget devoted to retail banking in that
year was spent to finance these IT activities. As already
mentioned, the change in technology from batch to online
processing toward the mid- 1980s constantly required
additional IT investment in the card business. Similar
relocation decisions were also made by credit card
7ZO
operations of other large BHCs.
However, these relocation decisions and hence IT
investments, were not only based on changes in the
competitive environment. In addition, the deregulation of
Erdevig, Eleanor H, 'New directions for economic
development - the banking industry', in: Economic
Perspectives, FED of Chicago, Sept./Oct. 1988, pp.17-
24, here p.19.
compare Ringer, R., 'Lenders more restive over rate
ceilings', in: The American Banker. 6 May 1982, p.3.
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so-called usury ceilings (a special kind of interest rate
ceiling on various types of consumer credit) - or to be
more specific, its partial abolition - on credit cards,
also supported the decision-making process. In May 1980,
South Dakota passed a state regulation that removed rate
ceilings on credit cards and allowed BHCs to charge out-
of-state credit card customers the same interest rate as
permitted by its home state.369 This meant that large BHCs
with a national charter, such as Citicorp, located in
state X could export their rates to customers in state Y
with lower ceilings. In a second event, the Competitive
Eguality Banking Act (CEBA) of 1987 allowed nonbanks to
create national credit card banks permitted to issue
credit cards on a nationwide basis.370
, 371 , ,
The partial removal of these ceiling rates and the
conseguences of the CEBA, finally gave commercial banks
the opportunity to compete with nonbanks on a more level
playing field. Thus, a significant change in the banking
Erdevig, Eleanor H, 'New directions...', ibid, p.18.
Among the top 25 card issuing banks are five nonbank
credit card banks. These are Greenwood Trust (Discover
card) , American Express Centurion Bank, Associates
National Bank, Household Bank, and Lomas Bank USA.
Staten, M., 'Sorting Out Growth in Revolving Credit',
in: Journal of Retail Banking, vol.12, no.l, Spring
1990, pp.67-71, here p.67.
There still exist a few US states that keep usury
ceilings as an integral part of their state banking
legislation, despite the fact that the bulk of states
has followed South Dakota's example.
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legislation was also clearly supportive in the decision¬
making process for those substantial IT investments.
Similar to the strategic response (POS banking) to the
market-entry of retailers, large German commercial banks
did not 'change' their IT strategy concerning credit cards
during the previous decade. The GZS provided the
management, administration, and servicing of the issued
credit cards, which, in turn did not create a need among
commercial banks to purchase or develop application
packages to perform these services themselves.
Furthermore, the banks even refused to spend money in the
processing of transactions related to the whole range of
card services including both Eurocard and EC-card
services. For this purpose they jointly set up a
processing company, the Bankverlag, which is based in
Cologne. Throughout the 1980s, this organisation overnight
processed transaction tapes received from the
participating banks covering their entire card services.
Again, apart from a negligible data-entry system,
including optical character readers and tape-units no IT
investment was reguired.
This situation has changed since the beginning of the
1990s. With the issue of their own Eurocards and own label
bank cards, all large German clearers started inhouse card
processing facilities. In the process, they took over
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services previously outsourced to the above mentioned
organisations. This strategic move incurred substantial IT
investment in 1990 and 1991. Due to the fact that
virtually no IT infrastructure for card processing was
implemented in these banks, they had to either design a
card processing system from scratch, or to purchase an
already existing system. In light of time pressure and
nonexisting programming skill to develop a bank-internal
solution, two large commercial banks (Commerzbank and
Deutsche Bank) purchased the card processing system from
Hogan, an American banking software specialist. Dresdner
Bank, in turn, decided to design and develop its own in-
house card processing application system. This decision
was primarily triggered by Dresdner Bank's more
conservative and modest growth estimate regarding the
number of credit card holders in Germany by the mid-1990s.
The purchase cost and subsequent modifications and
adjustments to the bank-internal IT standards, which
employed a project team of twelve employees for almost a
year (in the case of Deutsche Bank), amounted to roughly
DM 12 million. Additionally, the banks purchased another
card application to handle the management, distribution,
and processing of their own label cards. In the case of
Deutsche Bank, this institution at the same time acquired
an application system called OCM 24 from SDM, an US
banking software vendor, and integrated it into the
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existing IT infrastructure. The costs attributable to this
project were similarly high as compared to the Hogan
system. Thus, roughly DM 25 million were spent on IT
activities related to the application side of the card
business only. Furthermore, hardware expenses such as
mainframe and storage device upgrades, workstations in the
branches to run the applications, and communication
facilities to establish an online dialogue mode were
required. However, due to the fact that these significant
IT investments, which represent a substantial change in
the German banks' IT strategy regarding the card business,
happened in 1990 and mostly in 1991, they are on the very
edge of the time frame chosen for this investigation.
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7.6 Main Results
Independent nonbank credit card organisations (such as
Amex) are competitors to commercial banks in the area of
consumer credit through the issue of rivalling credit
cards. Benefitting from a general attitude among consumers
toward convenient payment instruments, short-term debt to
satisfy consumption needs, and a reserve purchasing power
instrument in circumstances of tight liquidity, these
credit cards represent competitive threats of substitution
to commercial banks * equivalent services because of
attractive features implied in the card and an image of
exclusivity.
This threat of substitution, however, differs
significantly in intensity between the US and German
market because of mainly four factors. Firstly, the US
population, on average, is more inclined to create short-
term consumer debt than the German population. Credit
cards are therefore more frequently used in the US as in
Germany. Secondly, the lack of an efficient guarantee
system for cheque clearings in the US, which in contrast
exists in Germany, made credit cards the preferred payment
vehicle for short-term transactions in the US. Thirdly,
the most frequently utilised short-term credit facility in
Germany is the disposition credit of standard current
accounts. A facility that does not exist in the US banking
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market. In addition, eighty percent of all transactions in
Germany are still paid cash. Fourthly, the well-
established eurocheque and EC-card system in Germany (more
than 20 million cards issued in 1990) represented a
substantial barrier to entry for all kinds of credit
cards, and severely impeded the market penetration of
credit cards in the German retail banking market
throughout the 1980s.
Within this market environment, German commercial banks
were in a very secure market position to respond to the
market-entry of nonbank credit card organisations.
Moreover, they did not regard them as severe competitive
threats at all. Having entered the market in the 1970s as
T & E cards, Amex in 1979 had reached only 132,900
372 • • •
cardholders. Until 1986 roughly half a million
cardholders could be contracted. In 1987/88 due to
intensified marketing of the added values of gold and
personal card features, supportive side-effects of the
Amex bank, a growing middle market orientation, and image
gains through investment banking activities by its
subsidiaries targeted at HNWIs, Amex could increase its
membership base up to 680,000. Stimulated by these efforts
and by growing market acceptance of credit cards, German
commercial banks in 1989 started to offer their own
American Express, own records.
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Eurocards, which were previously issued by the GZS only,
provided premium versions with extended service features,
and issued own-label multi-purpose service cards.
However, throughout the 1980s, German commercial banks
stuck to the original market positioning of the Eurocard
as a mere additional product (for travel and
entertainment) to complete the product range offered to
wealthy individuals. In spite of this slight increase in
competition, German commercial banks did not change their
'IT strategy' of not having individual in-house card
processing and management functions. The last decade was
shaped by the GZS and the Bankverlag, which, as jointly
owned institutions, fulfilled the entire card processing
business for all participating member banks. The following
diagram illustrates this 'negative correlation' between
the market efforts of this nonbank competitor and
commercial banks' reaction in terms of IT.
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Figure 23: Banks' IT Reaction to the Market-Entry of
Credit Card Organisations into the German
Retail Banking Market
In the US, in contrast, the intensity of competition
was much stronger. Triggered by stepped-up competition
through Amex diversification into the wide area of
investment banking in 1980/81, which attracted affluent
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customers' deposits away from banks, its aggressive
marketing of card services and penetration of merchants at
the same time, and a generally supportive change in the
banking legislation affecting the credit card business, US
commercial banks, with Citicorp as a leader in 1981,
decided to create large, centralised card processing
centres, which required significant IT activities and
hence investments (in toto more than twenty percent of the
IT budget devoted to retail banking). This change in the
IT strategy went in line with a new business strategy of
treating credit cards as a core business. Citicorp's
acquisition of Carte Blanche in 1981, Diners Club in
1982/83, and the rapid growth of VISA and MasterCard, that
started at the same time, indicated this trend among
leading US commercial banks (BancOne, CoreStates, Chase
etc. pursued the same strategy). The following diagram
graphically emphasizes the relationship between the market
efforts of this nonbank competitor and commercial banks'
response in terms of IT.
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Figure 24: Banks' IT Reaction to the Market-Entry of
Credit Card Organisation into the US Retail
Banking Market
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8. Discussion of the Main Findings
This chapter outlines the key findings of the research
without repeating all of those findings sufficiently
discussed elsewhere. The findings are summarized within
the framework of the research objective by first briefly
pinpointing the starting positions of nonbank competitors
in the US and German retail banking markets, and secondly
by discussing the main results for each particular type of
nonbank competitor. The findings of each individual
nonbank type are then condensed into one broad picture and
assessed as a totality in light of the perceived
correlation under investigation. This chapter ends by
making suggestions for further research in this area.
Since the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933
which established the separation banking system, the US
banking system has been characterised by a constantly
growing intensity of competition, due to diversification
movements and the resulting increasingly overlapping
product and service ranges among the competing groups of
financial institutions. Furthermore, this competition even
intensified throughout the 1980s through the inroads
undertaken by non- and nearbank institutions into
predominantly the retail banking market. The factors that
initiated these diversification strategies, were primarily
the traditionally high profitability ratios in the
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commercial banking industry as compared to other
industries, and the positive profitability outlook of the
1980s in the retail banking market segment, due to
guantitative and gualitative changes in consumer demand
patterns of financial services, and cost reduction
potentials opened up through automation and
rationalisation. In this context, liberal nonbank
regulations allow the provision of virtually all banking
products by nonbank competitors, whereas commercial banks
are constrained by regulatory business restrictions of
substantial competitive relevance.
The differences and divergent developments of
competition between banks and nonbanks in the German
market that were demonstrated in this investigation
originate from different competitive starting positions,
which are a conseguence of divergent banking systems and
banking regulations between the US and German banking
system. With regard to the changing demand pattern of
financial services and the perception of the significance
of IT for a modern commercial bank, both factors, however,
showed almost parallel developments in both countries.
Similarly, the selected types of nonbanks, insurance
companies, thrift institutions, retail organisations, and
credit card organisations, and their respective substitute
products and services are observable in both banking
markets. Diversification strategies, substitution
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potential, and business activities of these nonbank
competitors, however, only partially culminated in
intensified competitive relations to commercial banks'
equivalent in both countries because of mainly two
reasons. Firstly, the nonbank activities did not always
reach a critical mass in terms of quantity to become a
significant substitution threat parallel in both
countries. Second, the aggregated negative implications on
commercial banks were not always severe enough to trigger
major response strategies to the same extent in the US and
Germany. Hence, the strategic response of US and German
commercial banks to the market-entry of various types of
nonbanks differs. With regard to the hypothesis that a
significant change of the retail banking market
environment is directly correlated with a significant
change in a commercial banks' IT strategy, this outcome,
per se, is not detrimental. As long as the direct
correlation can be shown, it does not matter which type of
nonbank in which banking market triggered a significant
change in the IT strategy.
In the case of the market-entry of life insurers in the
US via the provision of capital creating life insurance
policies in the form of New Wave Policies at the end of
1984, commercial banks did not respond because of three
reasons, (a) competition between insurance companies and
banks was traditionally high already caused by the strong
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market acceptance of insurance policies, (b) the
regulatory separation between the insurance and commercial
banking industries created a highly constrained
environment for commercial banks to respond, (c) the
cooperation between investment banks and insurance
companies could not be counterbalanced because of the
Glass-Steagall Act. The market-entry of insurers was
perceived as insignificant and commercial banks were not
forced to respond at all. Hence, a significant change in
the banks' IT strategy was not observable. Accordingly,
the aggregated cost of IT activities attributable to the
strategic response of commercial banks were negligible.
In Germany, in contrast, the level of competition was
relatively low because of the function of the insurance
industry as a refinancing source for commercial banks, and
traditional cooperation agreements between banks and
insurers in the provision of credit and insurance services
to private households. Thus, the provision of capital
creating life insurance products on a broad scale in the
second half of 1985, with its fish-trap effects on the
deposit potential (disintermediation) within the
commercial banking sector that meant a major upheaval, was
regarded as a severe competitive threat, and hence
answered accordingly. Fiducia's reaction at the end of
1986 and 1987, which represents about 25 percent of the
German retail banking market, with a response lag of
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roughly 15 months, marked the strategic response of the
German commercial banking industry. In that year, well
over 20 percent of the IT budget devoted to retail banking
was spent on IT activities related to the market-entry of
this type of nonbank competitor. The strategic reaction of
Deutsche and Dresdner Bank, although in 1989, with similar
system expense figures, underlines this behaviour.
With regard to the market-entry of thrift institutions
into the retail banking market in 1982 through the
provision of attractive sight deposits and a wider range
of credit services, almost identical to the services
offered by commercial banks, which was initiated by
product range liberalisations caused by newly enacted
banking regulations (DIDMCA, Garn.St-Germain Act), US
commercial banks hardly responded. The reason is that
thrift institutions, due to their nature and existing
interstate banking regulations, only qualified as very
local competitors. In addition, product range,
geographical, and emergency deregulations strengthened
commercial banks' market position relative to thrift
institutions. Thus, similar to the 'response' to the
market-entry of insurers, US commercial banks considered
the market-entry of thrift institutions as insignificant
and behaved accordingly in terms of their IT strategy. The
German Bausparkassen, in contrast, traditionally operated
in the legally protected market niche of long-term
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property finance and mortgage lending, with a very limited
product set as compared to US thrifts, and also
established a nationwide branch network. The provision of
innovative products, with attributes that qualified as
direct substitutes to banks' savings products, on a
nationwide basis in the first half of 1985, paired with a
generally improving house building and construction market
in the second half of the previous decade, led to a much
stronger increase in the competitive relation between
banks and Bausparkassen than in the US market. In order to
avoid negative business implications in the deposit side
of the retail banking market, German commercial banks were
urged to strategically respond to the market-entry of
Bausparkassen. Again with a response lag of about one and
a half years, Fiducia and Deutsche Bank in 1987
significantly changed their IT strategy by employing an
array of IT activities, that meant between 20-25 percent
of the IT budget in the retail banking function was
devoted to a substantial strategic response in the market
segment attacked by Bausparkassen.
Retail and credit card organisations primarily provide
short-and medium term consumer credit and charge
facilities. In the US retail banking market, these
organisations traditionally have a strong market position
because historically, commercial banks did not regard this
market as extremely lucrative due to their specialisation.
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The motivation of German retailers to provide sales
finance instruments is only observable towards the end of
the 1980s, since changing customer purchasing habits and
diversification tendencies promise higher returns. Due to
the fact that the financial services of both types of
nonbanks are primarily based on various kinds of plastic
cards (ranging from credit cards, to own label store
cards, to charge cards), the market opportunities and
substitution potential of these financial service
providers within the retail banking market, is mainly
determined by the usage frequency and acceptance of these
card products among private households in a country, their
perception about short-term consumer debt, and the
availability of technology at the point-of-sale in tandem
with the general level of automation in the banking
industry of that country. Accordingly, the high proportion
of card based transactions in the US represented inter
alia a driving motive for retailers to launch their own
credit cards on a broad scale in 1986, to expand in-store
financial centres, and to install small proprietary POS-
banking systems. However, due to the fact that only a
limited substitution link between retailers' credit
facilities and comparable bank credit facilities exist,
caused by different creditworthiness criteria, and the
uncertainty of POS technology paired with market
acceptance, US commercial banks only insignificantly
responded to the market-entry of retailers. POS banking
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did not evolve as a major banking utility of the US
commercial banking industry throughout the 1980s. Only
minor IT investments were made to participate in test
draft capture networks, card technology projects and the
like, which incurred negligible cost. Hence a significant
change in the banks' IT strategy did not occur. In the
German market, the market-entry of retailers through the
establishment of bank subsidiaries in 1984/85, and the
negligible card activities toward the end of the previous
decade, did also not lead to any strategic response by
German commercial banks, because (1) those nonbank bank
subsidiaries offered only a very limited product range,
(2) retailers were still largely dependent on bank credit
facilities as a prime refinancing source, (3) due to the
universal banking system, the scope and efficiency of
service provision by commercial banks in the consumer
credit segment is very high already, in part because of
nationwide branch networks (4) a lack of devotion, funds,
and enthusiasm among retailers' top management for retail
banking services was observable, in conjunction with
private households' reluctance to take up and utilise
plastic card payment instruments. Consequently, German
commercial banks did not significantly change their IT-
strategy. Moreover, due to the tendency of joint
technological solutions in the German banking industry,
banks established a jointly owned institution called GZS
that conducted pilot studies and test installations
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regarding POS banking. Hence, German commercial banks had
virtually no system expenses in this business area
throughout the previous decade. In addition, POS banking,
in line with the US situation, never left the planning and
experimentation stage in the 1980s.
This situation was reversed in the case of the market-
entry of credit card organisations. Supported by high
usage frequencies of plastic cards, a high market
acceptance of credit cards in the US population, and the
lack of an efficient guarantee system for cheque
clearings, aggressive card strategies by independent
credit card organisations such as Amex, linked with a
broad move into the financial services industry (also into
investment banking) in 1981, were perceived as a strong
threat of substitution and a significant change in
competition in the card segment of the retail banking
market. Facilitated by a change in the banking legislation
(the abolition of usury ceilings on several short-term
credit vehicles in various states), commercial banks
responded with a significant change in their IT strategy,
in that they centralised their card processing facilities.
Citicorp was first in 1981/82, with a time lag of about a
year, to set up completely new processing facilities which
meant substantial IT investments. Well over 20 percent of
the IT budget devoted to retail banking in that year was
spent to finance the necessary IT activities. In the
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German market, in contrast, commercial banks did not
respond to the increase in competition through independent
credit card organisations (Amex) in 1987/88. Due to the
insignificant distribution figures of credit cards in the
1980s, the existence of EC-cards as an entry barrier, and
German customers' generally cautious attitude toward
short-term debt, German commercial banks did not change
their 'IT strategy', throughout the 1980s, of not having
individual in-house card processing units. Similar to the
market-entry of retailers, jointly owned institutions
(among others again the GZS) conducted the card processing
tasks. Only as recently as 1991, the big three German
clearers have purchased substantial card processing
packages, and hence changed their IT strategy.
In looking at the market-entry of each type of nonbank
competitor in the retail banking market of both countries
throughout the 1980s, and commercial banks' strategic
response in terms of IT, in light of the hypothesis under
investigation, the above findings demonstrate that only in
three cases, out of a total of eight cases, a significant
change in the IT strategy occurred as a consequence of a
market-entry.
In analyzing each market-entry separately, it is
observable that only three entries were perceived as
significant among commercial banks. This is the case
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because the competitive and strategic scale of these
entries, the market-entry of life insurers and
Bausparkassen in Germany, and credit card organisations in
the US, differs substantially from the scale in the other
five entries. Extremely negative implications on the
deposit-side of the retail banking business of German
commercial banks, and, on the short-term, consumer credit
business of US commercial banks, were expected. Hence,
large-scale and quick response activities were required
that led to a significant change in the banks' IT
strategy, expressed in a surge of their IT budgets in the
year of the banks' strategic response.
Thus, according to the hypothesis, that a significant
change in the banks' market environment due to the market-
entry of nonbank competitors is directly correlated with a
significant change in the banks' IT strategy, only the
above three cases are relevant. Moreover, the findings
concerning the substantial IT reactions in the above cases
occurred as a strategic response to these relevant market-
entries. This outcome, that all cases of a significant
market-entry led to a significant change in the banks' IT
strategy, suggests that a direct correlation exists.
Hence, the hypothesis must be accepted. In addition, a
response lag between market-entry and IT reaction of 1-1.5
years was observable in all relevant cases.
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Furthermore, the findings of section 2.1.3 suggest that
the market launch of technological innovations does not
lead to immediate changes in the banks' IT strategy.
Commercial banks, in contrast, appear to be rather
cautious in significantly taking up technological
innovations, which is reflected in time lags of at least
two to two-and-a-half years. Hence, the potential
correlation between technological innovations, and the
banks' IT strategy as the main trigger for a change in the
banks ' IT strategy seems to be rather weak.
The results of this research also relate to academic
work done in the 1980s that established the concept of IT
as a competitive weapon.373 In exploiting information
technology resources in line with a change in the IT
strategy, a bank might be able to create competitive
advantages over rivalling nonbank competitors. This is
certainly a fascinating topic that requires a more
thorough analysis in further academic research.
Parsons, G.L., 'Information Technology: A new
Competitive Weapon' , in: The McKinsey Quarterly. Spring
1984, pp.45-60; also Porter, M.E., Competitive
Strategy. New York, 1980, Ch.2; also Porter, M.E.,
Competitive Advantage. New York, 1985.
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8.1 Limitations of the Research
No research can legitimately claim having explored all
aspects of and angles to a specific research problem. This
is also true for this research. It was the research
objective to look at changes in commercial banks' IT
strategy caused by a change in the market environment
solely from the perspective of market-entries by nonbank
competitors, leaving aside other factors, such as response
to interbank competition or the market-entry of foreign
banks. Such an approach is a necessary strategy in a
complex and turbulent area such as retail banking and
information technology to isolate the relevant research
issue. On the other hand, pursuing this approach implies
the limitation of neglecting the above aspects. However,
the findings of this research provide the necessary
framework and opportunities for further academic work that
could explore the implications of interbank competition
and the market-entry of foreign banks.
Another limitation of this research lies in the finding
that a certain interdependence between technological
innovations and the IT strategy of a commercial bank
cannot be entirely rejected. Although the results of
section 2.1.3 suggest that it appears to be rather weak
with regard to the retail banking industry.
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8.2 Further Research
This research has covered a wide range of issues, so
inevitably the opportunities for further research are also
considerable.
Apart from the pointer given in the previous section
about further research into the wide area of interbank
competition and its impact on the IT strategy of a
commercial bank, the following research opportunities are
also of strong interest.
It would be useful to build on these findings by
analyzing the wholesale banking side of large commercial
banks to find out whether a similar correlation exists.
This would help to pinpoint characteristics that are
specific to the retail banking function.
Another area worth looking at are for example smaller
commercial banks or even a different industry, such as the





Summary of the main questions and answers per bank
during the qualitative research of stage 2
Fiducia Informationszentrale AG
Respondents within Fiducia Informationszentrale AG:
1. Mr.B, CEO of the company, recruited Jan. 1992 from IBM
2. Mr.S, Divisional Manager Progeno (Application
Development Subsidiary), same post for four years,
previously career in software development with Fiducia
3. Mr.L, Controller IS/IT, 8 years with Fiducia in this
function
4. Mr.K, Head of IT planning dept., previously
responsible for the FIDIS/GENOS migration as project
manager
5. Mr.Z, Divisional Manager Orga (Organisation and DP
Subsidiary), two years in this position, previously a
career in software development with Fiducia
6. Mr.Scha, IBM Industry Specialist, in this position for
8 years
These respondents were confronted with the following list
of questions. Each respondent generally answered only a
subset of the questions depending on his experience and
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nature of the job. The aggregated insights gained are
presented in the attached tableau.
1. Strategy and Marketing - Retail banking
1. What is the general corporate/marketing strategy
towards nonbank competitors ? Towards insurers,
thrifts, retailers, and credit card organisations ?
Al. Nonbank competitors are increasingly regarded as
significant competitors in retail banking services.
Our organisation has responded towards these
competitors by building up closer relations with our
traditional partners R + V and BSH. Particularly the
market entry of insurers and independent Bausparkassen
(thrifts) in the second half of the 1980s had an
impact on our business. Retailers and credit card
organisations were not regarded as severe competitors.
2. When did the market-entry occur ?
A2. Insurers entered the retail banking market in a
significant scale in 1985 and independent
Bausparkassen did the same thing in 1986. The other
two nonbank competitors came later in 1987 and 88.
3. Could you please comment on the event (and date
shown)?
A3. Yes, these market-entry dates and the services you
mentioned seem to be correct. I remember several
meetings when we were discussing these nonbank
activities.
4. What effect did the market-entry have on the
organisation and the product line affected ?
A4. The growth rates in various service lines of our
partner banks, in particular long-term savings plans,
mortgages, and long-term financing started to slacken.
5. Why did the market-entry occur ?
A5. Insurers were trying to broaden their first deposit
base by issuing capital creating life insurance
policies. They were also attracted by the stable
profit margins in retail banking services, the trend
towards All-finance which started to gain momentum in
1985, and the more yield orientated attitude of
customers. Bausparkassen, in turn, were affected by a
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declining housebuilding market towards the mid-1980s.
So, they had to do something to keep their
profitability on a high level - which they always had
due to the Bausparkassengesetz. Retailers and credit
card companies are competitors primarily in the short-
term consumer finance business. Retailers identified
similarities in terms of service characteristics
between retailing and retail banking. They also tried
to create a sales promotion vehicle by issuing store
cards and credit facilities. Credit card organisations
such as American Express were around for years. They
wanted to benefit from the underdeveloped German card
market and the growing usage of plastic cards in
Germany from the second half of the 1980s onwards.
6. What are the characteristics of the nonbank
competitor; advantages/weaknesses ? In relation to
your own organisation ?
A6. Insurance organisations provide their services via a
highly flexible, mobile, and aggressive sales force.
Hence, a good product can penetrate the market very
quickly. Their staff is also well trained. The same
applies for Bausparkassen. Bank branches are naturally
much more static. On the other hand, bank customers
tend to be rather loyal. With regard to retailers,
they don't have a reputation as credit service
providers. There is also the reluctance of German
customers to sign a credit contract in a department
store or to pay by store cards. I don't think that
German retailers can copy a company like Sears. The
German market, in that respect, is different from the
US market.
American Express has a long tradition as a T & E card
provider. American Express cards are also used by
companies as corporate credit cards. But I do not
believe that it could significantly harm the banking
industry (ie by mass-marketing credit cards), bearing
in mind the high distribution figures of EC cards, and
the Eurocard, which was substantially pushed in 1990
and 1991.
7. What was the market penetration strategy applied by
the nonbank competitor ?
A7. Insurers used their well trained sales force. They
also took over established banks and started to siphon
off revenues from the banking industry. Bausparkassen
pursued the same approach. Just look at the Wiistenrot
conglomerate. Retailers tried to imitate Sears by
creating in-store financial centres and issuing store
cards. But they were not really successful. American
Express increased its number of features on the card,
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and also widened its target group by offering 'normal'
credit cards targeted at middle-class income earners.
8. What, if any, changes would you expect regarding
nonbank competition in the various product lines ?
A8. Throughout the 1990s we are now prepared to fight off
any further attacks by these nonbank competitors. At
the moment I cannot see any other nonbank competitor
that could establish a significant threat. Interbank
competition will certainly be a constantly strong
competitive force in particular in light of the
forthcoming Single Market in Europe.
9. Did your organisation regard the market-entry as
significant ? If so, why ?
A9. Only the market-entry of insurers and independent
Bausparkassen was perceived to be of a significant
nature (please see question 6) . Hence, we responded
accordingly. The activities of retailers and
independent credit card issuers were regarded as
insignificant because of the nature of the German card
market, the high branch density and scope of service
provision of our partner banks, and the attitude of
German customers to generally keep low levels of
short-term indebtedness.
10. Could you describe the competitive relation between
nonbank competitor and your organisation. Is it weak
or strong ? Please specify.
A10. The competitive relation between our organisation and
insurers and Baussparkassen developed from a fairly
weak relation, due to traditional cooperations, into
a strong relation throughout the previous decade. With
regard to retailers and credit card organisations, the
competitive relation was very weak and remained so
throughout the 1980s. Competition in the credit card
segment only started to intensify to some extent over
the last two years (1989-91/92).
11. What was your organisation's strategic response ?
All. We intensified the link-up between the cooperative
banks and their traditional partners BSH and R + V
insurance group.
12. When did the strategic response happen ?
A12. We first focused on the R + V connection. This link
was widely enhanced by the end of 1986. In 1987, we
had implemented a much better link-up with Bauspar-
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kasse Schwabisch Hall.
13. Could you please specify the business activities
undertaken ?
A13. The business activities required were mainly IT
related. We also increased our training efforts to
prepare our partner banks' staff to more aggressively
sell products of these partner organisations by using
specifically developed system applications.
14. What changes, if any, were required within your
organisation ?
A14. Apart from an increase in awareness, none, because
traditionally the link was already in place.
2. IT Strategy, role, development, and cost
1. How would you regard the role of IT/IS within the
banking industry ? Within retail banking ?
A1. IT definitely has developed into a critical success
factor for the banking industry. Without IT, not only
in retail banking, but also in investment banking,
hardly any transaction could be made. We are living in
a high-tech, inter-related world, and banking has to
reflect that as well.
2. IS/IT - importance in your organisation ? Position in
the organisation ? Likely development ?
A2. We are the central DP and application development
organisation for cooperative banks in the South and
Southwest of Germany. In 1990, roughly 600 individual
partner banks were linked to our institution. Fiducia
has always been among the frontrunners in terms of
state-of-the-art technology in banking. This will not
change in the future.
3. How has IS/IT changed the relationships with your
business partners ?
A3. Traditionally, we have had relationships with R + V
and BSH which implies a loose IT connection. Since
1987, when we implemented a computer-to-computer
communication link, mutual database access facilities,
file transfer possibilities etc. this relationship is
much closer. Not only in terms of IT. It also meant
the coordination and matching of Fiducia's IT
architecture and BSH 's / R+V's architecture where
interfaces had to be implemented.
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4. What are current IT strategies in your organisation ?
A4. We are currently working on the design of an
enterprise-wide data model and possibilities to
restructure our entire information architecture.
5. Could you describe the IT strategy of your
organisation throughout the 1980s ?
A5. The major IT strategy, apart from cyclical change
management, was the transformation of our Fidis/Genos
central customer management and service system from
hierarchical database structures into the relational
world. Due to growing numbers of reguests by many
partner banks for more online services, easier
database access facilities, and increasing Genos
transaction figures, the original system was to be
migrated according to a three-phased plan. Firstly, in
1985 - with the increasing market acceptance of
relational database systems - the operational database
segments managing the daily business of a bank were to
be migrated in the new database shell. In a second
step, the application programs accessing the database
system needed to be modified according to the new
tools and software requirements. During the third
step, originally planned towards the end of the 1980s,
data of related organisations should be integrated. In
other words, the evolution of the Genos system was
planned as an incremental process.
6. How did your organisation respond in terms of IT to
the market-entry of nonbank competitors ?
A6. In line with the decision to create a much closer
link-up with our partners, we had to realise the IT
connection much quicker (at least two years). We also
needed more decentralised computer power in the
individual banks to enable banking staff to sell a
whole array of different financial services.
7. When, if ever, did the response occur ?
A7. We responded to the market-entry of insurers in 1986
and to the market-entry of Bausparkassen in 1987. We
did not respond to retailers market-entry activities,
nor to those of credit-card organisations.
8. Could you please specify as detailed as possible what
IT activities were performed directly attributable to
the market-entry of a nonbank competitor ?
A8. By mid-1986 an insurance application and database
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system called Ruvis was developed and went on stream.
This system was essentially a reduced image copy of R
+ V's customer database. In this context various
project teams were engaged in coding extensive
database extraction and matchcode programs. This was
necessary because Fiducia's internal data
identification and customer key system was completely
different from R + V's eguivalent. In addition, a new
online dialogue system was developed to access to
access various databases within the Ruvis system. All
these activities required the purchase of relevant
software licenses, such as DB2, Netmaster, AS, SQL,
etc. Apart from these purchases and development
activities a physical communication link was
established in mid-1987 in order to establish direct
file transfer between both partners. Furthermore, in
light of the changing business requirements for
cooperative banks, we needed widely enhanced
decentralised computer power. Hence, Fiducia increased
its number of installed PCs and terminals between
1986-87 by 159 %, from 187 to 455, and by 50 % from
4321 to 6470.
Similar IT activities were IT activities were required
to establish the link-up between BSH and Fiducia. Two
new long-term lending and Bauspar database systems,
Hallis and Immoplan, were developed from scratch, and
extensive matchcode, data extraction, and online
access applications had to be designed. These
activities were completed in 1987, and both systems
went on stream shortly thereafter. Additionally, a
communication line was put in place between Fiducia
and BSH. With regard to specific IT activities
regarding credit cards and POS between 1985-89, the
GZS was responsible for all test projects,
installations, and the like. We only maintained our
existing EC-card application and started some
development work in 1989 to create a new Genos segment
that covered our Eurocard engagement. However, the
bulk of these card related IT activities, in tandem
with in-house card processing efforts, began in 1990
and 1991.
9. What were the cost of these IT activities ?
A9. I can only provide you with a very incomplete list of
the cost of individual IT activities because of the
confidential nature of this data. However, this list
enables you to get an understanding of the magnitude
of IT investment relevant to nonbank activities:
a) related to insurance:
- cost of purchased software licenses DM 550,000
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- database licenses DM 330,000
- cost related to system integration and
communication DM 2 Mio
- project cost to design the online system DM
300,000
- purchase of PCs DM 2 Mio
- purchase of banking terminals, more then DM 10
Mio
b) related to Bauspar:
- additional software licenses DM 160,000
- design and project cost DM 637,000
- additional communication expenditure DM 900,000
- additional decentralised PC and terminals, more
than DM 3.5 Mio
The IT expenses regarding POS banking and credit cards
were almost negligible (less than DM 1 Mio) throughout
1985-89.
10. What was the development (size) of the IT budget
devoted to retail banking in your organisation ?
A10. Our IT budget was constantly growing throughout the
previous decade.
11. Is the aggregated sum of the IT cost directly
attributable to the market-entry of a nonbank
competitor - in the year of the strategic response -
bigger than 20 % of the IT budget devoted to retail
banking in that year ?
All. With regard to the activities performed in the area of
insurance and Bauspar, the aggregated sum of these
activities in 1986 and 1987 respectively, was bigger
than 2 0 percent of the IT budget devoted to retail
banking in that year. However, the aggregated IT
expenses concerning POS and credit card business were
much less than 20 percent. They were almost negligible
during the previous decade.
12. Would you regard a change in technology as the main
driver for a change in the IT strategy ?
A12. This is a very difficult question to answer. The
technology needs to available, otherwise there will
not be any investment in it. On the other hand, market
forces such as the market entry of nonbank competitors
or strategic moves by bank competitors are certainly
substantial factors. If these market forces are strong
enough they certainly play an important role in the




Respondents within Deutsche Bank AG:
1. Mr.Ra, Director of Organisation, recruited in 1988
from Chase Manhattan Bank
2. Mrs.On, Head of Strategic Planning IT, in this
position for two years, previously career in software
development with Deutsche Bank
3. Mrs.Re, Head of IT life insurance subsidiary, in this
position since establishment of the subs, in 1989
4. Mr.Ba, Assistant Director life insurance subs.,
recruited in 1990
5. Mr.Sc, Product Manager Card Business, in this position
since 1989, previously a career in retail banking
services
6. Mr.Fe, Head of IT Bausparkasse subs., in the position
since 1990, previously systems design with the parent
company
7. Mr.Bu, Assistant Director Bausparkasse subs.,
recruited in 1988
These respondents were confronted with the following list
of questions. Each respondent generally answered only a
subset of the questions depending on his experience and
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nature of the job. The aggregated insights gained are
presented in the attached tableau.
1. Strategy and Marketing - Retail banking
1. What is the general corporate/marketing strategy
towards nonbank competitors ? Towards insurers,
thrifts, retailers, and credit card organisations ?
Al. Throughout the previous decade, primarily around 1985-
87, nonbank organisations intensified their inroads
into traditional retail banking business. However,
only two of the four types of nonbanks, namely
insurers and thrifts (Bausparkassen) were regarded as
serious competitors. Deutsche Bank responded to them
by firstly creating cooperations with institutions of
these industries, and secondly by setting up, de novo,
own subsidiaries, the Deutsche Bank Bauspar AG, and
the Deutsche Bank Lebensversicherung AG.
2. When did the market-entry occur ?
A2. Insurers were first in entering the retail banking
market in 1985. Independent Bausparkassen followed
somewhat later in 1986. Retailers and credit card
institutions were later towards the end of the
previous decade.
3. Could you please comment on the event (and date
shown)?
A3. The financial services offered by these nonbank
competitors and the relevant market-entry dates seem
to be correct. We analyzed them carefully and
discussed our response.
4. What effect did the market-entry have on the
organisation and the product line affected ?
A4. Growth rates in our deposit business started to slow
down because these nonbank products were substitutes
to our normal savings accounts and long-term savings
plans.
5. Why did the market-entry occur ?
A5. Lets start with the market-entry of Baussparkassen
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because we first created our Bauspar subs, in 1987 and
then the insurance subs. in 1989. Bausparkassen
traditionally enjoyed a legally sheltered marketplace.
However, their profits started to decline in the mid-
1980s due to a deteriorating housebuilding market,
They attempted to diversify - within their legal
limits - into our savings and mortgage business to
generate profits. Insurers were competitors in long-
term saving plans for a long time. However, the steady
growth rates and high profitability of retail banking,
paired with the general trend towards All-finance,
were reasons for them to enter the retail banking
market. Retailers and credit card organisations, such
as American Express, showed some increased market
activity but never really entered the market. I
suppose reasons for them were consumer credit via
store cards as a means of sales promotion in the case
of retailers, and an increased slice of the modestly
growing plastic card market in Germany between 1987-
89.
6. What are the characteristics of the nonbank
competitor; advantages/weaknesses ? In relation to
your own organisation ?
A6. With regard to Bausparkassen and insurers, both use a
well trained, mobile, and aggressive salesforce. This
enables them to quickly market new products. They are
also knowledgeable in how to sell financial services,
an asset that for instance retailers lack. On the
other hand, Deutsche Bank has a relatively dense,
nationwide branch network. Additionally, customers in
general are very loyal towards their 'Hausbank'.
American Express can build on its tradition as T & E
card provider in attempting to enter the mass market
for credit cards. However, two factors will limit this
company's market potential. Firstly, the distribution
of the EC card and the Eurocard which the banking
industry began to push strongly in 1989/90.
7. What was the market penetration strategy applied by
the nonbank competitor ?
7A. Insurers penetrated the market by the launch of
substitute products via their aggressive salesforce.
But they also tried to break into the banking market
by setting up investment banking subs, such as the
Allianz group did, and by taking over fully licensed
commercial banks, for instance the Aachner-Miinchner
insurance group acquired the BfG bank. Large
independent Bausparkassen also took over established
banks or started de novo. An example for that is the
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BHW group. Retailers, such as Hertie, formed alliances
with banks and insurers in order to provide financial
services on their own premises. In addition, they
issued store cards, such the Hertie or Massa card.
American Express pushed the 'green' credit card
targeted at the middle income range, and also provided
more features.
8. What, if any, changes would you expect regarding
nonbank competition in the various product lines ?
A8. There are no signs in the marketplace that nonbank
competition will significantly increase over the next
few years.
9. Did your organisation regard the market-entry as
significant ? If so, why ?
A9. Deutsche Bank regarded the market-entry of credit card
institutions (American Express) and retailers as
insignificant because of the underdeveloped German
plastic card market, the attitude of typical Germans
to maintain low levels of short-term consumer debt as
compared to Americans, the fact that the efforts
undertaken by these competitors were only of minor
strength, and the existence of a well functioning
eurocheque system. The market-entry of insurers and
Bausparkassen, in contrast, was perceived as
significant, because we could see and feel the efforts
undertaken by these competitors.
10. Could you describe the competitive relation between
nonbank competitor and your organisation. Is it weak
or strong ? Please specify.
A10. The competitive relation between our organisation and
retailers as well as credit card organisations was
weak throughout the previous decade. In the case of
Bausparkassen and insurers, it developed from a
relatively weak relation caused by traditional
cooperations into a strong relation during the second
half of the 1980s.
11. What was your organisation's strategic response ?
All. We first issued new competitive products, such as the
Banksparplan mit Versicherungsschutz via our
traditional partners, but then the decision was made
to create subsidiaries in both industries, the DB
Lebensversicherung and DB Bauspar, in order to be
independent from a third party. Another reason was to
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benefit from different growth figures in those
industries, ie the strongly growing housebuilding
market from 1986/87 onwards.
12. When did the strategic response happen ?
A12. The Deutsche Bank Bauspar AG was founded in 1987, and
the Deutsche Bank Lebensversicherung AG was
established in 1989.
13. Could you please specify the business activities
undertaken ?
A13. We had to integrate both subsidiaries into the DB
network. We also had to hire extensively experienced
staff from both industries in tandem with training
efforts of our banking staff. Both subsidiaries needed
to be hooked up with our central IT organisation, and
administrative functions had to be implemented within
the new organisation. Finally, an independent
salesforce had to be gradually build up.
14. What changes, if any, were required within your
organisation ?
A14. Banking staff in our branch outlets, which are the
prime distribution channel, had to cope with a whole
array of new financial services on top of the
traditional banking services.
2. IT Strategy, role, development, and cost
1. How would you regard the role of IT/IS within the
banking industry ? Within retail banking ?
Al. Information technology is an absolute must within a
modern commercial bank. Deutsche Bank for instance,
has devoted itself to a steadily growing technology
investment program to remain state-of-the-art
regarding banking technology over the last five years.
This program covers both areas, wholesale as well as
retail banking.
2. IS/IT - importance in your organisation ? Position in
the organisation ? Likely development ?
A2. The IS/IT function has increasingly gained higher
importance in our organisation. Not only since
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internal studies have shown what will happen when the
main DP centre would break down for a couple of days.
IT will certainly become even more important during
this decade.
3. How has IS/IT changed the relationships with your
business partners ?
A3. Traditionally we had cooperations with business
partners such as the Berlinische Lebensversicherung
AG. However, those cooperations did not require
substantial IT activities. Only since we founded our
subsidiaries, we had to build up a completely new IT
infrastructure in both subs., and both organisations
had to be integrated into the parent's IT
architecture.
4. What are current IT strategies in your organisation ?
A4. We are currently working on a new branch office
layout. This means a polarisation of self-service
components on the one hand side, and intelligent
financial services consulting stations on the other.
We are also actively involved in gradually migrating
various application and database systems from
hierarchical to relational structures.
5. Could you describe the IT strategy of your
organisation throughout the 1980s ?
A5. The major IT strategy was to incrementally introduce
state-of-the-art technology in all important business
areas of the bank. This included the design of new
applications, if demanded by the market, based on new
technology (ie relational database structures) and
thus the incremental migration into the 'new world'.
6. How did your organisation respond in terms of IT to
the market-entry of nonbank competitors ?
A6. In line with the decision to establish two
subsidiaries from scratch, an entirely new IT
infrastructure had to be implemented within these
affiliates. This includes the widely increased
implementation of decentralised computer power.
Furthermore, both organisations had to be quickly
integrated into the parent's IT infrastructure.
7. When, if ever, did the response occur ?
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A7. Deutsche Bank responded to the market-entry of
Bausparkassen in 1987, and founded its insurance
subsidiary in 1989. We did not respond to the market-
entry of retailers and credit card organisations
throughout the previous decade.
8. Could you please specify as detailed as possible what
IT activities were performed directly attributable to
the market-entry of a nonbank competitor ?
A8. Due to a lack of in-depth programming skills in the
insurance and Bauspar area, and because of the time
pressure, Deutsche Bank, in both cases, decided to
purchase existing application packages on the market
and to subsequently modify them according to its
internal standards. In due course, WS, a central
insurance application package was purchased in 1989.
Extensive redesign and project activities were
required to perform the modifications. Additionally,
high speed communication lines had to be installed
between the parent's DP centre and the subsidiary
caused by the decision that WS had to be installed on
the parent's central mainframe system. Furthermore, a
scanning and document retrieval system, called
FileNet, with 126 PCs, optical disc storage
facilities, and client-server technology to handle the
insurance contract management was implemented in the
subs. Bridge programs between the central and
decentralised system were hence also required.
Finally, the constant match between the parent's
central customer management system called Cerberus,
and WS necessitated extensive programming activities.
Similar IT activities were required to establish the
IT infrastructure within the Bauspar subs, and to
implement the integration. Deutsche Bank purchased the
Bauspar-system from the LBS Kiel in 1987 and modified
more than 800 programs. Furthermore, extensive data
matching, bridge, and redesign activities were
required. With regard to POS banking activities and
card services hardly any IT activities were performed
during the previous decade. Only very recently, in
1990 and 1991, Deutsche Bank purchased a complete in-
house card processing system and attached software
from Hogan and SDM, two specialist vendors for card
management and processing technology.
9. What were the cost of these IT activities ?
A9 Detailed and accurate cost figures are confidential.
The following list provides an overview of selected
IT cost items related to nonbanking business:
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a) IT investment related to insurance:
- purchase and modification cost of WS DM 12 Mio
- communication and DP utilisation cost DM 4.5
Mio
- decentralised FileNet-related cost DM 6 Mio
- various extensive project cost more than DM
10 Mio
- hardware and banking terminals, several million
DM
b) IT investment related to Bauspar:
- purchase and modification of the Bauspar
application system DM 6 Mio
- project and modification cost DM 5 Mio
- communication and DP utilisation cost DM 4 Mio
- hardware, cabling, and communication facilities
DM 2.5 Mio
- banking terminals and decentralised computer
power, more than DM 10 Mio
The IT expenses regarding POS banking and credit cards
were almost negligible throughout the 1980s. However,
Deutsche Bank, in 1990/91, spent roughly DM 25 Mio for
the purchase and subseguent modification of in-house
card management and processing technology (more than
DM 12 Mio for the Hogan system, and the rest for a
system called OCM 24 from SDM)
10. What was the development (size) of the IT budget
devoted to retail banking in your organisation ?
A10. Primarily since we started our long-term IT investment
program (mid-1980s) the IT budget was constantly
growing.
11. Is the aggregated sum of the IT cost directly
attributable to the market-entry of a nonbank
competitor - in the year of the strategic response -
bigger than 20 % of the IT budget devoted to retail
banking in that year ?
All. With regard to our insurance and Bauspar engagement,
the aggregated sum of the IT cost in the year of the
strategic response was between 20 and 25 % of the IT
budget devoted to retail banking.
12. Would you regard a change in technology as the main
driver for a change in the IT strategy ?
A12. We certainly had not invested heavily in terms of IT
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if there wouldn't have been a market and therefore
profit opportunity, and competitive changes in the
marketplace forcing us to respond. It does not make
sense to invest in IT just for the sake of it.
Dresdner Bank AG
Respondents within Dresdner Bank AG:
1. Mr.Ri, Head of IT/IS function, recruited in 1988 from
McKinsey & Co
2. Mr.So, Head of Strategic Planning IT, in this position
since the mid-1980s
3. Mr.Go., Corporate Staff Project Planning and Cost
Management, five years in the same position
4. Mr.Mu, Assistant Director Bausparkassen Subs.,
recruited in 1990
5. Mr.Si, IBM Account Manager Dresdner Bank, in this
position for two years, previous experience as sales
rep with Dresdner Bank
6. Mr.Scha, IBM Industry Specialist, in this position for
8 years
These respondents were confronted with the following list
of guestions. Each respondent generally answered only a
subset of the questions depending on his experience and
nature of the job. The aggregated insights gained are
presented in the attached tableau.
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1. Strategy and Marketing - Retail banking
1. What is the general corporate/marketing strategy
towards nonbank competitors ? Towards insurers,
thrifts, retailers, and credit card organisations ?
A1. Nonbank competitors, predominantly insurers and
Bausparkassen, increasingly diversified into
traditional banking business throughout the previous
decade. Dresdner Bank responded to these movements by
(a) building up closer relations with our traditional
partner Allianz AG, and (b) by founding a Bausparkasse
subsidiary. Retailers and independent credit card
organisations were not regarded as severe competitors.
2. When did the market-entry occur ?
A2. Insurers' market-entry occurred in 1985, and
independent Bausparkassen entered the retail banking
market in 1986. The other two nonbank competitors came
later in 1987.
3. Could you please comment on the event (and date
shown)?
A3. The entry dates given and the related nonbank services
seem to be correct. Our analyses came to similar
results.
4. What effect did the market-entry have on the
organisation and the product line affected ?
A4. Dresdner Bank, like the other large German clearers,
felt slackening growth in our classical deposit
business, such as various types of savings accounts,
particularly in the years 1986-87.
5. Why did the market-entry occur ?
A5. There exists a variety of reasons for individual types
of nonbanks to enter the retail banking market. Among
the most important is certainly the traditionally
stable profit margins in retail banking services,
problems in their own industry, such as the declining
housebuilding market that affected the Bauspar
business in the mid-1980s, and the move among many
contenders of the financial services industry towards
the provision of All-finance services.
Apart from the more general reasons, there were
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nonbank-specific reasons, such as insurers' ambition
to broaden their refinancing base on the back of the
commercial banking industry. Retailers attempted to
provide merchandise, consumer credit, and insurance
services out of one hand, whereas credit card
organisations intended to steal away a large market
share of the slowly developing card market in Germany
in the late 1980s.
6. What are the characteristics of the nonbank
competitor; advantages/weaknesses ? In relation to
your own organisation ?
A6. Retailers and independent credit card institutions
hardly possess substantial advantages over banks.
Retailers merely attempted to imitate Sears Roebuck's
financial services concept by issuing store cards (ie
Kaufhof card) and offering credit services. However,
retail organisations do not have the credibility to
attract away bank customers. In addition, the German
market is still very much cash and eurocheque-oriented
which also represents a significant entry barrier for
credit card organisations, such as American Express.
Furthermore, Dresdner Bank, like the other large
commercial banks, created the Eurocard in 1977/78,
which we significantly pushed in 1990. With regard to
insurers and independent Bausparkassen, their major
advantage is the fast distribution channel for new
financial services compared to our relatively
inflexible branch outlets. On the other hand, we
certainly have a customer loyalty advantage.
7. What was the market penetration strategy applied by
the nonbank competitor ?
A7. Insurance organisations penetrated the market by
issuing capital creating life insurance policies via
their aggressive salesforce. They also took over
established banks and thereby started to attract away
revenues from the banking industry. Independent
Bausparkassen, such as Wiistenrot and BHW, also
developed into financial services conglomerates by
acquiring or setting up banking subsidiaries. Retail
organisations created in-store financial centres
offering short-term consumer credit and insurance
services. They formed cooperation agreements with
insurers and hired fully trained bankers to staff
these centres. They also issued specific store cards,
such as the Kaufhof or Hertie card. American Express,
diversified from the traditional T & E market segment
into the mass-market for credit cards by issuing
various credit cards with different features.
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8. What, if any, changes would you expect regarding
nonbank competition in the various product lines ?
A8. Due to our standing in the marketplace, the nationwide
branch network, and the responses to attacks from
nonbank competitors throughout the second half of the
1980s and the beginning of this decade, nonbank
competition is not expected to grow in the near
future.
9. Did your organisation regard the market-entry as
significant ? If so, why ?
A9. Only the market-entry of insurers and Bausparkassen
were regarded as significant because of their
potential to harm our refinancing base. Retailers and
credit card organisations were perceived as weak
competitors. This is true because of the nature of the
German card market and the scope of service provision
of our branch outlets.
10. Could you describe the competitive relation between
nonbank competitor and your organisation. Is it weak
or strong ? Please specify.
A10. The competitive relation between American Express,
retail organisations and Dresdner Bank was weak
throughout the previous decade. On the other hand, the
competitive relation between our organisation and
insurers and Bausparkassen developed into a strong
competitive relation during the second half of the
1980s.
11. What was your organisation's strategic response ?
All. Dresdner Bank chose to broker the products of existing
insurance companies and in due course formed a close
strategic alliance with Allianz AG. With regard to the
Bauspar business, we decided to establish our own
subsidiary.
12. When did the strategic response happen ?
A12. We began to intensify the relation with Allianz in
1987, which ended up in an agreement in 1989,that
Allianz developed into our exclusive supplier of
insurance services. The Bauspar subsidiary was founded
in 1990.
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13. Could you please specify the business activities
undertaken ?
A13. The main business activities undertaken were of an
integrative nature. The Bauspar subs, had to be
installed from scratch, including all administrative
and IT related functions. The activities concerning
the Allianz cooperation encompassed system integra¬
tion, distribution channel selection, staff training,
and related incentive scheme developments.
14. What changes, if any, were reguired within your
organisation ?
A14. A transformation process was started that incremen¬
tally changed the typical bank teller into an more
marketing-oriented sales person of banking products
and various other financial services.
2. IT Strategy, role, development, and cost
1. How would you regard the role of IT/IS within the
banking industry ? Within retail banking ?
Al. Information technology is the engine that keeps a
commercial bank going, especially in retail banking.
If one looks at the recent developments in electronic
banking services, such as self-service banking, the
significance of IT is obvious.
2. IS/IT - importance in your organisation ? Position in
the organisation ? Likely development ?
A2. IT has increasingly gained higher importance within
Dresdner Bank during the previous decades. The head of
the IT/IS function reports directly to the executive
responsible for organisation and related banking
services.
3. How has IS/IT changed the relationships with your
business partners ?
A3. Before the Bauspar subsidiary was established, and the
close link-up with Allianz was in place, there were
hardly any IT connections with business partners. Both
strategic movements, however, meant the implementation
of advanced program-to-program communications and all
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related physical tasks between the partners or between
the subsidiary and the parent company.
4. What are current IT strategies in your organisation ?
A4. Dresdner Bank has started to redesign its entire IT
architecture based on relational structures and
enterprise-wide data modelling.
5. Could you describe the IT strategy of your
organisation throughout the 1980s ?
A5. One of our major objectives was to further enhance the
productivity of our back office functions through the
implementation of state-of-the-art central computer
power. In addition, Dresdner Bank attempted relatively
early to implement a nationwide electronic banking
concept, that is primarily self-service banking
facilities, in its branches.
6. How did your organisation respond in terms of IT to
the market-entry of nonbank competitors ?
A6. With regard to the market-entry of Bausparkassen, we
de novo established a Bauspar subsidiary. This meant
the complete build up of a functionable IT infrastruc¬
ture and the connection of this infrastructure with
our central DP centre in both physical communications
and application-wise. Similarly, a connection with
Allianz had to be realised. We also needed more
decentralised computer power in the branches in order
to cope with the increased variety of financial
services. The number of PCs devoted to financial
services in the retail banking function of the bank
grew significantly between 1987-91. In 1987, they grew
by 55 %, in 1988 by 44 %, in 1989 again by 33 %, and
in 1990, as well as in 1991 by 27 %.
7. When, if ever, did the response occur ?
A7. Dresdner Bank built the close relation with Allianz in
1989, and founded its Bauspar subsidiary in 1990. We
did not respond to the market-entry of retailers or
independent credit card organisations throughout the
previous decade.
8. Could you please specify as detailed as possible what
IT activities were performed directly attributable to
the market-entry of a nonbank competitor ?
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A8. With regard to the establishment of the Bauspar
subsidiary, Dresdner Bank needed to be fast. Hence, an
already existing Bauspar system was purchased and
subsequently modified from the Landesbausparkasse
Kiel. This included extensive redesign and programming
activities. Additionally, sufficient computing power
and storage facilities had to be reserved on the
central CPU of the parent. Finally, communication
links between the subsidiary and the parent were
installed. Similarly, communication links, data
extraction, bridge and matching programs between the
central customer management systems of Allianz and
Dresdner Bank had to be implemented.
Our point-of-sale banking activities were negligible.
Throughout the previous decade, there was no standard
carrier technology available, the prices for POS
equipment were very high, and the GZS did all project
work. The card services for both EC cards and
Eurocards were also covered by the GZS. Hence, only
recently, in 1990, we started to develop our own in-
house card processing system.
9. What were the cost of these IT activities ?
A9. We cannot provide a list showing the cost of these
individual IT activities because of the
confidentiality of this data.
10. What was the development (size) of the IT budget
devoted to retail banking in your organisation ?
A10. On an averaged base, the IT budget was steadily
growing over the past decade.
11. Is the aggregated sum of the IT cost directly
attributable to the market-entry of a nonbank
competitor - in the year of the strategic response -
bigger than 20 % of the IT budget devoted to retail
banking in that year ?
All. With regard to Dresdner Bank's strategic response to
insurers in 1989, and Bausparkassen in 1990, the
aggregated sum of IT cost directly attributable to the
market-entry in these years, was bigger than twenty
percent. The cost concerning POS and card services
were much less.
12. Would you regard a change in technology as the main
driver for a change in the IT strategy ?
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Respondents within Commerzbank AG:
1. Mr.Lu, Head of Market Analysis, in this position since
1987, previous experience in retail banking services
and IT planning with Commerzbank
2. Mr.La, Head of Application Development, 7 years in
this position
3. Mrs.Te, Product Management POS and Card business,
recruited in 1988
4. Mr.Ges, IBM account Manager Commerzbank, in the
position for 5 years
5. Mr.Scha, IBM Industry Specialist, in this position for
8 years
These respondents were confronted with the following list
of guestions. Each respondent generally answered only a
subset of the guestions depending on his experience and
nature of the job. The aggregated insights gained are
presented in the attached tableau.
1. Strategy and Marketing - Retail banking
1. What is the general corporate/marketing strategy
towards nonbank competitors ? Towards insurers,
thrifts, retailers, and credit card organisations ?
Al. Commerzbank has formed strategic alliances in the
insurance business with Deutsche Beamtenversicherung
AG, and in the Bausspar business with Leonberger
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Bausparkasse. Retailers and independent credit card
organisations were not regarded as critical
competitors in the interval 1980-90.
2. When did the market-entry occur ?
A2. Insurance organisations entered the retail banking
market in 1985, and Bausparkassen followed a year
later. Retailers and credit card organisations
attempted to do the same thing, but never really got
off the ground.
3. Could you please comment on the event (and date
shown)?
A3. Yes, according to my memory these are the correct
services and entry dates.
4. What effect did the market-entry have on the
organisation and the product line affected ?
A4. Commerzbank was faced with deteriorating growth
figures in its deposit business in the last third of
the previous decade which was caused by increased
competition in the retail banking market segment.
5. Why did the market-entry occur ?
A5. These nonbank competitors were attracted by commercial
banks' steady growth in retail banking. They wanted to
participate in this growth potential. They also
identified similarities in the provision of typical
retail banking services and for instance insurance
policies or Bauspar contracts. Finally, a reason for
credit card organisations or retailers was certainly
the relatively weak engagement of the commercial
banking industry in the card business.
6. What are the characteristics of the nonbank
competitor; advantages/weaknesses ? In relation to
your own organisation ?
A6. Insurers and Bausparkassen are much more flexible in
introducing new financial services due to their mobile
salesforce. Their staff is also well trained and
experienced. We, in turn, do have close relations with
our customers, and also traditionally have a good
reputation as banking service providers. Retailers,
for example certainly have their problems in estab-
345
lishing financial credibility.
7. What was the market penetration strategy applied by
the nonbank competitor ?
A7. American Express tried to mass-market the credit card,
by diversifying from their traditional T & E business
and upmarket target group into the middle market
segment. This company also increased the number of
features on each card, apart from the variety of
different cards. Retailers intended to benefit from
the perceived concept of selling merchandise and
simultaneously providing credit for it. Large
Bausparkassen and insurers pursued an expansion
strategy by taking over banks or setting up banking
subsidiaries in conjunction with their normal
distribution channels.
8. What, if any, changes would you expect regarding
nonbank competition in the various product lines ?
A8. I reckon the large German commercial banks, by now,
are well positioned in the retail banking market
segment. I cannot see a threat of substitution from
any nonbank competitor just now.
9. Did your organisation regard the market-entry as
significant ? If so, why ?
A9. Only Bausparkassen and insurers were regarded as
strong competitors and we reacted accordingly. They
could severely harm our refinancing and first deposit
base. The underdeveloped card market, the attitude of
typical German customers to keep low levels of short-
term consumer credit, the well respected and
functioning EC-card system, all three were aspects
that influenced the perception about American Express
and retail organisations, such as Hertie or Quelle, to
be only insignificant players in the retail banking
market.
10. Could you describe the competitive relation between
nonbank competitor and your organisation. Is it weak
or strong ? Please specify.
A10. Only the competitive relation between our organisation
and insurers or Bausparkassen respectively developed
into a strong competitive relation. With regard to the
other two nonbank competitors, the competitive
relation is very weak.
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11. What was your organisation's strategic response ?
All. Commerzbank intensified the link between its business
partners, Deutsche Beamtenversicherung and Leonberger
Bausparkasse.
12. When did the strategic response happen ?
A12. We intensified the link with Leonberger Bausparkasse
in 1988, and in 1989 we had implemented a much better
link-up with Deutsche Beamtenversicherung.
13. Could you please specify the business activities
undertaken ?
A13. The business activities undertaken were mainly of an
integrative nature and ranged from system integration
in information technology and applications, over
training of bankers to sell insurance policies and
Bauspar contracts, to agreements covering the sharing
of profits and award systems.
14. What changes, if any, were required within your
organisation ?
A14. The recognition within each employee that retail
banking gradually develops into financial services to
the private customer which includes much more than
typical savings accounts and credit.
2. IT Strategy, role, development, and cost
1. How would you regard the role of IT/IS within the
banking industry ? Within retail banking ?
A1. IT is the motor of retail banking. Electronic banking
will become a key business segment in commercial
banking in the near future. Hence, the role of IT will
increase even further.
2. IS/IT - importance in your organisation ? Position in
the organisation ? Likely development ?
A2. IT is currently part of the second management level
reporting to the director of organisation and
administrative/support services.
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3. How has IS/IT changed the relationships with your
business partners ?
A3. Since the implementation of communication links, a
common user access surface, and mutual database access
facilities, the relationship with our business
partners got much closer.
4. What are current IT strategies in your organisation ?
A4. We are currently optimizing our common user access
interface among Commerzbank and its business partners,
and also started to work on the design of an
enterprise-wide data model.
5. Could you describe the IT strategy of your
organisation throughout the 1980s ?
A5. The IT strategy of the 1980s was to enhance the labour
saving automation of backoffice functions through the
introduction of state-of-the-art technology in tandem
with activities to support the customer interface.
6. How did your organisation respond in terms of IT to
the market-entry of nonbank competitors ?
A6. Commerzbank made the decision to create a close link¬
up with its business partners. Hence, the connection
and system integration had to be realised. We also had
to provide more decentralised computer power in our
branches. Thus, we equipped banking staff entrusted
with the job to sell for instance insurance policies
with laptops.
7. When, if ever, did the response occur ?
A7. Commerzbank responded to the market-entry of insurers
in 1989, and to the market-entry of Bausparkassen in
1988.
8. Could you please specify as detailed as possible what
IT activities were performed directly attributable to
the market-entry of a nonbank competitor ?
A8. With regard to the establishment of the IT link
between Commerzbank and Leonberger Bausparkasse, as
well as DBV extensive programming activities were
required. Additionally, sufficient computing power and
storage facilities had to be reserved on the central
CPU. Communication links, data extraction, bridge and
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matching programs between Commerzbank's central
customer management systems and those of its partners
had to be implemented. We also designed a common user
access surface for all partners in the network, and
agreed over standardized programming structures and
interfaces.
Our point-of-sale banking activities were negligible.
Throughout the previous decade, there was no POS
technology available, the prices for POS eguipment
were high, and the GZS did all project work. The card
services for both EC cards and Eurocards were also
covered by the GZS. Hence, only recently in 1991, when
the card market picked up, we purchased an in-house
card processing system from Hogan, a US software
vendor of credit card applications.
9. What were the cost of these IT activities ?
A9. This information is strictly confidential.
10. What was the development (size) of the IT budget
devoted to retail banking in your organisation ?
A10. The budget developed not steadily upwards throughout
the previous decade. However, on average, the budget
size showed a rising tendency.
11. Is the aggregated sum of the IT cost directly
attributable to the market-entry of a nonbank
competitor - in the year of the strategic response -
bigger than 20 % of the IT budget devoted to retail
banking in that year ?
All. With regard to the activities performed in the area of
insurance and Bauspar, the aggregated sum of these
activities in 1988 and 1989 respectively, was bigger
than 2 0 percent of the IT budget devoted to retail
banking in that year. However, the aggregated IT
expenses concerning POS and credit card business were
much less than 20 percent. They were almost negligible
during the previous decade.
12. Would you regard a change in technology as the main
driver for a change in the IT strategy ?
A12. There is certainly a relation between the availability
of information technology and IT investments. However,
I do not believe that any commercial bank would invest




1. Mr.Mai, Department Head of Public Affairs, in this
position for three years
2. Mr.Fa, Executive of Citibank Germany, in this position
since 1990; previously assignments in various
functions in the US
3. Mr.Pri, IBM Account Manager Citibank, in this position
since 1989
4. Mr.Gre, Industry consultant and project manager with
McKinsey, 5 years banking and IT experience with
McKinsey
These respondents were confronted with the following list
of questions. Each respondent generally answered only a
subset of the questions depending on his experience and
nature of the job. The aggregated insights gained are
presented in the attached tableau.
1. Strategy and Marketing - Retail banking
1. What is the general corporate/marketing strategy
towards nonbank competitors ? Towards insurers,
thrifts, retailers, and credit card organisations ?
Al. Retailers and thrifts were not regarded as strong
competitors to the retail banking business in the
interval 1980-90. Citi took over selected thrifts and
transformed them into community type branch outlets.
With regard to independent credit card organisations,
350
Citi decided to acquire two card issuing organisations
on top of its own cards, and hence create a large card
business. Due to the legal separation of insurance and
commercial banking, and investment and commercial
banking, Citi was strongly impeded to tackle insurers
and the insurance business.
2. When did the market-entry occur ?
A2. American Express significantly entered the retail
banking market in 1980/81, and thrifts followed a year
later (triggered by deregulation). Insurers attempted
to enter the market in 1985/86, and retailers did the
same thing in 1986, but never really got off the
ground (apart from their credit card business).
3. Could you please comment on the event (and date
shown)?
A3. Yes, according to my memory these are the correct
services and entry dates.
4. What effect did the market-entry have on the
organisation and the product line affected ?
A4. Citi felt strong competition in the short-term
consumer credit segment of the retail banking credit
business when management decided to strongly push
consumer banking at the beginning of the previous
decade.
5. Why did the market-entry occur ?
A5. Nonbank competitors were attracted by commercial
banks' steady growth and high profitability. They
wanted to participate in this growth potential. They
also identified similarities in the provision of
typical retail banking services and for instance the
retailing of merchandise or insurance services.
Finally, a reason for credit card organisations, such
as American Express was certainly the strong growth
potential of credit cards as the main noncash payment
vehicle that became visible towards the end of the
1970s.
6. What are the characteristics of the nonbank
competitor; advantages/weaknesses ? In relation to
your own organisation ?
A6. American Express had a long experience in the T & E
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business including extensive customer databases which
made quick contacts with customers easily possible in
light of the introduction new card services aimed at
a wider target group. Their staff is also well trained
and experienced. Citi, in turn, does have close
relations with its customers, and also traditionally
has a good reputation as banking service providers.
Retailers, for example certainly have their problems
in establishing the credibility of a professional
banking institution. Particularly, throughout the
1980s, large retailers like Sears Roebuck and also
American Express had the advantage of
establishing a nationwide network of locations whereas
the interstate banking legislation prohibited
commercial banks from doing the same.
7. What was the market penetration strategy applied by
the nonbank competitor ?
A7. American Express tried to mass-market the credit card,
by diversifying from their traditional T & E business
firstly into the upmarket target group of wealthy
individuals by providing corporate and golden cards.
They then also attacked the middle market segment
through the provision of personal cards. This company
also increased the number of features on each card,
apart from the variety of different cards. Retailers
intended to benefit from the perceived concept of
selling merchandise and simultaneously providing
credit for it (ie Sears concept of financial centres
and the provision of store and credit cards), whereas
thrifts simply started to offer substitute products
(ie NOW accounts and MMDAs) as soon as they were
legally permitted to do so. Large insurers pursued an
expansion strategy by taking over investment banks or
setting up investment banking subsidiaries in
conjunction with their normal distribution channels.
8. What, if any, changes would you expect regarding
nonbank competition in the various product lines ?
A8. I reckon that Citi is well positioned in the retail
banking market segment. I cannot see a significant
threat of substitution from any nonbank competitor
just now.
9. Did your organisation regard the market-entry as
significant ? If so, why ?
A9. Only independent credit card organisations were
regarded as strong competitors and we reacted
accordingly. They could severely harm our consumer
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credit market bearing in mind the attitude of typical
US customers to relatively high levels of short-term
consumer credit compared to for instance German
customers. Thrifts were only very local competitors,
retailers lacked the financial credibility, and
insurers were more or less out of reach due to our
banking legislation.
10. Could you describe the competitive relation between
nonbank competitor and your organisation. Is it weak
or strong ? Please specify.
A10. Only the competitive relation between our organisation
and credit card providers developed into a strong
competitive relation. With regard to the other three
types of nonbank competitors, the competitive relation
is weak.
11. What was your organisation's strategic response ?
All. Citi decided to substantially increase its market
share in the card market by aggressively taking over
two independent credit card providers Diners Club and
Card Blanche and combining it with the existing card
business.
12. When did the strategic response happen ?
A12. The takeovers occurred in 1981 and 1983. The
implementation of a centralised card management and
processing strategy was done in 1982 and 83 (Sioux
Falls, South Dakota).
13. Could you please specify the business activities
undertaken ?
A13. The business activities undertaken were mainly of an
creative and integrative nature and ranged from system
integration in information technology and
applications, the transfer of entire processing
locations, the design and build up of a new location,
to the closure of redundant card centres.
14. What changes, if any, were required within your
organisation ?
A14. Apart from the requirements that came with the
relocation decision, a major change was the
recognition at the beginning of the previous decade
that Citi had started to aggressively move into
consumer banking.
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2. IT Strategy, role, development, and cost
1. How would you regard the role of IT/IS within the
banking industry ? Within retail banking ?
A1. Citibank regards itself as a 'high-technology' bank
(see mission statement). IT is crucial for the
provision of services to consumers on a global scale,
that is what Citi intends a truly global and service
dedicated organisation.
2. IS/IT - importance in your organisation ? Position in
the organisation ? Likely development ?
A2. IT is placed very high in the organisation (on the
Board level) In Qoutron (purchased in 1986) Citi even
runs its own IT subsidiary to develop true proprietary
software and systems. This company was also targeted
at gaining a slice of the growing market of dedicated
banking software technology.
3. How has IS/IT changed the relationships with your
business partners ?
A3. Traditionally, Citi has pursued an proprietary
approach regarding major strategic movements, such as
the card business or self-service banking. Relations
with business partners, for instance Dun & Bradstreet
and Reuters, in terms of IT, therefore, remained
relatively loose.
4. What are current IT strategies in your organisation ?
A4. We are currently discussing a common technology
framework. That framework is an agreement on how
software, hardware, and communications can be unified
under one architecture. This standard is necessary to
speed up product introduction, enable the introduction
of balkanized back offices, and through the latest in
software technology, transform the bank from being a
high cost supplier of services to a much more
efficient operation.
5. Could you describe the IT strategy of your
organisation throughout the 1980s ?
A5. The major IT strategy of the 1980s was to build up the
general IT coverage within the entire institution
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according to Walter Wriston's concept of the fifth
power (with which he inter alia meant the significance
of the information function for a modern commercial
bank). According to the rapid development of the
retail banking function, decentralised computer power,
related application systems, self-service banking
stations (ie cash dispensers and ATMs), and the like
were installed in each branch in order to enhance
customer responsiveness. However, this strategy led to
the result, at the end of the 1980s, that a whole
array of independent and partially incompatible
computer systems existed, that impeded the quick roll¬
out of new retail banking products.
6. How did your organisation respond in terms of IT to
the market-entry of nonbank competitors ?
A6. Citi decided to centralize its card processing and
servicing infrastructure which developed into an
amalgamation of a variety of different card products.
7. When, if ever, did the response occur ?
A7. Citi responded to the market-entry of independent
credit card organisations in 1981/82. The bank did not
respond substantially to retailers, insurers, and
thrifts market-entry activities.
8. Could you please specify as detailed as possible what
IT activities were performed directly attributable to
the market-entry of a nonbank competitor ?
A8. With regard to the establishment of our centralised
card processing and servicing approach (which was at
least partially triggered by a change in state banking
legislation regarding the credit card business), this
decision meant significant investment in IT (hardware,
software, cabling and communication facilities etc) to
equip a completely new designed processing location.
In addition, large scale program transfer and redesign
activities of the existing credit card systems in
conjunction with system integration activities had to
be done. The individual programming tasks ranged from
credit applications, data capture, posting, and
statementing functions, to issue and credit collection
programs. At the beginning, the majority of these
applications were coded as batch processing
applications. From the mid-1980s onwards, however,
they were incrementally replaced by online solutions.
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9. What were the cost of these IT activities ?
A9. I cannot provide you with cost information concerning
this topic.
10. What was the development (size) of the IT budget
devoted to retail banking in your organisation ?
A10. In 1990, Citi spent $ 1.57 billion on IT, application
systems, and related areas such as training.
Throughout the 1980s, the IT budget was constantly
growing with a large share devoted to consumer
banking.
11. Is the aggregated sum of the IT cost directly
attributable to the market-entry of a nonbank
competitor - in the year of the strategic response -
bigger than 20 % of the IT budget devoted to retail
banking in that year ?
All. With regard to the activities performed in the area of
card businesses, the aggregated sum of these
activities in 1981/82, was bigger than 20 percent of
the IT budget devoted to retail banking in that year.
However, the aggregated IT expenses concerning POS,
insurance, and thrifts during the previous decade were
much less than 20 percent.
12. Would you regard a change in technology as the main
driver for a change in the IT strategy ?
A12. Citi has always been among the leaders with regard to
information technology in banking. This naturally
meant investment in IT as soon as it became available.
However, one cannot believe that any commercial bank
would invest significantly in information technology
without satisfying an identified business need or
because of competitive pressures.
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Chase Manhattan Bank
Respondents within Chase Manhattan:
1. Mr.Po, Head of IT, Chase Manhattan Germany, in this
position for five years
2. Mr.Ty, IBM Large Account Sales Rep. of Chase
Manhattan, in this position since 1989
3. Mr.Wa, IBM Account Manager Chase Manhattan, in this
position since 1989
4. Mr.Gre, Industry consultant and project manager with
McKinsey, 5 years banking and IT experience with
McKinsey
These respondents were confronted with the following list
of questions. Each respondent generally answered only a
subset of the questions depending on his experience and
nature of the job. The aggregated insights gained are
presented in the attached tableau.
1. Strategy and Marketing - Retail banking
1. What is the general corporate/marketing strategy
towards nonbank competitors ? Towards insurers,
thrifts, retailers, and credit card organisations ?
Al. Retailers, insurers, and thrifts were not regarded as
strong competitors to the retail banking business in
the interval 1980-90. This was due to Chase' selective
approach to retail banking. The bank focused only on
upper- and middle-income segments of the retail market
- professionals, executives, and individuals of high
net worth. With regard to independent credit card
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organisations, such as American Express, Chase decided
to create a central subsidiary, the Chase Bank (USA)
and to purchase a substantial cheque business of First
National Bank of Chicago to push its card and
traveller cheque business.
2. When did the market-entry occur ?
A2. American Express significantly entered the retail
banking market in 1980/81, and thrifts followed a year
later (triggered by deregulation). Insurers attempted
to enter the market in 1985/86, and retailers did the
same thing in 1986, if one looks at Sears' in-store
financial centres and Discover card activities.
3. Could you please comment on the event (and date
shown)?
A3. The services and entry dates identified seem to be
correct.
4. What effect did the market-entry have on the
organisation and the product line affected ?
A4. Chase' card business, the Case Visa, ran into troubles
in 1980/81. Profitability fell strongly in these
years.
5. Why did the market-entry occur ?
A5. Nonbank competitors were attracted by commercial
banks' traditional growth and high profitability. They
wanted to participate in this growth potential. They
also identified similarities in the provision of
typical retail banking services and for instance the
retailing of merchandise or insurance services.
American Express wanted to benefit from the strong
growth potential of credit cards as the main noncash
payment vehicle and the tendency of typical US
customers towards short-term consumer credit.
6. What are the characteristics of the nonbank
competitor; advantages/weaknesses ? In relation to
your own organisation ?
A6. American Express had a long experience in the T & E
business including extensive customer databases. This
competitor also tackled the same target group, the
high net worth individuals. Chase, in turn,
particularly with wealthy individuals, has
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traditionally close relations with its customer base,
and a good reputation as banking service providers.
Like other nonbanks, American Express had the
advantage of establishing a nationwide network of
locations whereas the interstate banking legislation
prohibited commercial banks from doing the same.
7. What was the market penetration strategy applied by
the nonbank competitor ?
A7. American Express tried to mass-market the credit card,
by diversifying from their traditional T & E and
cheque business firstly into the upmarket target group
of wealthy individuals by providing corporate and
golden cards. They then also attacked the middle
market segment through the provision of personal
cards. Overall, the number of features on each card
was also gradually increased.
8. What, if any, changes would you expect regarding
nonbank competition in the various product lines ?
A8. Chase, by now, has defined its retail banking market
segment very clearly. I think that interbank
competition, in our markets, will be a stronger
competitive force in the near future than the threat
of substitution by nonbank competitors.
9. Did your organisation regard the market-entry as
significant ? If so, why ?
A9. Only independent credit card organisations were
regarded as strong competitors and we reacted
accordingly. They could severely harm our retail
banking efforts, which were to a large extent card and
cheque based at the beginning of the previous decade
because of their target group definition. Thrifts and
retailers are not really competitors in our retail
banking markets segments. Insurers were more or less
out of reach due to our banking legislation.
10. Could you describe the competitive relation between
nonbank competitor and your organisation. Is it weak
or strong ? Please specify.
A10. Only the competitive relation between our organisation
and credit card providers developed into a strong
competitive relation. With regard to the other three
types of nonbank competitors, the competitive relation
is weak.
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11. What was your organisation's strategic response ?
All. Chase founded a new national bank, the Chase Bank,
which was the focal point for Chase' entire card
business and the Chase Visa Cheque business.
Additionally, Chase decided to substantially increase
its market share by purchasing traveller cheque
business from First National Bank of Chicago.
12. When did the strategic response happen ?
A12. The establishment of the subsidiary, the purchase, and
the centralisation approach, all three occurred in
1982.
13. Could you please specify the business activities
undertaken ?
A13. The business activities undertaken were mainly IT
related. The computer systems of the acquired business
and the incumbent had to be integrated. Furthermore,
the existing Chase Visa processing location was
transferred to the newly designed banking location.
14. What changes, if any, were required within your
organisation ?
A14. Apart from the restructuring activities, the whole
company had to become much more focused and customer
responsive.
2. IT Strategy, role, development, and cost
1. How would you regard the role of IT/IS within the
banking industry ? Within retail banking ?
Al. IT is not only an important means of cost reduction,
it is nowadays a critical success factor for a bank
operating in a highly competitive marketplace.
2. IS/IT - importance in your organisation ? Position in
the organisation ? Likely development ?
A2. IT is placed very high in the organisation and many
products incorporate an IT element or are solely IT-
based (ie InfoCash, Same-Day-Reporter). However, it
does not have the same significance as it has to for
instance Citibank, which tackles the entire retail
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banking market.
3. How has IS/IT changed the relationships with your
business partners ?
A3. Through investments in telecommunication technology
and networking throughout the 1980s (ie Chase
International Data Network), Chase could improve and
speed up relations to business partners, internally
and externally.
4. What are current IT strategies in your organisation ?
A4. We are currently increasing the market penetration of
self-service components and providing widely enhanced
decentralised computer power on the branch level via
PCs and intelligent workstations.
5. Could you describe the IT strategy of your
organisation throughout the 1980s ?
A5. The major IT strategy of the 1980s was to quickly
build up a high degree of terminalisation in the bank
on a world-wide basis paired with the implementation
of highly proficient internal data communication
networks. In addition, the level of automation of
routine backoffice processes should be enhanced.
6. How did your organisation respond in terms of IT to
the market-entry of nonbank competitors ?
A6. Chase decided to centralize its card and traveller
cheque marketing, servicing, and processing and
infrastructure through the foundation of a new
subsidiary.
7. When, if ever, did the response occur ?
A7. Chase responded to the market-entry of independent
credit card organisations in 1982. The bank did not
respond to retailers, insurers, and thrifts market-
entry activities.
8. Could you please specify as detailed as possible what
IT activities were performed directly attributable to
the market-entry of a nonbank competitor ?
A8. With regard to the establishment of the Chase Bank,
this decision meant significant investment in IT
ranging from hardware capable of handling strongly
increased volumes of data, optical character readers,
software, cabling and communication facilities etc) to
361
equip a completely new bank. In addition, large scale
program transfer and redesign activities of the
existing card and cheque systems in conjunction with
system integration activities of the purchased cheque
application system had to be done.
9. What were the cost of these IT activities ?
A9. I cannot provide you with cost information concerning
this topic.
10. What was the development (size) of the IT budget
devoted to retail banking in your organisation ?
A10. Over the interval 1980-90, the IT budget devoted to
retail banking was gradually growing in line with our
involvement.
11. Is the aggregated sum of the IT cost directly
attributable to the market-entry of a nonbank
competitor - in the year of the strategic response -
bigger than 20 % of the IT budget devoted to retail
banking in that year ?
All. With regard to the activities performed in the area of
credit cards and traveller cheques, the aggregated sum
of these activities in 1982, was bigger than 20
percent of the IT budget devoted to retail banking in
that year. However, the aggregated IT expenses
concerning POS, insurance, and thrifts during the
previous decade were almost negligible.
12. Would you regard a change in technology as the main
driver for a change in the IT strategy ?
A12. I think that both technological innovations and
business needs together drive the IT strategy of a
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A. Cardholder authorized and makes a credit card purchase
1. Merchant transmits transaction data to merchant's bank
2. Merchant's bank (Acquirer) transmits data to Interchange System
3. Interchange System forwards transaction data to Card Issuing bank
4. Card Issuing bank transmits crediting instructions to Interchange System;
Interchange Fee withheld
5. Interchange System credits the merchant's bank for the credit card
transaction amount net of Interchange Fee
6. Merchant's bank credits merchant's account net of Merchant Discount
8. Card Issuing bank bills cardholder
C. Cardholder pays Card Issuing bank for annual fee. principal and finance charges





Market Share of Leading German Bausparkassen
Institutions 1988 in % 1989 in
Bausparkasse Schwabisch Hall 32.12 32.39
BHW-Bausparkasse 26.81 25.96
Bausparkasse Wiistenrot 19 . 15 18 . 63
Leonberger Bausparkasse 5.49 5.43
Badenia Bausparkasse AG 3 .36 3 . 59
Deutsche Bank Bauspar AG 0. 59 0.94
Dresdner Bauspar AG — 0.06
Source: Bank und Markt. iss.4, April 1991, p.15.
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Appendix 4
Growth and Distribution of Revolving Credit in
the US 1979 - 1989
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•INCLUDES REVOLVING CREDIT HELD BY NATIONAL CREDIT CARD BANKS
SOURCE: FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, G-19 STATISTICAL SERIES





























Assets: Consumer Credit, Business and
Professional Loans, mortgages
Liab: Citi—one and B & P transaction
acc., savings, CD, IRA, IMRA
Distr.: Residential micromarkets with
related commercial hub








Distribution of Credit Cards in the US and Germany
1) Total Distribution Figures in Germany (in 1000):
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
1,650 2,150 3,430 4,450 5,560
2) Distribution by Card Issuer in Germany (in 1000):
1985 1992
Eurocard 350 4 , 000
VISA 130 1, 650
Diners 280 360
AmEx 430 1, 000
Source: Handelsblatt, Nov. 10th, 1992, p.13
3) Distribution of AmEx Card Service in the US (in Mio):
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
16.3 17.2 19.7 22.3 24.3 25.9 25.8
Source: Company Records, 1992
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Appendix 8
Deposits made by Nonbanks in Germany










Source: German Bundesbank, Monthly Report, Statistical
Supplement, vol.42, iss.8, August 1990, pp.14-15
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Appendix 9
Credit taken by Nonbanks in Germany in 1981-89










Source: German Bundesbank, Monthly Report, Statistical
Supplement, vol.42, iss.8, August 1990, pp.16-17
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Appendix 10
Total Debt owed by US Private Domestic Nonfinancial Sector







Source: Federal Reserve, Domestic Financial Statistics,
Table A44, various issues



















Source: Federal Reserve, Domestic Financial Statistics,
Table A45, various issues
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Appendix 11
US Consumer Instalment Credit Outstanding held by
Commercial Banks




1984 212,391 23 . 5
1985 242,084 14 . 0
1986 261,604 8.1
1987 278,537 6.5
1988 324,792 16. 6
1989 343,865 5.9
1990 345,132 0.4
Source: Federal Reserve, Domestic Financial Statistics,
Table A39, various issues
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Appendix 12
GROWTH OF HOUSEHOLDS' FINANCIAL ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 1960-1984
Growth Rat* Differential vis-4-vis
. Ratio to All Domestic
Compound Annual Growth Rates All Domestic Non-financial Sectors' Non-financial 8ectors'
Financial Assets/Liabilities (1) Financial Assets/Liabilities
1960/1970 1970/198C 1980/1984 1960/1970 1970/1980 1980/1984 1960 1970 1980 1984
Financial Assets
Australia 9.8 14.5 12.0 1.1 1.1 0.5 66.9 67.8 74.8 76.1
Canada 8.6 (2) 13.8 9.9 -0.4 (2) 0.6 0.4 60.8 (2) 58.9 61.7 62.6
Germany 13.5 11.5 7.5 2.4 1.3 - 44.8 55.6 62.8 62.9
Italy 11.5 (3) 19.2 19.1 1.3 (3) -0.8 1.4 57.3 (3) 62.3 58.3 61.1
Japan 18.4 17.0 10.6 -0.6 1.9 1.5 45.8 43.6 51.1 54.0
Sweden 9.6 13.7 -2.3 -0.7 52.3 42.5 41.5
United States 7.1 8.9 * 4 10.0 0.2 -0.2 0.7 78.6 79.4 77.6 79.6
Liabilities
Australia 9.1 14.5 13.5 2.0 2.5 -1.2 22.3 26.8 33.4 32.1
Canada 11.7 (2) 14.5 5.4 2.8 (2) 1.1 -4.2 14.3 (2) 17.9 19.6 16.8
Germany 13.6 15.9 5.9 2.7 5.3 -1.8 3.0 3.8 6.1 5.7
Italy 13.7 <3) 16.9 15.9 4.2 (3) -4.1 -4.6 4.2 (3) 5.5 3.9 3.3
Japan 21.3 16.5 8.8 2.1 1.8 0.3 15.9 19.0 22.3 22.5
Sweden 13.6 11.0 -0.3 -3.8 26.3 25.7 22.5
Onited States . 8.2 11.6 9.6 1.2 0.9 -1.3 29.1 32.6 35.2 33.7
1. Annual rate of growth of households' financial assets/liabilities minus annual rate of growth of all domestic non-financial
sectors' financial assets/liabilities.
2. 1961-70 and 1961, respectively.
3. 1963-70 and 1963, respectively.





Compound Annual Rates of Growth of Total Assets of Deposit
Money Banks (in current US $)
1960/1970 1970/1980 1980/1985
United States 8.3 11.2 9.8
Germany 15.2 18.2 2.3
Source: OECD, Competition in Banking, Annex 2, Table 3.3,
Paris, 1989
CHANGE IN RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1960-1984
(Par cant of assats of all financial institutions; ond-yoar)




















































































































































































































































































































































Belgium 31.0 1.2 6.7 41.8 12.3 7.0
France 62.6 11.4 1.5 15.0 9.5
Germany 9.9 0.7 0.0 27.4 25.3 36.7
Italy 49.2 1.2 0.1 43.8 3.7 2.0
Japan 5.8 11.6 12.4 27.8 42.4
Hetherlands . * 17.7 t 0.3 0.2 38.1 27.0 16.7
Sweden 20.9 2.1 - 30.9 46.1 -
Switzerland 13.0 4.0 0.8 29.2 49.6 3.4
U.K 54.7 12.4 0.2 8.7 13.4 10.6
U.S.A 84.2 14.0 0.1 - 1.2 0.5
Source: Frost & Sullivan Inc, the European Market For





Comparison of the number of Cash Dispensers, ATM and EFTPOS
terminals in Europe, United States and Japan - 1st January 1989
Cash Dispensers EFTPOS terminals
and ATMs
Countries Number of Number of Number of Number of
machines inhabitants machines - inhabitants
installed per installed per
machine machine
Belgium 844 11,763 19,118 519
France 11,457 4,862 120,000 464
Germany 7,500 8,213 8,669 7,106
Italy .' 5,700 9,958 4,360 13,019
Netherlands 1,017 14,454 1,495 9,833
Sweden 1,741 4,859 1,202 7,037
Switzerland. 1,736 3,813 1,398 4,735
United Kingdom.... 13,870 4,108 24,300 2,346
Japan. 73,357 1,674 642 191,299
United States 81,161 3-, 024 44,000 5,614
Source: Frost & Sullivan Inc, The European Market For




Large German Commercial Banks' Operating Expenses of
the Banking Business1
1982 DM Mio 2 , 604
1983 DM Mio 2, 349
1984 DM Mio 2,588
1985 DM Mio 2,959
1986 DM Mio 3 ,286
1987 DM Mio 3 ,430
1988 DM Mio 3 , 648
1989 DM Mio 3 , 869
1990 DM Mio 4,309
Source: German Bundesbank, Monthly Report, P & L -
Statements, vol.42, iss.8, 1990, p.28; also
vol.44, iss.8, 1992, p.42
This includes depreciation on IT equipment, property,
and general equipment. Personnel and other
administrative expenses are excluded.
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Appendix 17
Equipment Depreciation of US FED Banks' - District












Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Annual Report, var. iss., Stat. Annex, Table 6
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